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chapter 
one
introduction
The goals of this book
This book focuses on the practices of regulatory governance, throughout the study 
of the de facto independence of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). The start-
ing point is the observation that the current version of capitalism corresponds to 
the golden age of regulation: since the 1980s no government function in OECD 
countries has grown faster than regulatory activity (Jacobs 1999). Following an 
apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decarteli-
sation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling 
of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new 
risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a ‘new order of regulatory 
capitalism’ is rising, implying a ‘new division of labour’ between state and society 
and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005a). 
The previous mode of governance, relying on public ownership and direct public 
intervention, alongside with self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by 
a more formalised, expert-based, sector-specific, multi-level, and independently 
regulated mode of governance. 
Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent 
administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority 
delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature 
of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new actor in 
Western Europe, at least for certain domains, and they are increasingly widespread 
across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set 
up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and 
finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the 
pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data 
privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they 
are formally separated from democratic institutions and from elected politicians, 
thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability 
and legitimacy. On the other hand, even though IRAs accumulate executive, 
rule-making and adjudicatory functions, together with traditional regulatory 
competencies, some important questions about their role as political actors are 
still unaddressed.
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The argument of the book 
The core argument of this book is that ‘de facto independence’ constitutes the 
key variable for the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory 
agencies, and consequently provides the conceptual lenses that offer the greater 
analytical leverage for the examination of the practices of regulatory governance. 
De facto independence refers to the effective autonomy of agencies during their 
day-to-day regulatory action, after the delegation of regulatory competencies. 
This variable is assumed to be vital for evaluating the effectiveness of the new 
regulatory order and for appreciating the effects of agencification on the politico-
administrative system. However, despite the importance of this variable, few com-
parative studies examined the de facto independence of agencies across countries 
and sectors. Plausibly, one of the major reasons for this lack of comparative work 
is the absence of a suitable method for conceptualising and assessing de facto in-
dependence that can be used in cross-case studies. Hence, the primary aim of this 
research was the development of a systematic measurement of agencies’ de facto 
independence, with clear, precise, and adequately general conceptual foundations. 
Some appealing theoretical and empirical questions that remain unanswered have 
then been examined.
To begin with, this book investigates whether IRAs fulfil their mandates after 
the delegation of competencies and how they use their formal independence. The 
kind of relationship that they develop with their environment deserves special at-
tention. On the one hand, the analysis aims to determine whether IRAs are operat-
ing in the shadow of the administrative hierarchy, are really independent in the ex-
ercise of their day-to-day activity, or are deviating from statutory prescriptions. On 
the other hand, the phenomenon of potential ‘capture’ by the regulated industries 
will be discussed. The second step consists of the analysis of the reconfiguration 
of political power in political systems following the development of regulatory 
governance and the concomitant phenomenon of delegation of public authority to 
independent regulators. This implies the assessment of the role of IRAs in policy-
making. Finally, the accountability of IRAs will be appreciated with reference to 
media coverage of their credibility and efficiency, in order to explore the extent to 
which the news media can provide a means to control agencies that is compatible 
with their independence.
Concretely, this book propose an approach for conceptualising, assessing, and 
explaining agencies’ de facto independence in a rigorous way, which is suitable 
for comparative studies. The relation between formal and de facto independence 
will be investigated, while political, institutional, and organisational explanatory 
factors for the variation in de facto independence beyond statutory prescriptions 
will be considered. Then, the political role of IRAs is examined. As IRAs do not 
restrain themselves exclusively to the execution of regulatory functions, they may 
become potentially relevant political actors, which might influence the political 
decision-making process significantly. The empirical analysis will focus on the 
impact of de facto independence, together with other organisational and institu-
tional variables, on their ‘centrality’ in a number of domestic lawmaking process-
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es, following a structural and reputational approach. The last part will concern the 
media accountability of regulators. Agencies, by design, lack input legitimacy; at 
the same time, the direct measurement of regulatory results and agencies’ perform-
ance is conceptually and empirically very demanding. As a second-best strategy, 
the media could provide an accountability forum for credibility and efficiency. 
Again, the effect of de facto independence is examined.
Theory, data, and methods
A wide-ranging new institutionalist approach is adopted as ‘middle-range’ theoret-
ical framework. This analytical choice implies, on the one hand, that institutional 
and organisational factors are considered the decisive conditions for explaining 
political phenomena. On the other hand, it follows the assumption that the ‘three 
new institutionalisms’ (Hall and Taylor 1996) – rational choice institutionalism, 
historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism – can be integrated to 
some extent or at least used in a complementary way, rather than considering them 
to provide competing explanations. Therefore, specific methodological tools are 
required, which are in line with the ontological assumptions of the different new 
institutional theories and with the related need for combining different levels of 
analysis (Hall 2003).
The data collection procedure followed three steps. The full dataset, which was 
used for the first empirical part of the book, was selected according to the criteria 
of comparability between the organisational models and the array of regulatory 
competencies and consists of sixteen IRAs. Data sources are above all question-
naires, which are improved and validated with interviews, database information, 
and written first-hand documentation: archive sources, agencies’ reports, and of-
ficial documents from public administrations and parliamentary services. In the 
second part, in order to ensure the comparability of the politico-administrative 
systems, the analysis focuses on the six ‘most similar’ cases, relying on another 
survey inquiry and enhancing background information with secondary literature, 
written documentation, and a small number of face-to-face and electronic inter-
views. In turn, the third part offers an in-depth comparison of two ‘most-likely’ 
and ‘least-likely’ cases, in which the crucial data derive essentially from content 
analysis of newspapers.
The data analysis techniques are adequate for examining the research ques-
tions outlined above with an approach of ‘complex causation’. In the first part, 
a fuzzy-set analysis is executed, that is, a technique where the logic of causal 
analysis is based on set-theoretic relationships. Cases are seen as configurations 
of conditions, permitting a diversity-oriented research strategy, which focuses 
on exploration and discovery, by the examination of singular or deviant cases, 
while also involving the testing of multiple and conjunctural patterns of causation 
(Ragin 2000). The second part relies on a two-step qualitative comparative analy-
sis (QCA). In fact, the nature of the selected variables and the reduced number of 
cases call for the use of ‘crisp sets’, applying a Boolean logic with simple dichot-
omised values that account for the presence/absence of a given condition (Rihoux 
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2006). Finally, the third part presents a ‘most different’ comparison, where the 
potential effects of the conditions under investigation are explored by means of the 
discussion of a ‘most likely’ and ‘least likely’ cases (Mahoney 2007).
Main findings
The main empirical findings can be summarised as follows. The first empirical 
part demonstrates that formal independence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for explaining variations in IRAs’ de facto independence from polit-
ical decision makers and regulatees; instead, their life cycle, their inclusion in 
networks or regulators, and the presence of veto players have a crucial positive 
impact. The role of agencies in policy making is investigated in the second part, 
showing that IRAs are the most central actors in policy making related to their area 
of competence, more than expert commissions, organised interest representatives, 
and ordinary agencies subordinated to the ministerial level; in addition, results 
suggest that de facto independence from political decision makers is necessary for 
explaining the maximal centrality of agencies in lawmaking and that the combina-
tion of the non-professionalisation of the legislature and low independence from 
regulatees is a sufficient condition. Finally, the third empirical part shows that the 
media provides quite consistent coverage of IRAs’ activities and constitute a po-
tential ‘accountability forum’ for independent regulators.
A number of consequences of these findings can be mentioned. First, the dis-
juncture between formal and de facto independence appears critical for the study 
of the consequences of agencification, because the democratic deficit may become 
unsustainable; this problem is complicated by the fact that actors other than elected 
politicians, that is, the representatives of the regulated sector, may have an influ-
ence on agencies’ factual independence. Nonetheless, it appears that regulators are 
neither under direct political control nor systematically captured by the regulated 
industries, challenging, in this way, the core argument of the economic theory of 
regulation (Stigler 1971; Pelzman et al. 1989). Second, following a structural and 
reputational perspective, IRAs have a central role in lawmaking. This point sup-
ports arguments about the rise of an age of ‘regulocracy’ (Levi-Faur 2005a) and 
‘agencification’ (Christensen and Lægreid 2005), while also suggesting that the 
activity of formally independent regulators is not limited to the implementation of 
the delegated regulatory competencies (i.e. market supervision and technical regu-
latory functions), but that they may also exert significant political power. The third 
point relates to the fact that the news media compose a ‘multi-pronged’ system of 
control, which, when effective, can make agencies accountable without hindering 
their factual independence.
In conclusion, the degree of de facto independence, after delegation of regula-
tory competencies, varies according to institutional and organisational variables. 
In turn, it helps to explain, on the one hand, the influence of agencies in policy 
making and, on the other hand, their media accountability. These results provide 
quite a different picture of the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism than what 
is commonly assumed. Not only are IRAs’ statutory prescriptions not always di-
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rectly implemented in practice, possibly challenging the effectiveness of the new 
regulatory order and thus raising substantial concerns about the scientific and so-
cietal fascination for fancy notions such ‘best practices’, and ‘benchmarking’, but 
also, in practice, the crucial role of IRAs does not lie only in their regulatory func-
tions, but rather in the execution of policy-making tasks in their domain of com-
petencies. Therefore, the study of agencies’ political power, accountability, and 
legitimacy should be considered paramount for the research agenda on regulation, 
as in general for the study of political institutions (Moe 2005).
Structure of the book
The structure of the book is as follows. The next chapter will offer a literature 
review, before presenting the theoretical framework and the research design. 
Chapter 3 consists of the first empirical part, that is, the analysis of the de facto in-
dependence of IRAs. The role of agencies in policy making is analysed in Chapter 
4. The third empirical part will be discussed in Chapter 5, concerning IRAs’ media 
accountability as regards credibility and efficiency. The last chapter summarises 
the main findings, offers a sketch of the synthetic model, and, after a section on the 
normative consequences of independence and a very brief gloss about the recent 
trends of regulatory capitalism, presents some perspectives for further research.

chapter 
two
theoretical framework and 
analytical approach
Key concepts: regulation, agencification, independence
Defining regulation and regulatory functions
This research study on independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) is embedded in the 
broader interdisciplinary research agenda on regulation. This term requires some 
clarification. Three traditional meanings should be distinguished, which are situ-
ated at different levels of generality (Baldwin et al. 1998; Jordana and Levi-Faur 
2004). In the widest sense, regulation refers to all rules and mechanisms of so-
cial control, including non-intended actions and non-state processes. The second 
meaning is related to regulation as public governance, that is, state intervention 
in the ‘private sphere’, with the purpose of steering the economy and supporting 
a number of goals that promote the ‘public interest’. In this sense, state interven-
tion encompasses a variety of measures, such as taxation, subsidies, redistribution, 
and public ownership, in addition to rulemaking and implementation. Following 
the narrowest concept, which is the one adopted in this book, regulation can be 
defined as a specific form of governance that is operating through the promulga-
tion of authoritative sets of rules, while setting up mechanisms for monitoring, 
scrutinising, and promoting compliance with these rules. This form of regulation 
is typically accomplished through the work of IRAs.
Regulation is said to go in tandem with agencification, and the two phenom-
ena are even mutually reinforcing (Christensen and Lægreid 2005). The political 
decisions leading to liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation in the last two 
decades implied the need for re-regulating the markets, while the promulgation of 
new rules required the creation of independent regulators (Vogel 1996). In turn, 
the establishment of regulatory bodies fostered the development of new technolo-
gies of regulation, promoting regulatory governance by the state, inside the state 
and from outside the state. In this context, crucial regulatory functions were del-
egated to IRAs: goal formulation, rule making, and standard setting; monitoring 
and control, information gathering, scrutiny, supervision, inspection, audit, and 
evaluation; enforcement, behaviour modification, adjudication, and the applica-
tion of rewards and sanctions (Christensen and Lægreid 2001; Hood et al. 2001). 
Agencification also involved a complexification of the vertical and horizontal in-
ter-organisational tasks of the public administration, combining, for instance, per-
formance assessment, compliance appraisal, government audit, contractualisation, 
and oversight (Power 1997; James 2000; Radaelli 2004b). As a result, independent 
regulatory agencies are cumulating an increasing number of competencies and ex-
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erting – at least potentially – a considerable amount of public authority. The fusion 
of different competencies and regulatory powers typifies IRAs as a very peculiar 
and remarkable type of public sector organisation.
Governance by independent regulatory agencies
The development of regulatory governance in Western Europe is visibly epito-
mised by the macroscopic phenomenon of agencification of the civil service and 
the establishment or reform of regulatory authorities at the level of individual 
countries and EU institutions. From a very general perspective, the term ‘agencies’ 
refers to a variety of non-autonomous, semi-autonomous, and largely autonomous 
organisations, without clear distinction between their statutory independence, 
managerial or organisational autonomy, and other forms of bureaucratic auton-
omy. Pollitt and colleagues defined agencies simply as public organisations that 
have ‘some extra degree of autonomy’, in comparison to normal division and di-
rectorates in the core of the ministries (Pollitt et al. 2004). Agencies defined as 
such represent a very heterogeneous type of public sector organisation, which is 
increasingly common. As an illustration, public agencies, when broadly defined, 
employ more than 75 per cent of all the civil servants in the United Kingdom and 
95 per cent of the employees in the Swedish central government (Jordana and 
Levi-Faur 2004). According to a worldwide comparative study covering sixteen 
sectors and forty-nine countries over thirty-nine years (1964–2002), more than 
twenty agencies were created per year from the 1990s to 2002, and, by the end 
of 2002, regulatory agencies were identified in about 60 per cent of the possible 
cases (Jordana et al. 2007). Using more aggregate data, agencies account for ap-
proximately 50-75 per cent of public expenditure and public employment at the 
OECD level (OECD 2003). 
This study has a more specific focus: it examines IRAs, those agencies that 
possess regulatory competencies, have a specific organisational model, which 
comprises a chairperson, board and own secretariat, and benefit from formal inde-
pendence from elected politicians. Not all agencies are in fact regulatory agencies: 
some have only executive tasks; others are simple consultative organisations for 
policy makers. Moreover, not all agencies are formally independent: some are in 
subordinate relationships with public administration and ministries or are structur-
ally integrated into the ordinary civil service. Instead, IRAs are defined as ‘gov-
ernmental entities that possess and exercise some grant of specialized public au-
thority, [constitutionally] separate from that of other institutions, but (…) neither 
directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials' (Thatcher 
and Stone Sweet 2002). This definition approximately corresponds to the 'fourth' 
type of organisation identified by Verschuere and colleagues, that is, 'externally 
autonomous public organisations with their own budget, defined as legal entity 
under public law, and with a governing board' (Verschuere et al. 2006).
Western European IRAs comprise a relatively uniform universe of cases, 
which is particularly interesting for the study of the consequences of the delega-
tion of public authority, given the scope and the extension of their regulatory com-
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petences, i.e. rule making, monitoring and supervision, and adjudication and sanc-
tioning. What is more, the impressive spread of IRAs across European countries 
implies a major institutional change (Levi-Faur 2005a; Gilardi 2008) that deserves 
careful attention for its potentially significant consequences on the distribution of 
power in political systems at domestic, supranational and global level. Finally, as 
IRAs represent a constitutional anomaly, due to their formal separateness from 
democratic institutions, they are also raising a number of normative concerns. 
Therefore, after the consolidation of the new regulatory order, it is crucial to de-
velop a comprehensive analytical approach to examine the practices of regulatory 
governance by IRAs. 
The next section reviews the literature on agencification, with a special focus 
on the functioning of IRAs in Western Europe. The review is more thematically 
ordered than chronological. The first part covers research studies that illustrate 
the rationales for delegating regulatory competencies to IRAs and elucidate their 
worldwide diffusion. Second, a number of studies are presented concerning the 
implementation of regulatory governance, as well as the theoretical perspectives 
that are adopted for conceptualising and analysing the functioning of regulators. 
In the third part, the consequences of agencification are discussed with respect to 
democratic legitimacy, reconsidering the principles for securing accountability. 
By way of conclusion, the examination of some open questions is provided. Please 
note that each review is necessarily selective: here, the emphasis is on European 
empirical studies and comparative political science approaches. In addition, the 
interpretation of the contribution of some research studies may appear to be pre-
sented in an over-simplified manner. However, a certain grant of schematisation is 
useful to depict the broad picture of an interdisciplinary, complex, heterogeneous, 
and ever-evolving field; finally, the classification of different streams of literature 
has to be considered a meta-analytical tool for systematisation purposes, as those 
categories largely overlap in practice.
Origins and diffusion of the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism
Origins of the American regulatory state
The United States of America led the way early on in establishing specialised 
agencies to supervise and control the business sector and, afterwards, to imple-
ment social regulations (Carpenter 2001b). To put it simply, the development of 
the American regulatory state followed three steps: the first was related to the 
‘Progressive Movement’, from the 1890s to the 1920s; the second was a conse-
quence of the ‘New Deal’ during the 1930s; and the third emerged in accordance 
with the ‘New Era’ of social regulation in the 1960s (Moran 2002). The creation 
of autonomous regulatory bodies first followed a tendency towards the depoliti-
cisation and proceduralisation of the political process, promoting ‘the values and 
ideals of professionalism, scientific and technical expertise, administrative com-
petence and neutrality, and efficiency […]’ (Vogel 1986). Then, the priority of 
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regulation over public ownership was affirmed, with the aim of minimising market 
failures and promoting virtuous competition between business actors. The third 
step corresponded to the broadening of the scope of the regulatory state, from its 
initial economic focus to the creation of new agencies, which started to endorse 
concerns that fall beyond the functioning of markets, namely social and environ-
mental regulation. 
Origins of the European regulatory state
The concept of regulatory state re-emerged in another context. It has proven to be 
particularly helpful to defining the style of policy making exerted by the suprana-
tional institutions of the European Union (EU), namely the European Commission 
(Majone 1994b, 1996a, 1997a, 2001c). Majone argued that regulation, defined as 
‘the development of rules and regulation by independent agencies’, is the most im-
portant mode of policy making in Europe, with the purpose of increasing the alloc-
ative efficiency of markets and correcting market failures. In fact, while the growth 
of regulation at the national level must be understood primarily as a reorientation 
of public priorities, following the ‘post-Keynesian’ shift of states’ functions from 
direct interventionism in the economy to a more indirect approach, at the EU level, 
this phenomenon derives from the inherent lack of modes of command at the dis-
posal of European institutions in front of policy implementation in member states. 
Specifically, the strong prominence of regulation at the European level is due to 
two main characteristics of the European political system (Moran 2002). On the 
one hand, the tight budget limits the capacity of positive policy making. On the 
other hand, regulation is a political strategy adopted in the absence of an admin-
istrative means to implement European policies. Therefore, the Commission fol-
lowed the so-called principle of subsidiarity, by expanding European regulation, 
while delegating the competencies of implementing new policies to member states 
in a number of economic and social domains, which are predominantly regulated 
through the so-called non-majoritarian institutions, consisting above all of inde-
pendent regulatory agencies. This kind of policy-making approach, which appears 
to be very common in practice, despite the diversity of actors’ interests and the 
consensus-oriented nature of European institutions, has been interpreted as part of 
a political strategy of ‘subterfuge’ adopted by the Commission and the Courts of 
Justice to prevent political impasse and promote innovative regulatory processes 
(Heritier 1997). 
Origins of the hyper-regulatory state
The British regulatory state originates from the American experience and recov-
ers some elements of the EU ‘negative’ regulatory state, but presents a number 
of distinctive features (Moran 2003). The model of regulatory governance that 
emerged in Britain from the 1970s corresponds to an innovative redefinition of 
state’s functions in Europe, while also presenting, quite surprisingly from the per-
spective of common sense, a quite proactive style of governance. To begin with, 
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delegation to independent agencies in the UK represented the solution to the new 
challenges with which policy makers needed to cope, following the crisis of the 
Keynesian welfare state and the subsequent political decisions of privatising and 
liberalising the markets, and in line with the momentum for a reorganisation of the 
government usually designated as ‘new public management’, or ‘NPM’ (Moran 
2003). The command-and-control bureaucracy has been thus largely transformed 
into a more fragmented set of public bodies, which function in a multi-level mode 
and benefit from a certain degree of bureaucratic autonomy. These agencies re-
ceived several brand new regulatory competencies, leading to a phase of ‘regula-
tory hyper-innovation’ (Moran 2003). They were tasked with re-regulating areas 
where policy makers had decided to withdraw direct public interventionism, so 
as to prevent market failures and to sustain the ‘public interest’. In addition, quite 
unexpectedly, agencies started to colonise and administrate some vital sectors that 
were previously uniquely self-regulated, such as universities and financial markets 
(Moran 2002). At the end of the day, though the state abandoned most of its inter-
ventionist ambitions, it also acquired new responsibilities; accordingly, the bound-
aries between the public and the private were deeply redefined, or, more precisely, 
they became more and more indistinct.
The diffusion of the regulatory state in Western Europe
Regulatory governance by IRAs proliferated across Western Europe, in a wide 
range of sectors: finance, pharmaceutical products, electricity, telecommunica-
tions, environmental protection, and so forth. Gilardi examined these phenomena 
of diffusion, suggesting at first that governments have two distinct types of ratio-
nal incentives to delegate competencies to IRAs (Gilardi 2002a, 2005c, 2008). 
Governments may decide to tie their own hands in order to create credible com-
mitments and to deal with the problem of political uncertainty by securing their 
political choices for the future. However, he explained, phenomena of delegation 
are also shaped by non-functional factors. The diffusion of IRAs across Europe 
followed a process of emulation, where governments adopted such an institutional 
model of regulatory authority, as it was socially valued and represented the ‘taken-
for-granted’ solution to a given problem. These insights improved the theoretical 
foundations for the study of delegation and regulation. In fact, new institution-
alist approaches were increasingly endorsed for explaining delegation emerged, 
referring principally to two streams of literature (that partially overlap). On the 
one hand, following a sociological research tradition, drawing from organisational 
theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), phenomena of policy learning and institu-
tional isomorphism are highlighted for explaining the interdependent decisions of 
delegating public authority to IRAs (Gilardi 2008). On the other hand, the focus 
on historical legacies and patterns of national and sectoral regulation permitted 
the explanation of the adoption of different regulatory models, despite being con-
fronted with similar functional pressures (Thelen 1999). 
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The globalisation of regulatory capitalism
Levi-Faur and Jordana expanded the approach of the regulatory state by identify-
ing the phenomena of agencification as part of a global structural transformation 
towards a new form of governance beyond the state, that is, regulatory capitalism 
(Levi-Faur 2005a). The emerging regulatory order, which is characterised by ‘a 
new division of labour between state and society’, points to the proliferation and 
the growing heterogeneity of the institutional forms and the technologies of regu-
lation. Accordingly, regulation seems to increase despite efforts in the opposite 
direction, given that the rationale for the creation of IRAs seems stronger than the 
rationale for privatisation and deregulation. Furthermore, regulatory governance 
by independent agencies is diffusing worldwide, beyond OECD countries, namely 
in Central and South America and in South Asian countries (Jayasuriya 1999) 
and in a number of developing countries (Cook 2004). In particular, Jordana, 
Levi-Faur and Fernandez drew attention to the restructuring of the state in Latin 
America through the ongoing creation and reform of regulatory agencies (Jordana 
et al. 2007). Their results confirm that this process follows a contagious diffusion 
pattern, which is driven more by (social) emulation than (rational) learning. The 
authors further distinguished between national patterns of diffusion and sectoral 
diffusion. On the one hand, the number of previously established regulatory agen-
cies predicts the probability of establishing a new one in that country. On the other 
hand, the number of regulatory authorities in the same sector in other countries 
influences the probability of the establishment of new regulatory authorities in 
that sector.
Global and multi-level regulatory governance
Agencification and standard-setting. Besides agencification at domestic level, an-
other trend towards the consolidation of a transnational form of regulatory gover-
nance is identified by some scholars of international relations (IR) and international 
political economy (IPE), in which regulatory bodies are regarded essentially as 
promoters of ‘soft law’ and standard setters. Their goals and tasks are varied, as 
they combine different degrees of private and public powers at different levels of 
governance – national, regional or global – according to the policy issue and the 
institutional capacity (Abbott and Snidal 2003). As a result, agencification at the 
transnational level redefines the patterns of global authority and blurs the bound-
aries between states and markets. The provision and distribution of public goods 
is highly affected by a regulatory context that is simultaneously shaped by private 
and public actors. International agencies typically differ from domestic regulators 
because they consist of nongovernmental or multi-stakeholder organisations that 
function as global networks through the so-called technical committees, which 
usually involve experts that represent the industry at the national level, and vari-
ous types of officials, namely representing the most powerful states (Mattli and 
Büthe 2003; Mattli and Buthe 2005). One should note that certain political sys-
tems display institutional features that easily accommodate the new international 
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standards, while others exhibit low complementarities, generating competitive 
disadvantages and limited representation at the international level. Moreover, the 
global landscape of standardisation agencies is portrayed as heterogeneous and 
highly complex, with overlapping jurisdictions. As a consequence, for instance, 
large companies can choose the most suitable organisation and then switch from 
one organisation to another or proceed in parallel in different organisations so as 
to facilitate the adoption of a certain standard (Werle 2001). Following a similar 
argument, the standard-setting process is used by firms as a competitive tool when 
seeking to establish their technology or a standard that promotes their technol-
ogy as a global standard, by selecting those organisations that provide them with 
a higher level of influence either through the exclusion of rivals or by beneficial 
decision-making mechanisms (Austin and Milner 2001).
Networks governance
The literature on ‘multi-level’ governance recently examined the creation of EU 
networks of regulatory authorities, such as the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators, the European Regulators Group, and the European Platform of 
Regulatory Authorities (Héritier et al. 2001; Eberlein and Grande 2005; Coen 
and Thatcher 2008; Eberlein and Newman 2008). These developments are in line 
with the new style of network governance promoted by the European Commission 
(Kohler-Koch 2002). National IRAs are progressively included in various transna-
tional regulatory networks (Coen and Thatcher 2008) – together with scientific ex-
perts, business actors and representatives of member states, the Commission, and 
the European parliament – ideally contributing to ‘harmonisation’, ‘convergence’, 
and the promotion of ‘best practices’ through the diffusion of norms and policy 
learning. Indeed, on the one hand, networks should provide ‘as a more or less 
unintended by-product’ (Majone 2000) incentives and means to agencies for the 
development of a more effective regulatory process, given the long-term dynamic 
of cooperation among agencies and the requirement of international reputation. 
On the other hand, networks might configure a system of reciprocal controls that 
make agencies more accountable to their peers (Moe 1985). Eberlein and Grande 
examined the emergence of the European regulatory regime constituted by trans-
national regulatory networks as an informal way to support the Europeanisation 
of member states’ regulation (Eberlein and Grande 2005). The point is that even 
weak supranational institutions can be influential through the adoption of deci-
sion-making processes that are informal, horizontal, multi-layered and ‘experi-
mentalist’ (Slaughter 2004; Sabel and Zeitlin 2010). The articulation among the 
levels remains an open question, but some preliminary evidence shows that the 
network of European national competition authorities may offer advantages to 
both the Commission and national regulators (Wilks 2005; 2007). It allows the 
Commission to reduce its workload and obtain greater freedom on the use re-
sources; on the other hand, national regulators gain potential ‘horizontal’ partners 
and vertical allies in front of national governments and regulatees. Moreover, it 
has been observed that European networks have a decisive impact on the domestic 
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adoption of standards, for which the most central actors within the network are the 
early adopters (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011).
IRAs after delegation
Public and private interest theories
The early approaches to the functioning of IRAs were essentially normative, fol-
lowing two broad research agendas: public interest theories and private interest 
approaches. In the first case, the positive effects of delegation to IRAs were taken 
for granted, as regulation was seen as the solution required to correct a number 
of fundamental market failures, specifically in order to neutralise the oligopolis-
tic-monopolistic tendencies of an open economy; cut down any potential nega-
tive externalities; ensure the universal supply of public goods; compensate for 
the asymmetry of information that may pervert market operations; counteract 
moral hazard phenomena implying increased collective costs; and reduce transac-
tion costs by providing shared standards (Mitnick 1980; Jordana and Levi-Faur 
2004). In an effort to extend the theory, Bernstein argued, in his seminal study, 
that regulatory agencies might follow a life cycle from initial activism to gradu-
al devitalisation and progressive inertia and bureaucratisation (Bernstein 1955). 
Private interest tenants, on the contrary, conceive free markets as the best solution 
for maximising social and economic welfare, thus postulating negative effects of 
delegating regulatory competencies to agencies. The economic theory of regula-
tion (ET) of the Chicago school, based on microeconomic assumptions drawn 
from classic rational choice theory, offered the general theoretical framework of 
this approach (Stigler 1971; Pelzman et al. 1989). The central argument is that 
regulators and regulatory processes are unavoidably shaped by the regulated in-
dustries. Narrow and well-organised private interest groups, who detain crucial 
pieces of information, are able to ‘capture’ regulatory agencies and obtain regu-
lation in line with their interests, at the expense of the more dispersed interest of 
consumers. Elected politicians and civil servants are conceived as purely strate-
gic self-interested agents that are relentlessly pursuing their rent-seeking goals. 
According to Stigler, government officials and bureaucrats will seek to maximise 
their wealth by adopting collusive behaviour with the regulated firms, in exchange 
for some valuable goods, such as campaign contributions, rewarding employment 
perspectives, and even cash incentives. As a consequence, it is assumed that ‘as a 
rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primar-
ily for its benefit’ (Stigler 1971: 3). To sum up, both public and private interest 
approaches conceive the independence of regulatory agencies (or, respectively, 
their non-independence) as a constant that is directly derived from their postulates 
about the virtuous or kleptomaniac nature of agents, and their behaviour is seen 
as functionally predetermined, without any explicit discussion of the factors that 
may produce unintentional phenomena. Public interest theories of regulation have 
been criticised because of their somewhat idealised assumptions about the neutral 
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and disinterested behaviour of supposed competent experts who populate agencies 
(McLean and Foster 1992; Feintuck 2004).  Moreover, it has been noted that they 
fail to address the question of the inherent conflicts around the societal definition 
of public interest (Francis 1993). Similarly, as regards private interest theories, 
three other flaws can be identified. It has been noted that this approach is built on 
unrealistic assumptions on the exaggerated rationality of actors and fails to recog-
nise the critical role of organisational and institutional factors. From an empirical 
point of view, the ET suffers from a lack of systematic evidence; finally, it can 
hardly explain the beginning of an era of deregulation, even if Pelzman partially 
reframed the argument (Pelzman et al. 1989), trying to accommodate with limited 
success the developments of the regulatory state since 1980.
Institutional design
Historically, the phenomena of deregulation offered substance to a new academic 
literature that focused on the – alleged – crisis of the American regulatory state, 
starting from the works of public lawyers who pointed out the risky expansion 
from economic to social regulation, potentially leading to implementation failures 
and control problems (Moran 2002). The answer has been a renewed focus on in-
stitutional design (Goodin 1996) in order to depict the appropriate mechanisms of 
control over bureaucracy and regulatory agencies, often proposing models that are 
made operational with insights from game theory. For instance, the process of pol-
icy execution has been illustrated as a game among legislators, the chief executive, 
and bureaucratic agents to whom authority is delegated, by studying the trade-
off between administrative discretion and opportunities for oversight and political 
control (Calvert et al. 1989).  Snyder and Weingast studied how elected officials 
may influence regulation through the appointment of agency leaders (Snyder and 
Weingast 2000). Spiller investigated the strategic interactions between agencies 
and courts using a three-level game (Spiller 1998). Huber and Shipan showed how 
elected politicians can still steer the policy-making process in a context where 
electoral laws, the structure of the legal system, and the professionalism of the 
legislature shape bureaucratic autonomy and their relation with agencies, using 
a transaction cost approach (Huber and Shipan 2002). In general, the principal-
agent (PA) framework was considered suitable for defining the relationships be-
tween elected politicians and bureaucracies and for analysing the rationale for 
delegating public authority to agencies. Yet these models have been criticised for 
their inaccuracy in portraying the functioning of those particular bodies that ben-
efit from formal independence: IRAs. Indeed, following Majone, the regulatory 
action of independent agencies should not be understood in terms of a PA relation 
(Majone 1997a, 2001c). The PA model, drawing from the theory of the firm, was 
conceived for portraying a relationship in a structure where the principal should 
minimise any possibility of an agent’s shirking. Instead, the need for credibility, a 
core element of the rationale for delegating public authority to IRAs, requires that 
the agency will benefit from a factual independence in their day-to-day activities. 
In other words, according to a fiduciary mode of delegation, the principal’s pow-
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ers and competencies are substantially delegated to the independent body – the 
trustee –that is, the IRAs.
Similar models, diverging patterns
The expansion of regulatory governance and the development of IRAs at the do-
mestic level do not follow linear and constant patterns, illustrating rather the di-
versity of the actors, mechanisms, and principles that are concerned (Levi-Faur 
2005a; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005). Considerable cross-national and cross-
sectoral variation in the extent of liberalisation and re-regulation has been noted, 
highlighting the importance of domestic politics in shaping regulatory reform, 
which were usually promoted by government ministries and supported or op-
posed by sectoral interest groups (Vogel 1996). Braithwaite and Drahos offered 
a synthesis of the globalisation of regulatory capitalism through the creation of 
international regimes in thirteen sectors worldwide (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; 
Levi-Faur 2006a). They identified and investigated several mechanisms driving 
global regulation, such as coercion, reward, modelling, adjustment, coordination, 
and capacity building, and they distinguish the role of states, international organi-
sations, corporations, individual actors, and epistemic communities. The result is a 
picture of the dynamic of globalisation that follows very diverse patterns in differ-
ent countries and different areas of business regulation, showing that many forms 
of regulatory governance can emerge from the interaction between the markets, 
firms, and states in a global environment and that the globalisation of regulatory 
governance has been successful in some cases and has been resisted in others. 
They have also indicated within the general trend the existence of diverse local 
patterns through which some states have become rule takers rather than rule mak-
ers. In a similar vein, scholars of public policy and public administration argue that 
the dynamic of regulatory change is shaped by cultural and institutional norms, 
stressing the role of country-specific and sector-specific path dependence. First, 
some authors insist on national factors, maintaining that regulatory policies are 
best explained with reference to the action of national interest groups and showing 
how historical legacies matter when adopting specific regulatory regimes (Hood 
et al. 2001; Pollitt et al. 2004). Following a similar line of reasoning, scholars who 
adopt a sociological organisational approach show that analogous statutory pre-
scriptions can mean different things in different institutional contexts (Christensen 
and Yesilkagit 2005). In fact, while formal rules and institutional design are impor-
tant to illustrating the choice of an organisational model (Egeberg 1999), informal 
norms play a crucial role in determining their implementation (Peters 2001). As 
an illustration, Christensen and Lægreid demonstrated the limits of implement-
ing NPM reforms by showing that administrative reforms are generally incremen-
tal and often symbolic, although they agree on the existence of a general trend 
indicating that authority is progressively decentralised from ministries to agen-
cies (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). They also maintained that the development 
of the new agency model – more autonomous, more horizontal, and more for-
malised – is mainly driven by international isomorphism, but it varies across and 
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within countries in the balance between these three characteristics (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2005). Finally, regulatory competencies are said to overlap between 
regulatory agencies, ministries, legislative bodies and courts, in the context of a 
movement from a state-centric approach to a multi-level perspective. 
Unintended consequences
The delegation of regulatory competencies to IRAs raised serious concerns about 
the possible unanticipated outcomes of regulatory governance. First, the study 
of EU regulation as an instrument of policy making revealed the existence of 
a number of problems related to potential regulatory capture and implementa-
tion failures (McGowan and Wallace 1996). A similar argument emerged from 
the cross-country comparative analysis of public management reforms, involv-
ing IRAs and other semi-autonomous public bodies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). 
Concretely, it appears that the results of regulatory reforms may form only a loose 
relationship with the initial intentions of the decision makers, which, in turn, has 
to be understood not as the coherent product of a single policy maker, but rather as 
the side-effect of a series of partial, plural, and localised attempts. Therefore, not 
only institutional design but also cognitive limits, the diversity of political strate-
gies, and institutional inertia should indeed be taken into account to explain the 
regulatory outcomes. Wilks and Bartle’s case study of a number of competition 
policy agencies in Europe showed that agencies were created essentially for their 
symbolic significance and were not expected to be factually active for rule making 
or implementation (Wilks and Bartle 2002). However, this policy area has been 
populated with powerful actors that possess great technical expertise and can exert 
significant influence, imposing their policy priorities and regulatory interpreta-
tions. As a result, agencies have redefined their roles so as to have a real impact on 
the economy: specifically, according to the authors, the investigated competition 
agencies were able to reorient their regulatory action from a narrower technocratic 
focus on market freedoms, both escaping from business capture and replacing 
the broader criteria of public interest. In parallel, the political concerns about the 
implementation of regulatory governance pushed the development of a European 
agenda on meta-regulation. Following the Lisbon agenda, the emphasis on ‘best 
practices’ that emerged in the OECD context was translated into the European pro-
gramme on ‘better regulation’ (Radaelli and De Francesco 2007). Regulatory im-
pact assessment (RIA) became a central concern of the member states of the EU, 
however still without producing actual convergence (Radaelli 2005). In fact, even 
the development of meta-regulation seems to produce some unintended conse-
quences. For instance, due to differences in political contexts, specifically in some 
crucial elements such as institutions, territory, policy process, and legitimacy re-
quirements, the introduction of instruments that are labelled ‘impact assessment’ 
does not always actually correspond to proper RIA practices (Radaelli 2004b).
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Legitimising regulatory governance by IRAs 
The democratic deficit of the regulatory state
Besides unintended consequences, several scholars pointed to the so-called demo-
cratic deficit of regulatory governance by IRAs. The argument goes as follows. 
Democratic systems can be conceptualised as chains of delegation from voters, to 
parliament (in parliamentary systems), to government, to ministers, to administra-
tion (Strom et al. 2003). Delegation to IRAs constitutes an additional step, which 
is, however, qualitatively different, as IRAs are not directly accountable to voters 
or to elected officials (Gilardi 2008). IRAs are indeed, by definition, non-majori-
tarian and unelected bodies. As a consequence, in the regulatory state, the role of 
elected representatives is becoming less relevant, in favour of influence connected 
to specialised experts (Papadopoulos 2003), while the significance of democratic 
participation is undermined (Lodge 2004), leading to a ‘net loss’ of democratic 
legitimacy (Majone 1999; Scott 2000b). In order to compensate for this deficit, the 
legitimacy of regulatory governance by independent agencies – in the Weberian 
sense of social acceptance of the regulatory order – is supposed to derive from (1) 
the separateness of IRAs from politics and organised interests; (2) the expected 
high credibility and efficiency of IRAs, based on the assumption that they are 
more proficient in producing qualitatively better policy output than democratic 
institutions; and (3) the expected high procedural accountability of IRAs, i.e. the 
assumption that they operate in a law-baked, transparent, open, and fair way, more 
than democratic institutions can do. Hereafter, these options are briefly presented.
A Madisonian state
The intrinsic absolute value of agencies’ independence is a critical point in the 
theory of delegation to IRAs (Majone 1996a; Spence 1997). Administrative bu-
reaucracies in general and regulatory agencies in particular have been described as 
the fourth branch of government. In this sense, the legitimacy of the new regula-
tory order derives from the separation of powers, a concept that has enjoyed a long 
history since Montesquieu and the French Enlightenment to typify the modern 
constitutional state (Manin 1997; Maravall and Przeworski 2003). The separation 
of powers, that is, a system of government with the appropriate checks and bal-
ances, helps to prevent the abuse of power and guarantees the rule of law (Persson 
et al. 1997). This view of legitimacy is consistent with the Madisonian model of 
democracy (Hamilton and Madison 1788), prescribing the fragmentation and limi-
tation of the political power in order to impede the tyranny of the majority (Riker 
1982). IRAs can be considered institutions protecting some pre-established ‘basic 
principles’ from the ‘populist’ component of democracy and from the possibly 
arbitrary use of power by the political decision makers. However, the effective 
separation of powers cannot be simply deduced from the formal independence 
of regulators. Hence, in order to endorse this form of legitimacy, even before dis-
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cussing its relevance, we should primarily assess whether independence, as pre-
scribed in agencies’ statutes, really corresponds to effective independence from 
political decision makers (see Chapter 3). Otherwise, in the case of a systematic 
discrepancy, the legitimacy of the regulatory order would risk being contested, 
reducing the ‘social sustainability’ of regulatory governance by IRAs (Costanza 
1992; Kemp and Rotmans 2005; Knoepfel et al. 2007), because when they miss 
the ‘non-majoritarian standards of legitimacy’, the democratic deficit would be 
considered unjustified (Majone 2002).
Output-oriented legitimacy
The traditional argument to counteract the democratic deficit consists in the claim 
that a lack of ‘inputs-oriented legitimacy’ might be compensated by a positive 
evaluation of results by citizens (Scharpf 2000a). Accordingly, the legitimacy of 
IRAs could rely on the capacity of producing regulatory outcomes considered sat-
isfactory: this is the substantive component of IRAs’ legitimacy (Majone 2001a). 
After all, regulatory agencies are cut off from the chain of democratic delegation 
precisely with the purpose of obtaining ‘better’ results from regulatory action be-
cause, on the one hand, a certain amount of autonomy is supposed to be necessary 
for credible regulation. Particularly in sensitive, unpredictable, and globalised eco-
nomic sectors, such as the financial markets (Baker 2005), the enhanced credibil-
ity derived from the expected time-consistency of independent regulatory policies 
is considered such a crucial stake for the functioning of the system that the choice 
of an independent regulator could be considered per se legitimate. On the other 
hand, specialised agencies are expected to possess the expert-based knowledge 
that politicians and bureaucrats lack, which is indispensable to perform some tasks 
in a complex society, increasing the efficiency of decision making (Majone 2001a, 
c). Nevertheless, two major drawbacks are challenging this form of legitimacy 
pertaining to IRAs. The first scepticism is about empirical evidence: there is still 
no clear-cut evidence concerning the results of the regulatory action performed by 
IRAs. Moreover, it is not even certain that a deficit of ‘inputs legitimacy’ could be 
perfectly compensated thanks to a ‘better’ quality of the outcomes. Indeed, ex-post 
legitimacy can hardly be conceptually separated from input legitimacy because the 
positive evaluation of results by political actors depends primarily on the previous 
agreement about the existence and the framing of a specific problem, which is rare 
in practice, and because scientific expertise and political interests are often firmly 
intertwined (Papadopoulos and Benz 2006).
Procedural accountability
The literature on regulatory governance proposes a way to solve the legitimisa-
tion dilemma by providing the belief in legitimacy through enhanced procedural 
accountability of the regulatory process, namely with reference to independent 
regulators (Baldwin et al. 1998; Flinders and Buller 2006). The basic idea is as 
follows. Political actors, even if they disagree with a decision, should accept it as 
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legitimate if it was made in a way considered fair, namely if it originated from 
an open and inclusive political process, ideally based on openness, transparency, 
equal access, and deliberation. Therefore, one can compensate for the democratic 
deficit if the regulatory agencies in charge engender the belief among the relevant 
actors that procedures are appropriate. Indeed, according to some scholars – this 
solution is generally adopted by IRAs’ professionals as well – it is eventually pos-
sible to legitimise regulation by independent agencies thanks to a ‘legitimacy by 
the throughputs’, whatever the costs the decisions may entail (Stern 1997; Stern 
and Holder 1999; Lodge 2004). This corresponds to the procedural component of 
IRAs’ legitimacy (Majone 2001a). Nonetheless, once again, a double-side criti-
cism to this form of IRAs’ legitimacy has to be considered. On the one hand, ac-
countability and efficiency may conflict, undermining the underlying assumption 
that justifies the delegation to IRAs. Indeed, it has been argued that a participa-
tive and deliberative process would weaken the efficiency of the regulatory action 
(Majone 1994b, 2001a), as such a process would increase the political transaction 
costs of the process significantly. On the other hand, a minimal version of account-
ability probably cannot grant the legitimacy of the IRA to the relevant political 
actors. In fact, when participation is reduced, and legitimacy is only based on 
procedural correctness, the regulatory order will risk being considered scarcely 
legitimised, likewise a ‘weak democracy’ (Barber 2004). This puzzle is inherent 
to all scenarios in terms of procedural accountability, as stated by Sosay (Sosay 
2006). In the participatory scenario, the diffusion of power is emphasised, and the 
public involvement is improved. The management of the social complexity is ac-
complished by decentralising power and opening channels of access to decision. 
This scenario appears roughly in line with the Habermasian ideal of communica-
tive and collective deliberation. Nevertheless, apart from the criticisms about the 
idealisation of that assumption – the prospect that only certain powerful interest 
groups are actually able to influence the process, thus excluding ordinary citizens 
and looser organisation, such as consumer associations (Olson 1971) – it is plau-
sible that the participation of an increasing number of actors does undermine the 
decision-making capacity of the agency, reducing its efficiency (Majone 1999), 
i.e. its raison d’être. Conversely, the technocratic scenario presents the merely pro-
cedural way to legitimise IRAs. The instrument is the implementation of a strict 
rule-based system providing expertise in order to maximise the efficiency of the 
regulatory action. It corresponds to the Weberian process of rationalisation and 
bureaucratisation that follows the development of a complex and differentiated 
society. This scenario implies the minimisation of the involvement of political rep-
resentatives and public participation, generating the supremacy of the technocratic 
rule over democracy.
In conclusion, regulatory governance by independent agencies, although un-
contested at present, can hardly rely on a strong stock of legitimacy. Delegation 
and depoliticisation are thus quite fragile political strategies, and the new regulato-
ry order is likely to be quite easily challenged, especially in the case of a paradigm 
shift. Yet some recent trends entail new perspectives for legitimising IRAs. On the 
one hand, the emergence and ongoing consolidation of transnational networks of 
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regulators might configure a new potential source of legitimacy of regulatory poli-
cies, if these institutional arrangements are effective (Eberlein and Grande 2005). 
For instance, European networks (Coen and Thatcher 2008) – where domestic 
IRAs, scientific committees, member states, the Commission, and the European 
parliament are involved – could provide, ‘as a more or less unintended by-product’ 
(Majone 2000), incentives and means to agencies for the development of an in-
dependent and efficient regulatory process, given the lasting cooperation among 
agencies and the requirements of international reputation, ideally also making the 
agencies reciprocally accountable (Moe 1985). On the other hand, the media could 
provide an ‘accountability forum’ which is particularly suitable for IRAs, as it will 
be discussed at length in Chapter 5.
Studying the functioning of regulators: regulation in practice
The question of the functioning of regulatory agencies is becoming a central con-
cern for a number of scholars in the fields of public policy, comparative politics, 
public administration, public management, and political economy, leading to the 
emergence of a series of empirically oriented case studies and comparative analy-
sis. For instance, Thatcher and Stone Sweet focused on delegation to agencies as 
a distinctive instrument of public governance and explored the behaviour of IRAs 
after delegation in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy (2002). It is confirmed 
that functional explanations are insufficient: for instance, Britain has delegated the 
most, despite facing less problems of credible commitment than Italy or France. 
Some contextual variables, such as state traditions and political leadership, help to 
explain the diverse responses to pressures for delegation, by influencing the choice 
of the institutional model and the form of delegation (Thatcher 2002c). In another 
research study, Thatcher showed that, on the one hand, in the cases under study, 
elected officials have rarely used their formal powers to overturn IRAs’ decisions. 
On the other hand, little IRA activity against the regulatees is found, reflecting 
the idea that regulators may partially act in favour of the interest of the regulated 
industries (Thatcher 2002d). 
Nonetheless, in spite of these progresses in the literature, the study of the im-
plementation of regulatory reforms remains rather underdeveloped. Specifically, 
the literature on the behaviour of independent regulatory agencies in practice and 
their role in regulatory reforms has been described as ‘characterized by weak theo-
retical development, an absence of comparable data, little comparative analysis, 
and few empirical studies’ (Christensen and Lægreid 2005). In particular ‘the ef-
fects of administrative reforms are often promised or assumed but seldom well 
documented’. Indeed, a number of major issues in the study of the effects of regu-
latory reforms are intensely debated; three points can be considered crucial. First, 
as Verhoest and colleagues argues, contemporary research on the consequences 
of organisational autonomy of public agencies usually adopts too heterogeneous 
definitions of autonomy and, at the same time, a too restrictive conceptualisation 
and operationalisation of it (Verhoest et al. 2004). They called for a more inte-
grated approach to autonomy that should also reach a higher level of abstraction, 
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generalisation, and applicability. Accordingly, the priority consists of investigat-
ing the distinction between the de jure (or formal) independence of agencies and 
their de facto (or informal) independence, which may be considerable, thus trig-
gering the assumption of depoliticisation and neutrality of regulatory governance 
by independent agencies. Second, the functioning of autonomous agencies must 
also be analysed from the point of view of the redistribution of power within the 
political system, wherein the role of agencies in policy making deserves more 
attention, as specialised agencies possess the technocratic competencies to deal 
with complex issues that may constitute valuable political capital and benefit from 
an increasing separateness from democratic institutions (Christensen and Lægreid 
2005). Third, the new forms of accountability should be investigated further, that 
is, those composing a ‘multi-pronged system of controls’, which can make agen-
cies accountable without hindering their independence (Majone 1996b). The main 
themes of this research study derive precisely from these three empirical issues, as 
I will illustrate in detail in the subsequent chapters.
To tackle these three issues, a scientific inquiry into the practice of regula-
tion by IRAs has three main broader theoretical focal points that will be consid-
ered through the next chapters. This study first endeavours to extend the study of 
regulation, as a hybrid, multi-level form of governance (Marsh and Stoker 1995; 
Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004) to the appreciation of those elusive, slippery, in-
formal aspects that have been neglected but are nonetheless crucial for a full un-
derstanding of the functioning of regulators. In this sense, the causes and main 
consequences of the key variable for the study of regulation in practice – IRAs’ de 
facto independence – will be investigated. This implies examining whether IRAs 
fulfil their mandates after the delegation of competencies, how they actually use 
their formal independence, and what kind of informal relationship they develop 
with their environment. Second, when conceiving regulation as a public policy 
executed by IRAs (Wilson 1980), the aim of this book is to contribute to the litera-
ture on policy formulation and implementation by discussing the conditions that 
shape not only the execution of regulatory policies but also the role of agencies 
in the political process. The related questions refer to participation in policymak-
ing, and the strength of different actors in the regulatory state. The third question 
concerns the examination of the impact of the news media, as an increasingly 
autonomous actor, which can crucially shape the conduct of policy-making and 
regulatory governance, in a context of ‘mediatisation’, and specifically the extent 
to which they can act as ‘accountability forum’ for independent regulatory agen-
cies (Bovens 2007).
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An institutional approach to regulatory governance
New institutionalisms and organisation theory
Before presenting the empirical analyses, it is time to briefly depict the general 
theoretical framework. A specific analytic perspective is adopted, that is, a com-
prehensive new institutionalist approach. New institutionalism is a compound 
theoretical framework – a collection of interrelated theories, concepts, and hypoth-
eses – for the study of the relations between institutional features, political agency, 
performance, and change (March and Olsen 1984). The ‘new’ institutionalism(s) 
(or neo-institutionalism) differs from the ‘old’ because of its focus on empirical 
research, its analytical orientation, and its concern with methods and methodology 
(Peters 2005). It constitutes a relatively composite approach that stresses the sub-
stantially greater leverage for explaining political and social phenomena through 
an understanding of the institutional framework. The central concern of scholars 
from new institutionalism is not only the impact of institutions on politics, poli-
cies, and political choices but also the explanation of where institutions come from 
and how they change. Actors’ interests, strategies and ideas also matter, while 
agents and structure should be understood as necessarily intertwined, as two sides 
of the same coin (Giddens 1986; Giddens and Turner 1987). However, the distinc-
tive feature of this approach is to start from an analysis of the structures and then 
eventually focus on the ‘independent’ impact of agents, while institutional and 
organisational factors also shape the preferences and behaviour of those actors. 
Accordingly, actors’ preferences and strategies are usually conceived, not as pos-
tulates about the immanent nature of agents, but as open empirical questions, and 
are expected to be influenced by structural (endogenous and exogenous) factors 
and contextual variables. 
How should institutions be defined? The answer depends mostly on the ‘vari-
ety’ of new institutionalist theory that is adopted. However, it is possible to note 
a shared set of fundamental assumptions concerning the operational definition of 
this concept. Following a classic argument (Berger and Luckmann 1966), institu-
tions can be conceived at the most abstract level as structures that create ‘desire-
independent’ reasons for action, through collectively accepted systems of rules 
(Searle 2005). Therefore, a minimal definition of the term ‘institution’ should in-
clude the persistence of a collectively accepted and relatively durable set of rules 
that can be more or less formalised; the prospect of a partially autonomous impact 
on the political system and the political process; and the possibility of predeter-
mining the actors’ behaviour to a certain extent. 
It is crucial to distinguish between the terms ‘organisations’ and ‘institutions’. 
As North stated, the term ‘organisation’ refers to the players, whereas the term 
‘institutions’ denotes the (more or less formalised) rules of the game (North 1990). 
To put it differently, the former term consists of levels of groups as actors, and the 
latter term consists of grades of conventions or constitutions (Khalil 1995). Of 
course, the categories forming this conceptual distinction may occasionally over-
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lap, namely because organisations are irremediably enmeshed in the broader insti-
tutional framework. However, at an analytical level, organisations are said to be 
collective entities that are both distinguishable from institutions, on the one hand, 
and from (the behaviour of) individual actors, on the other hand (Scott 2001). 
Last but not least, it should be noted that the focus on institutional factors is also 
relevant for political decision makers and society at large, since it can potentially 
enlighten political reforms and offer solid evidence for enhancing constitutional 
design, legal frameworks, and implementation provisions.
Varieties of new institutional theories: towards an unified framework
Three types of new institutionalisms can be identified: rational choice institu-
tionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism (Hall and 
Taylor 1996). Here it is argued that the articulation of the three new institutional-
isms may configure a quite consistent analytical approach, which can fruitfully 
guide the empirical analysis, by offering the most advanced and comprehensive 
overarching theoretical framework, which is appropriate for this research study, 
both in terms of theoretical development and analytical leverage. In fact, much 
common ground exists. 
To begin with, the three new institutionalisms share similar theoretical founda-
tions. At the heuristic level, four main commonalities can be highlighted (Peters 
2005). First, all the new institutional perspectives share the goal of overcoming 
both the old institutionalism and behaviouralist theories, with a more analytically 
oriented and methodologically sound approach and with a focus on structures of 
interactions, formal rules, norms, and beliefs. Second, the three approaches are 
based on the assumption that institutions are the central component of political life 
and that they represent the main explanatory factor in policy analysis. Third, all 
new institutionalisms postulate that institutions create regularities in political be-
haviour. Fourth, they treat a set of common empirical questions, for instance, con-
cerning the implementation of policies, the forming and functioning of executives, 
parliaments, and bureaucracies, and the effectiveness of political decisions. At an 
analytical level, another four characteristics of the ‘unified core’ of new institu-
tionalism can be mentioned (Immergut 1998). First, one of the new institutional-
ism’s main goals is to illustrate the discrepancy between actors’ potential interests 
and those expressed in their empirical behaviour. Second, according to the tenants 
of new institutionalism, the aggregation of individual preferences cannot easily be 
translated into collective phenomena. Third, new institutional theories often focus 
on institutional biases to explain unintended outcomes. Fourth, a major common 
research interest is to open the black box of political demands and outcomes. To 
sum up, the three new institutionalisms originate from similar foundations and 
share several fundamental assumptions and scientific goals.
In fact, they have been often implicitly or explicitly integrated in many well-
known theoretical and empirical studies. At least three distinctive sets of attempts 
can be identified. (1) Mayntz’ and Scharpf’s ‘actor-centered institutionalism’ of-
fers a good example of this kind of flexible approach (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; 
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Scharpf 1997), insofar as they treat actor orientations as a ‘theoretically distinct 
category influenced but not determined by the institutional framework within 
which interactions occur’. In their view, the preferences of relatively autonomous 
rational actors, which are embedded in institutional arrangements and societal 
structures, are shaped by ‘individual and organizational self-interest on one hand 
and (internalised) normative obligations and aspirations on the other’ (Scharpf 
2000b). Likewise, the neo-corporatist approach (Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982) 
shares similar principles of explanation (Schneider 2003). The basic assumption 
is that the institutional framework shapes the action of participants in policy bar-
gaining in a way that they also integrate group or public concerns in their strategic 
interaction. That is, they combine instrumental and normative commitments. The 
complementary use of rational choice institutionalism and sociological institution-
alism is even more evident in March and Olsen’s (1989) approach, as noted among 
others by Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom 1991). According to the authors, the institutional 
setting may enable the dominance or promote the interaction between a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (i.e. human action driven by rules and practices prescribing ap-
propriate behaviour for actors in specific situations) and a ‘logic of consequential-
ity’ (i.e. the rational and instrumental action motivated by incentives and personal 
advantage); in short, political institutions deploy rules of appropriateness that 
subsequently shape the calculus and actions of rational actors (March and Olsen 
2004; March and Olsen 2005). (2) Rational choice institutionalism has been used 
in combination with historical institutionalism as well. To begin with, the ana-
lytic narrative project (Levi 1997; Bates et al. 1998) endeavours to transcend the 
traditional ‘Methodenstreit’ between rationalists and historicists (Blyth 2006), by 
extending rational choice assumptions and tools to institutional historical research. 
The purpose of this approach is to explain singular crucial events, by adopting a 
combination of inductive case studies of historical processes and deductive for-
mal modelling, in order to generate hypotheses applicable to a larger set of cases 
and generalise conclusions to some extent (Bates et al. 1998). Correspondingly, 
Pierson’s well-known notion of ‘increasing returns’ is intended to ‘provide a more 
rigorous framework for developing some of the key claims of recent scholarship 
in historical institutionalism’, with reference to the concept of ‘path dependence’ 
(Pierson 2000; Pierson 2004). This concept, which operationalises the idea that 
‘history matters’, is framed in rational choice terms, that is, as a self-reinforcing 
process where the costs of switching to other policy alternatives increase over 
time. Finally, Katznelson and Weingast focus on ‘the deployment of institutions 
as middle-level mediations between large-scale processes and the microdynamics 
of agency and action’ so as to study the intersections between historical and ra-
tional choice institutionalism (Weingast and Katznelson 2007). In particular, they 
argue that ‘many of the putative differences separating historical institutionalism 
and rational choice institutionalism diminish, or even disappear, when (we) ask 
how institutional situations shape and help constitute and induce preferences peo-
ple use to make judgements and choices about the present and the future at par-
ticular moments in time’. (3) Concerning the cross-fertilisation between histori-
cal institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, the literature is somewhat 
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sparser, but still important. Thelen quotes Katzenstein’s approach as an example 
of a comprehensive and dynamic view of institutions, considered ‘not just as stra-
tegic context but as a set of shared understandings that affect the way problems 
are perceived and solutions are sought’ over time (Thelen 1999). For instance, 
Katzenstein studied the historical evolution of international relations through the 
institutionalisation of collective norms that define the appropriateness of actors’ 
behaviour and shape their identities (Katzenstein 1996). In addition, Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer employ an open comparative methodology situated at the intersec-
tion of historical sociology and historical institutionalism, derived from the claim 
that the two research traditions display common concerns for causal analysis, the 
study of processes over time and the use of systematic and contextualised com-
parisons (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). They conceive comparative histori-
cal analysis as a potential mediator between rival paradigms, such as rational and 
cultural approaches, because the former constitutes a middle position between the 
two ‘extremes’ of a purely speculative subjective understanding and the ambition 
of deductive, universally valid theories. 
After this short review (which could be easily extended), one should recognise 
the convergence of the scope, the aim and several postulates of (comparative) 
new institutional analyses, and the concomitant use of different new institution-
alist approaches in empirical research. However, instead of building bridges to 
unify these complementary paradigms, the most common objective still appears 
to be the accommodation of the core assumptions of a specific research tradi-
tion with insights and criticisms coming from competing approaches (Sil 2000, 
2004). Indeed, hardly a single theory of action will meet the requirements for 
analysing and interpreting complex political phenomena (Olsen 2001), and hardly 
a parsimonious theory may explain everything focusing on a particular (set of) 
explanatory conditions (Hirschman 1997; Katzenstein and Sil 2005). The search 
for theoretical purity may lead to an investigation of a world that just does not 
exist, making comparative political science look like ‘an odd anthropological sect 
that imagines, theorises, and measures a world that is not there, and spends its 
time predicting the unpredictable, rather than being a progressive intellectual dis-
cipline’ (Blyth 2006). A more realistic approach would presume, for instance, that 
strategic-oriented and rule-driven action would both occur concurrently, consecu-
tively, or, to some degree, simultaneously and that unintended consequences may 
arise from the implementation of a certain policy design.
Therefore, in a problem-oriented perspective, it is helpful to ‘give peace a 
chance’ (Schmidt 2006) by adopting a comprehensive approach, without prioritis-
ing any research tradition, instead of choosing in advance one paradigm following 
non-verifiable ontological assumptions. Following Eckstein’s call for an end to 
the ‘war of paradigms’ (Eckstein 1998), this goal implies an effort to bridge old 
divisions – between interests and norms, agency and structure, qualitative and 
quantitative methods (Goodin and Klingemann 1996) – and at the same time to 
link the common ground to more general questions of social theory, such as the 
interrelationship between institutions, interests and ideas  (Jachtenfuchs 2006), in 
order to recognise interesting questions and test alternative and complementary 
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explanations, instead of engaging in grand meta-theoretical debates (Katzenstein 
and Okawara 2001). A moderate ‘analytical eclecticism’ is thus adopted in this 
research study, heading for the integration of the three new institutionalisms, con-
ceived as three parallel research traditions displaying a certain degree of prior 
compatibility and relative coherence (Sil 2000, 2004; Katzenstein and Sil 2005). 
Analytical eclecticism is a fruitful middle path between the ambition for a synthe-
sis moving beyond existing approaches (i.e. the convergence upon a new, unified 
framework of assumptions, concepts, methods, and interpretive logics) and, on 
the other side, the mere juxtaposition of competing paradigms. Rather, it con-
sists in the – quite inductive – integration of different research traditions into a 
single explanatory framework; at the same time, they can continue to evolve on 
relatively separate tracks in order to portray the complexity and contingency of 
the social world and human agency (Hirschman 1997). To do that, the distinct 
epistemological postulates underlying each research tradition should be adjusted, 
relaxed, or even suspended. Following Katzenstein, the analytical advantages of 
eclecticism are numerous: it enhances analytical leverage through the study of 
power, interest, and norms; it highlights different connections that parsimonious 
explanations dismiss; it protects researchers from taking as natural paradigmatic 
assumptions about the world; it offers a safeguard from the unavoidable failings of 
any one paradigm; and it helps making sense of empirical anomalies (Katzenstein 
and Okawara 2001).
Therefore, the three approaches can be used in a complementary way so as to 
model and explain complex political phenomena, by bringing into being a frame-
work, wherein the three new institutionalisms are each expected to portray one 
analytically distinct facet of the investigated phenomena. For instance, hypotheses 
derived from rational choice institutionalism can be adopted to draw attention to 
the effect of actors’ strategic behaviour, and namely to ‘reveal how intentional 
and rational actors generate collective outcomes and aggregate behaviour’ (Levi 
1997). Hypotheses derived from sociological institutionalism can be used to give 
an account of the relevance of organisational factors for policy outcomes and the 
importance of symbolic action for the understanding of politics (March and Olsen 
1984). Finally, hypotheses derived from historical institutionalism can help to con-
ceptualise the impact of contextual variables, showing how institutions mediate 
through time the way political actors structure the power relations among them 
and shape the goals they pursue (Steinmo et al. 1992). All three levels constitute 
a component of a comprehensive explanation in social science: according to the 
individualist-structuralist ‘bath-tub’ model of causal explanation in social science 
(Coleman 1990), the social, cultural, and institutional context influences the mi-
cro level of individual perceptions, values, and subsequent intentional actions, 
which, in turn, influence the meso level through a process of aggregation, arbitra-
tion, and mediation in particular organisations and groups, leading, finally, to the 
explanandum at the macro level (Berg-Schlosser 2003). The unity of analysis of 
this research study is localised at the organisational level (the IRAs), whereas the 
independent and dependent variables are located at the micro, meso, and macro 
levels. It remains to determine, following the empirical analysis, to what extent 
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which level(s) is (are) significant to explain a particular facet of the investigated 
phenomena investigation, and under which scope conditions causal relations em-
pirically hold.
At a methodological level, connecting the new institutionalisms requires a set 
of methods and techniques that is not only coincident with the complex struc-
ture of contemporary political science theories but also allows the researcher to 
integrate different explanatory factors in a compound explanatory model with a 
unified view of causation, while keeping the analytical levels distinct. The next 
section will discuss this point.
The possible alignment of ontology and methodology
This research study is built on the explicit choice of a ‘diversity-oriented’ qualita-
tive comparative analytical framework, which focuses on combinations of explan-
atory conditions (instead of individually independent variables), multiple causal 
paths (and not to average effects of single variables), and discovery (in opposition 
to rigorous test of pre-established hypotheses). This analytical choice also stem 
from a number of more practical limitations concerning the medium-small uni-
verse of cases here represented, for reasons of feasibility and given the availability 
of reliable datasets and data sources. To this aim, Ragin developed the qualita-
tive comparative analysis (QCA), a configurational analytical technique based on 
Boolean algebra (Ragin 1987) and its extension in terms of fuzzy sets (Ragin 
2000, 2006b; Rihoux 2006; Ragin 2008b; Rihoux and Ragin 2008). QCA assumes 
that the research environment of political science is extremely rich and that the 
connections between variables are better described in terms of multiple and con-
junctural causation (Ragin 2000). Accordingly, in-depth knowledge of cases and 
attention to multiple, singular, or deviant patterns of causation could be combined 
with analytical precision, transparency, and systematic accuracy (Rihoux 2006). 
This research strategy attempts to underscore heterogeneity and difference in kind 
and degree, using a configurational approach to social phenomena that allows re-
searchers to conceive each case as a combination of necessary and/or sufficient 
causal conditions (i.e. set memberships) (Smithson and Verkuilen 2006). 
Specifically, following this framework of complex causation, causal relations 
are decomposed in set theoretic terms (Ragin 1987, 2000). Causation can be mul-
tiple because different causal paths can lead to the same outcome. Causation can 
be conjunctural because single explanatory factors can be jointly necessary and/
or jointly sufficient for a given outcome. Within this kind of comparative analysis, 
necessity means that the presence of the outcome B always involves the condition 
A, and sufficiency means that the condition A always implies the presence of the 
outcome B. This technique will be discussed for the specific details of its applica-
tion in the methodological section of each empirical part of the dissertation.
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The analytical framework
Research design and methodology
This study takes seriously the need for aligning ontology and methodology (Hall 
2003). Following the paradigm of ‘unity amid diversity’ (Gerring 2001), this book 
does not oppose case-oriented and variable-oriented research. Rather, it combines 
different techniques within a single logic of complex causation, in line with the 
conceptual foundations of the theoretical framework. As regards data collection, 
the present research relies upon survey inquiries, face-to-face semi-directed in-
terviews, archives and electronic databases. Pertaining to data analysis, different 
techniques are employed in a complementary manner: crisp-set QCA analysis, 
fuzzy-set analysis, social network analysis, the actor-process-event scheme, and 
content analysis. Empirically, this book sheds light on the practices of regulation 
through a focal point: the de facto independence of IRAs from elected politicians 
and regulated industries. This question appears to be essential not only for the 
understanding of the implications of the recent spread of regulatory capitalism 
but also for the study of the dynamics of the global political economy and the 
challenges to democracy these transformations entail. In addition to the academic 
interest of this research, the improvement of the understanding of the functioning 
of IRAs may be relevant for the public at large. Indeed, political decision makers 
are delegating a number of crucial competences to independent regulators, which 
benefit from public authority without being elected by the people or directly man-
aged by elected representatives. In this context, the practices and performance of 
agencies are still obscure and little known. With reference to these developments, 
elected politicians, their representatives in international and supranational organi-
sations, and, above all, citizens would benefit from a more precise understanding 
of these evolutions, which refer to the substance of democracy and the significa-
tion of political representation.
Research questions
To endorse the concerns outlined above, this book starts from a series of ‘problem-
driven’ questions about the functioning of IRAs, which will be translated into a set 
of middle-range theoretical questions in the form of testable hypotheses.
 – Do IRAs fulfil their mandates after the delegation of competencies? 
 – Which factors shape the implementation of their formal independence? 
 – How do IRAs use their independence? 
 – What kind of relationship do they develop with their environment? 
 – Are they really independent in their routine?
 – Or are they operating in the shadow of the administrative hierarchy? 
 – Are they deviating from the statutory prescriptions? 
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 – Are they captured by the regulated industries? 
 – Who is involved in the regulatory process? 
 – Which are the key political actors in the regulatory state? 
 – How far do agencies influence the political decision-making processes? 
 – What are the outcomes of the activity of regulation? 
 – Do IRAs improve decision-making?
 – Can IRAs be(come) accountable?
All these questions are crucial to understand the meaning, significance, and 
implications of the new order of regulatory capitalism. To tackle this question, the 
line of attack developed in this book is the study of the distinctive characteristic 
of IRAs, that is, their factual independence. Specifically, the main goal of the 
present inquiry is to discover what is shaping the de facto independence of regula-
tory agencies and investigate its consequences on their role in policy making and 
accountability. It is worth noting that a crucial point that has received, until now, 
little systematic attention in the European literature on regulation will be specifi-
cally examined, that is, the relationship between IRAs and actors other than the 
political decision makers, and namely those being regulated.
The structure of the empirical analysis
The structure of the empirical analysis is threefold. The first part illustrates and 
explains the variation of de facto independence of IRAs, beyond statutory pre-
scriptions. The second studies the role of IRAs in the domestic policy-making 
processes, according to different levels of de facto independence and controlling 
for a set of contextual variables. The third examines the accountability of IRAs by 
investigating the link between their factual independence and their media evalua-
tion, in terms of credibility and efficiency. It follows that de facto independence, 
the key variable of the dissertation, is the ‘dependent variable’ in the first part of 
my research, while it is one of the ‘independent variables’ of the second and third 
parts (see Figure 2.1).
(i) Explaining de facto independence. There are arguments according to which 
de facto independence could be different from statutory prescriptions. 
Indeed, while formal rules are important, they only partially portray the 
functioning of agencies, and the institutional framework allows them a cer-
tain amount of discretion. More precisely, prescriptions concerning inde-
pendence, which are written in the constitutions of agencies, represent the 
intentions of the political decision makers, in the context of the structural, 
functional, and strategic pressures for developing a formally independent 
organisational model of agencies. On the contrary, the notion of de facto 
independence characterises the effective independence of agencies during 
their day-to-day regulatory action. The complex relations between de facto 
and formal independence are examined with a cross-national, cross-sectoral 
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comparison of sixteen Western European IRAs using fuzzy-set analysis. 
Organisational and institutional explanations are discussed.
(ii) The effect of de facto independence on the role of agencies in policy making. 
IRAs are relatively new powerful actors intervening in the political process 
at different stages, specifically rule making, monitoring, adjudication and 
sanctioning. In addition, they often initiate national legislative procedures, 
participate in pre-parliamentary consultations, and are integrated into 
parliamentary commissions. However, the impact of agencies on domestic 
policy making has hardly been studied. The role that IRAs play in a number 
of political decision-making processes is thus made operational and then 
examined, with special attention to the impact of de facto independence. 
(iii) The media accountability of agencies. IRAs were officially established 
as the instruments of a technocratic approach, which lacks democratic 
legitimacy, in order to reconcile the credibility of the regulatory order with 
the efficiency of policy making. Here, the focal point is to see to what 
extent can the news media function as an accountability forum, eventually 
enhancing IRAs’ legitimacy, by providing a consistent evaluation of their 
official goals in terms of credibility and efficiency.
Analytical scope and levels of analysis
As this research study is built on a comprehensive theoretical framework, it is nec-
essary to develop a model for connecting the levels of analysis, whereby the three 
new institutionalisms play a complementary role in explaining social phenom-
ena. Accordingly, rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, 
and historical institutionalism should not be considered competing theories, but as 
partially overlapping research traditions that could bring into being a multifaceted 
explanatory model, wherein each one ideally portrays a distinctive component. 
Before presenting the model, it is worth reminding that the present research starts 
from organisations as units of analysis (the IRAs), while the crucial variable (the 
agencies’ de facto independence) is epistemologically located at the meso level, 
and other explanatory variables are situated at the micro, meso, and macro levels.
Part I concerns the examination of the (micro-meso-macro) causes of a certain 
effect at the meso level (i.e. the causes of the de facto independence). This neces-
sitates the following: the specification of the context shaping actors’ perceptions/ 
beliefs/preferences; the identification of the strategies driving actors’ behaviour; 
and the examination of the logic of aggregation of actions at the meso level of 
the organisation. Parts II and III consist of the investigation of the (macro) conse-
quences of a certain cause at the meso level (i.e. the consequences of the de facto 
independence). This requires the study of how this variable interacts with other 
meso factors, aggregating actors’ strategic decisions, which are, in turn, mediated 
by their perceptions/ beliefs/ preferences, within the contextual structure that of-
fers them a range of opportunities and constraints, while accounting for implemen-
tation problems and unintended consequences for the outcomes. The thorough ap-
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plication of this ‘bathtub-like’ explanation (Coleman 1990; Berg-Schlosser 2003) 
entails the matching of all the three new institutionalisms by adopting a configura-
tional approach where the explanatory factors may be regarded as complementary.
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Summary
The delegation of public authority and regulatory competencies from govern-
ments, ministries and public administrations to formally independent regulatory 
agencies (IRAs) entails a pressing question regarding the effectiveness of their in-
dependence. This chapter examines the relation between formal independence, as 
prescribed in the constitutions of agencies, and de facto independence, as exerted 
in practice in their day-to-day regulatory routine. To this end, it conceptualises 
and assesses the de facto independence of IRAs, and discusses organisational, 
institutional, and political factors for explaining its possible divergence from for-
mal independence. The complex relations between these two conditions are exam-
ined with a cross-national, cross-sectoral comparison of sixteen Western European 
IRAs, using fuzzy-set analysis. The results show that formal independence is nei-
ther a necessary nor a sufficient condition for explaining variations in the de facto 
independence of IRAs. Other factors, such as the life cycle of agencies, veto play-
ers, and networks of agencies, have a decisive impact.
Towards the study of de facto independence
The tasks of political decision makers are being profoundly reshaped in Western 
countries. Governments and bureaucracies are increasingly delegating regulatory 
competencies to formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), which now 
represent the main institutional feature of the ‘new global order of regulatory capi-
talism’ (Levi-Faur 2005a; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005).  The shift of power in 
favour of these bodies is quantitatively impressive and qualitatively relevant. They 
have proliferated across countries and sectors, becoming the taken-for-granted, 
preformatted answer to a wide range of regulatory problems (Gilardi 2005c). IRAs 
are officially designed to improve the credibility and efficiency of policy making 
by insulating it from the short-term pressures of the political cycle, while also 
providing specialised, supposedly neutral technical expertise to policy makers. In 
this sense, the phenomenon of delegation to IRAs is conceptualised by new public 
management (NPM) tenants as a technocratic procedure for managing ‘complex’ 
political systems through depoliticisation and the use of technical knowledge. 
However, a number of fundamental questions about the consequences of delega-
tion to IRAs are still unanswered, first and foremost concerning the effectiveness 
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of their independence.1 To be precise, we still lack clear, comparative, systematic 
evidence concerning the factual independence of IRAs.
Are IRAs truly independent? In theory, delegation to factually independent 
regulators is the precondition for reliable, high-quality regulation. Therefore, 
the transfer to IRAs of ‘political property rights’ – regulatory competencies and 
regulatory powers – is required, according to a ‘fiduciary mode of delegation’ 
(Majone 2001c). In fact, delegation to an ‘agent’ who simply executes the orders 
of the ‘principal’ cannot enhance decision-making credibility. At the same time, 
the ‘trustor’ can transfer its powers to the ‘trustee’ but not its democratic legiti-
macy, locating the process of delegation to IRAs outside the chain of democratic 
delegation (Strom et al. 2003). As a consequence, regulatory governance by IRAs 
involves a ‘net loss of legitimacy’ for the political system (Majone 2005). In this 
context, the question of the effective implementation of this mode of delegation 
is particularly relevant and should constitute the first step of an inquiry into the 
practices of regulatory governance, before any investigation of the consequences 
of delegation. Any prospective lack of IRAs’ factual independence from elected 
politicians is likely to be contested by those being regulated, especially in the case 
of outcomes perceived as adverse by the stakeholders, reducing the social sustain-
ability of regulatory governance. It is also possible that some political actors will 
challenge the extant regulatory order because its ‘democratic deficit’ would be 
perceived as unjustified. Conversely, in the case of unanticipated higher independ-
ence and lower accountability, uncontrolled agencies may develop their own strat-
egies and reroute the mandated goals of delegation, overruling the will of elected 
politicians, reframing the definition of ‘public interest’ according to their organisa-
tional logic, and risking being captured by the regulated industries (Braun 2002). 
Endorsing these analytical and normative concerns, this chapter explores the 
conceptual and empirical relations between formal independence, as prescribed in 
the constitutions of agencies, and de facto independence, as exerted in practice, 
and examines whether, to what extent, and under which conditions the two types 
of independence may diverge from each other. The structure of the chapter is as 
follows. First, I propose a way to conceptualise the distinction between formal 
and de facto independence. Then, I present a theoretical discussion of factors that 
may influence agencies’ de facto independence, and I develop hypotheses about 
variations in de facto independence, illustrating why it can be expected to differ 
from formal independence. Next, I discuss data and methods before testing my 
theoretical expectations on sixteen Western European regulators using a fuzzy-set 
analysis technique. Results and conclusions follow. The main insight is that formal 
independence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for explaining the de 
facto independence of agencies, and the divergence from statutory prescriptions 
reflects a significant range of organisational and institutional conditions.
1 The criterion of effectiveness assesses the extent to which a process (here, the delegation of 
competencies to IRAs profiting from formal independence) actually delivers its intended result 
(i.e. the implementation of a regulatory order that is factually independent from the elected politi-
cians and from those being regulated) (Blühdorn 2006).
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Conceptualising the de facto independence of IRAs
There are several definitions of organisational ‘autonomy’ (Verhoest et al. 2004), 
but not many concern the more precise notion of ‘independence’, and very few 
specifically treat the problem of its effectiveness. It is worth noting that a certain 
degree of vertical and/or horizontal organisational separation and bureaucratic dis-
cretion is a characteristic of all branches of government and civil service, that is, 
ministerial departments, executive agencies, expert committees, advisory boards, 
extra-parliamentary commissions, street-level services, and so forth. In fact, the 
study of bureaucratic autonomy is an old concern for political scientists, especial-
ly for US students of bureaucracy and the congress. The autonomy of executive 
agencies from elected officials has been depicted by rational choice institutional-
ists as a strategic game, which includes decisions over the initial delegation of 
authority, the range of choices of policy alternatives, and the opportunities for 
oversight and control (Calvert et al. 1989). Typically, bureaucratic autonomy can 
emerge from dynamic systems in which imperfectly informed participants – the 
agency board, its staff, the legislature, the executive, the courts, and the stake-
holders – adapt to one another’s decisions over time, accommodating thus a het-
erogeneous array of results (Moe 1985). In addition, the importance of agencies’ 
autonomy was emphasised when investigating the balance of power between the 
parliament and the bureaucracies, indicating that politicians concede less policy 
discretion when the level of conflict increases or their legislative capacity grows 
(Huber and Shipan 2002). 
On the other hand, following a historical-organisational perspective, executive 
agencies’ autonomy can be conceived as a social relation shaped by reputational 
factors (Carpenter 2001b). Accordingly, public sector organisations gain supple-
mentary autonomy when they are able to develop politics of legitimacy, which are 
socially rooted, politically forged, and grounded in agencies’ capacity, involving 
networking and coalition building. In this context, autonomous bureaucracies are 
expected to be able to materially reorient and command public policies designed 
by elected authorities (Carpenter 2002a). However, in both cases, the conceptu-
al foundations of effective autonomy remained quite implicit. At a later stage, 
European scholars of public administration and public management adopted sev-
eral typologies to systematise the multiple definitions of organisational autonomy, 
proposing different conceptualisations, operationalisations, and measurements 
(Verhoest et al. 2004). In their extensive review, Verhoest and colleagues drew 
inspiration from previous research to pinpoint six basic alternative and comple-
mentary conceptions of autonomy (Verhoest et al. 2004). 
Managerial autonomy occurs when agencies possess important decision-mak-
ing competencies concerning the choice and use of their financial, human, and 
organisational resources. Policy autonomy relates to the extent to which agencies 
can make decisions about the procedures to reach external goals, policy imple-
mentation instruments, target groups and, at the higher level of autonomy, the 
social aims of regulation. Structural autonomy indicates how far the agency is 
separated from hierarchical governmental pressures, for which relevant factors are 
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the appointment procedure, accountability requirements, and the direct political 
influence of government on board members. Financial autonomy derives from the 
agencies’ funding procedure, namely distinguishing between government sources 
and internal sources, and between fixed or variable revenues. Legal autonomy is 
conceived as the degree to which statutory prescriptions can prevent the govern-
ment from changing agencies’ decisions or reallocating agencies competencies. 
Finally, interventional autonomy, according to the authors cited above, refers to 
the extent to which the agency is bounded or not by accountability requirements, 
performance evaluation, impact assessment, and audit duties with respect to regu-
latory outcomes and to (the lack of) restrictions concerning possible sanctions and 
external interventions. Three further, partially overlapping, distinctions should be 
added: first, internal autonomy referring to the organisational structure should be 
distinguished from external autonomy towards its environment (Bouckaert and 
Verhoest 1999). Second, organisational and managerial autonomy could be com-
bined into a single notion, while the latter could be defined separately from finan-
cial autonomy (Pollitt et al. 2004). Finally, Lægreid and colleagues conceived 
strategic autonomy as the possibility for agencies to formulate their own goals 
and objectives, while operational autonomy represents the room for manoeuvring 
when determining the use of policy instruments and resources (Lægreid et al. 
2006b). However, once again, as Pollitt and Bouckaert maintained in their very 
widely cited textbook, the effects and implications of the formal structures for 
guaranteeing autonomy are still poorly understood (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004).
To begin with, the recurrent problem when using this kind of typologies is 
‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori 1970): The approaches for defining organisational 
autonomy become more and more multidimensional and sparse, while, at the same 
time, they tend to adopt a too narrow focus, leading to a mislaying of analyti-
cal leverage and inconveniences associated with inappropriate comparative logic 
(Sartori 1991). The study of organisational autonomy is producing quite incon-
clusive evidence (Verhoest et al. 2004; Verhoest 2005). Instead, I propose to use 
the term ‘independence’ in a more specific way, in order to define those bodies 
that, possessing the highest level of institutional and organisational disaggrega-
tion, also hold a formal status granting separateness from elected politicians, i.e. 
independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). The scientific study of this specific type 
of public sector organisations is vital because they enjoy a considerable deal of 
public authority when developing, adopting and implementing crucial regulatory 
competencies without possessing democratic responsiveness. Formally independ-
ent agencies with regulatory functions correspond to the ‘fourth type’ of public 
sector organisation identified by Verschuere and colleagues (Verschuere et al. 
2006), that is:
Externally autonomous public organisations with their own budget, defined as 
legal entities by public law, and with a governing board.
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The concept of organisational independence as such was originally adopted 
to characterise the institutional status of central banks (Rogoff 1985). In its most 
encompassing version, the measure of central bank independence comprises 
two elements (Alesina and Summers 1993): political independence, defined as 
the ability to select policy objectives without influence from the government, 
and economic independence, that is, the ability to use instruments of monetary 
policy without restrictions. The various existing indices of central banks’ inde-
pendence are usually based on statutory prescriptions, such as the procedure of 
appointment of the members of the board, the approval requirements for monetary 
policy decisions, the prior definition of monetary objectives in the central bank 
statute, and the budgetary control mechanisms (Bade and Parkin 1982; Grilli et 
al. 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992; Alesina and Summers 1993). The seminal work 
of Gilardi drew inspiration from this approach to assess the formal independence 
of IRAs, with reference to a series of prescriptions, enshrined in the constitutions 
of agencies, which are intended to guarantee independence from elected politi-
cians (Gilardi 2002a, 2005a, 2008). Formal independence is the key factor to be 
considered when investigating the decision of delegating power to IRAs because 
it corresponds to the intentions of the decision makers about the need for provid-
ing time consistency and knowledge-based advice to regulatory policies. Here, an 
extension of this approach is proposed, by the means of the concept of de facto 
independence, to appraise the regulatory action of IRAs after delegation. Indeed, 
factual independence cannot be taken for granted but depends on both mecha-
nisms for granting independence and the use of those mechanisms (Moe 1985).
To this end, Yesilkagit and Van Thiel proposed a relational conception of ‘ac-
tual autonomy’, suggesting that agencies shall develop ties with all actors in the 
politico-administrative system and with societal actors at large: pressure groups, 
interest groups, consultants, public opinion, clients, target groups, the media, and 
so forth (Yesilkagit and Van Thiel 2008). The authors developed thus a measure of 
autonomy based on the level of financial and policy autonomy of the investigated 
public sector organisations. This innovative and ambitious approach presents three 
main shortcomings that make it difficult to apply as such to the present book for 
the study of IRAs’ functioning. First, it presents a wide-ranging, horizontal view 
of autonomy, vis-à-vis a large number of institutional, political, and societal ac-
tors, instead of focusing on the hierarchical relationship between agencies and 
elected politicians and its mirror image with those being regulated. Here I argue 
instead that, while all relationships can be relevant for studying the reconfigura-
tion of power in the political system, nonetheless, only those with politicians and 
regulatees are crucial for measuring the effective independence of regulators in 
the execution of their regulatory competencies. The latter relationships display 
indeed qualitative differences in comparison to informal ties that agencies may 
develop with other actors, as IRAs, politicians and regulatees, ‘the three forces in 
regulation’ (Thatcher 2005a), might have contradictory interests in the practice of 
regulatory governance. Second, their approach focuses on all types of bureaucratic 
agencies, without pinpointing the specific features of IRAs, so that, given the need 
for very detailed contextual evidence, it entails feasibility problems for extensive, 
systematic, comparative cross-national and cross-sectoral studies.
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Another attractive and original approach consists of interviewing agencies’ 
managers about the degree of autonomy they perceive themselves to have (Lægreid 
et al. 2006a; Lægreid et al. 2008). It is argued that even if this measure might not 
accurately reflect the actual level of autonomy, managers’ perceptions matter, as 
they guide agencies’ regulatory action and have important symbolic functions. 
This perspective is indeed very useful for the sociology of administration and for 
the examination of the legitimising effects of independence. As regards its appli-
cation in the present book, however, the major problem is that what is measured 
might not really correspond to the managers’ opinions concerning their autonomy, 
but rather to their perceptions about the degree of autonomy that has to be consid-
ered appropriate, given the institutional context. The interviewed managers may 
behave strategically, constructing their answers so as to try to gain external and in-
ternal legitimacy. In addition, and above all, this approach is not suitable for fully 
capturing the more structural, sometimes even unconscious, or at least rationally 
bounded features of factual independence, which also have an impact on the politi-
cal role of agencies and on their regulatory performance. For instance, no external 
pressure is perceived if agencies’ preferences are ‘organically’ in line with those 
of the politicians or the regulatees, e.g. when the representatives of one of the two 
groups of external actors are ‘naturally’ populating agencies’ boards. Nonetheless, 
it would be hard to qualify these agencies as truly autonomous. In addition, agen-
cies’ managers may perceive themselves as very autonomous, in the sense of not 
being subject to any explicit external pressures, but actually they may not dispose 
from the capacity of implementing their own decisions. Instead, to paraphrase a 
famous dictum, it seems more judicious to consider that ‘only those remain inde-
pendent who use their independence’. Hence, I propose to conceive the de facto 
independence characterising IRAs in a more abstract, general, and comprehensive 
way, starting from a very simple proposition: 
De facto independence characterises the effective independence of agencies as 
they manage day-to-day regulatory actions. 
To move towards a definition, one can conceptualise de facto independence 
drawing from Majone’s seminal paper (Majone 1997a), in which he identified 
IRAs as ‘highly specialized organisations enjoying considerable autonomy in 
decision-making.’ Autonomy means, above all, to be able to translate (1) one’s 
own preferences (2) into (authoritative) actions, without external constraints 
(Nordlinger 1981).2 Therefore, I suggest that the de facto independence of for-
mally independent regulatory agencies can be seen as a synthesis of two necessary 
components: 
2. Please note that I adopt Nordlinger’s (1981) abstract definition of autonomy, leaving aside his 
conception of independence that refers to his typology of states’ self-rule and strength. Rather, 
following Majone (2001), I use the term ‘‘independence’’ in the sense of separateness, develop-
ing the concept of de facto independence as a way to assess the independence of the agencies’ 
day-to-day regulatory action and operationalising it through the two components derived from the 
abstract definition of autonomy.
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(1) The self-determination of agencies’ preferences, and 
(2) The agencies’ autonomy throughout the use of regulatory competen-
cies, that is, during the activity of regulation.
According to this conception, factually independent agencies should be able 
to carry on their regulatory action without constraints within the limits of their 
mandate. In that regard, not only has the informal aspect of independence been 
somewhat neglected in the literature, but also the role of actors other than the 
politicians has been underestimated.3 Yet in view of the process of the delegation 
of regulatory competencies to agencies, it is plausible to consider IRAs ‘interme-
diary organisations’ that act as mediators between the elected politicians and the 
regulatees, i.e. the representatives of the sectors targeted by regulation (Braun 
1993). Indeed, even if agencies enjoy operational autonomy in order to promote 
the ‘public interest’ as defined in their constitutions, they have to interact regu-
larly with those being regulated to gather relevant information and ensure the im-
plementation of their decisions. In turn, those being regulated have incentives to 
obtain the more favourable regulation, making the most of their material and in-
formational resources. Accordingly, the ‘three forces’ in regulation are represented 
by three distinct sets of actors: elected politicians, IRAs and regulatees (Thatcher 
2005a). Therefore, elected politicians and regulatees are the relevant external ac-
tors, which may be able to mould the regulatory action of agencies and should be 
considered particularly relevant in assessing the independence of IRAs in practice.
To examine the relationship between IRAs and the regulated industries, and 
especially the possibility of ‘capture’, three indirect indicators are usually adopted 
(Thatcher 2002d). First, the extent to which there is a ‘revolving door’ is consid-
ered, i.e. the number of staff members moving from regulated industries to IRAs 
and then back. The underlying assumption is that the occurrence of revolving door 
phenomena from agencies provides them with material incentives favouring pro-
regulatees regulation, while revolving door from agencies may shape their cogni-
tive framing of regulatory issues and alter their hierarchy of values and policy 
beliefs in favour of the interests of the regulated industries. The second indicator is 
the number of sanctioning decisions that are made against the regulated industries, 
illustrating agencies’ operational functioning and the degree of their activism. 
Third, the number of legal challenges to the decisions of IRAs offers a measure 
of conflict between regulatees and IRAs, which could be interpreted as an indica-
tor of independence. According to this perspective, a comparison of regulators in 
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy showed that agencies are generally free from 
capture, with, however, some exceptions, as the author observed that IRAs have 
not broken decisively with prior regulatory traditions. In several cases, they favour 
3. Pedersen scrutinised agencies’ independence from the perspective of stakeholders and regulated 
industries, but she does so only dealing with formal rules (Pedersen 2006). Thatcher examined 
the relationships between agencies and the regulatees, but focused only on indirect indicators 
(Thatcher 2002d).
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suppliers, and, in crucial areas, such as merger control, IRAs have undertaken little 
activity (Thatcher 2002d).
This approach represents a very useful starting point, but as such it has two 
limitations. On the one hand, the extent to which there exists a revolving door 
cannot be considered alone, but should be combined with additional information 
on phenomena with similar effects on actors’ cognitive and strategic processes, 
such as regular meetings, exchanges of expertise, and ad hoc contacts between 
agencies, political decision makers, and regulatees. On the other hand, it is dif-
ficult interpret unambiguously the number of decisions, sanctions, and challenges 
to agencies’ decisions. For instance, given the absence of sanctions, can we con-
clude that regulators act in the interests of regulatees or rather that there is little 
IRAs’ activity because the regulated firms are already thoroughly respecting the 
applicable rules? 
My operationalisation of the notion of de facto independence will be presented 
in the methodological section. At this point, it is worth noting that the approach 
in terms of de facto independence is useful only when we expect that agencies’ 
de facto independence cannot be directly derived from formal independence. 
Therefore, in the next section, I will illustrate my theoretical expectations start-
ing from the possible disjunction between formal independence, as prescribed in 
the constitutions of agencies, and their de facto independence. Then, a set of or-
ganisational, institutional, and political explanations for the variation of de facto 
independence are offered.
Theoretical expectations
Analytical framework
The present study relies upon a fuzzy-set analysis (fs/QCA), which is particularly 
suitable for the extant research goals. First, this technique permits the discovery of 
all the configurations that explain the outcome of interest, so as to portray the com-
plex relationship between agencies’ formal and de facto independence in a com-
prehensive manner. Accordingly, a variety of conditions can be examined, leading 
to the assessment of multiple causal paths, according to the notion of ‘equifinality’ 
(Bennett and Elman 2006)). Second, this research strategy attempts to underscore 
heterogeneity and difference in kind and degree, instead of estimating the average 
‘net effect’ of independent variables. Each case is conceived as a combination of 
necessary and sufficient causal conditions, defined by their ‘set memberships’ in 
the outcome (Smithson and Verkuilen 2006). In fact, given my research question, 
I am more interested in subtly examining the causal connections between variables 
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions than in studying the general pat-
terns of covariation of two variables. Third, fuzzy set QCA is particularly help-
ful when dealing with a small-to-medium number of cases, balancing intensive 
and extensive investigation, while focusing on exploration and discovery (Ragin 
2000). Fuzzy set QCA combines the advantages of case-oriented (qualitative) 
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studies in terms of in-depth knowledge of cases and attention to multiple, singular, 
or deviant patterns of causation, and the precision, transparency, and systematic 
accuracy of a variable-oriented (quantitative) approach (Rihoux 2006). 
Following this approach, the present research is built on a comprehensive new 
institutional perspective. Therefore, a number of joint combinations of variables are 
offered, which are expected to lead to the different types of outcomes. Hypothesis 
1.1 and Hypothesis 1.5 depict two non-causal relationships. Hypothesis 1.2 mixes 
historical and rational institutionalist explanations for high de facto independence 
from elected politicians. Hypothesis 1.3 combines historical and sociological ex-
planatory factors of low de facto independence from elected politicians, and, re-
spectively, of low de facto independence from regulatees. Hypothesis 1.4 offers a 
rational-sociological perspective for explaining high de facto independence from 
regulatees. What is more, it is recognised that, following a partially inductive ap-
proach (Schneider and Wagemann 2003), the empirical analysis also permits the 
discovery of other configurations and causal patterns.4
Hypotheses
Outline of the hypotheses:
H 1.1 High formal independence is expected to be neither necessary nor 
sufficient for agencies’ high de facto independence from elected politicians
H 1.2 The combination of the old age of agencies and the presence of many veto 
players should lead to high de facto independence from elected politicians
H 1.3 The joint effect of highly coordinated economy and sectoral path 
dependency should be sufficient to predict low de facto independence 
from the politicians and the regulatees
H 1.4 The intense participation of agencies in European networks and the 
organisational weakness of regulatees are expected to lead to high de 
facto independence from regulatees
H 1.5 High de facto independence from politicians should imply scarce 
independence vis-à-vis the regulatees
4. To be precise, the development of middle-range theories is necessary for guiding the selection of 
the causal conditions and it is useful for identifying theoretically meaningful combinations that 
deserve special attention; yet the methodological approach that is embraced – looking for the 
potential combination of necessary and sufficient conditions – permits the discovery of differ-
ent causal patterns, implying a constant interaction between theory-testing and theory-building, 
which shall lead to a cumulative process of theory refinement and development of new empirical 
questions.
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Hypotheses:
The first hypothesis regards the disjuncture between formal and de facto indepen-
dence. Prescriptions concerning independence, which are enshrined in the con-
stitutions of IRAs, correspond to the official goals of the decision makers who 
delegated regulatory competencies to agencies, in line with functional pressures 
and political strategies for creating formally independent regulatory bodies. The 
formal structure of organisations constrains choices, and, at the same time, it 
creates and enhances capacity in certain directions; therefore, the presence of a 
formally independent model should have a certain impact on the effective inde-
pendence of IRAs (Egeberg 1999). However, earlier empirical research on organi-
sations has concluded that there is a gap between formal and informal structures, 
and even that the latter may have a greater impact than the former on organisa-
tional outcomes (Downs 1967; Dalton 2004). 
On the one hand, formal rules are constantly reinterpreted and adapted by the 
organisation vis-à-vis its environment. In fact, no rule can escape a certain degree 
of indeterminacy, as its meaning is always interpretatively flexible (Wittgenstein 
1958). They tend to function as symbolic elements that organisations incorporate 
to gain legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival prospects (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977). In particular, the process of delegating public authority from 
political decision makers (the ‘trustor’) to independent agencies (the ‘trustee’), 
though law-backed and highly formalised, invariably relies upon an incomplete 
contract, since it is impossible to spell out in explicit details all the precise obliga-
tions of the agent throughout the life of the contract, and the cost of monitoring 
the whole process would be prohibitive (Williamson 1985, 1993). Therefore, any 
organisational framework allows a certain amount of discretion (March and Simon 
1958; Friedberg 1997). In this context, diverse actors have incentives to sway the 
formal prescriptions of independence, by taking advantage of the existing leeway. 
For instance, following their internal organisational logic, agencies might develop 
their own ‘self-centred’ strategies, for developing further their role in regulatory 
regimes, and for gaining distinctive political power (Bendor et al. 2001). Similarly, 
elected politicians and civil servants are likely to try to retain controls over IRAs 
after delegation, so as to informally steer agencies as they desire, in order to re-
duce agencies’ discretion ‘by stealth’ and promote their political and economic 
goals, while avoiding public blame in the case of unpopular decisions (Egan 1998; 
Braun 2002). Finally, the regulated industries may seek to capture the regulatory 
agencies to obtain the most favourable regulation for their economic activities and 
competitive advantages in front of their internal and external business competitors 
(Stigler 1971).
In fact, a number of research studies suggested that the diversity of statutory 
prescriptions corresponds only partially to the variations in actual practices of 
IRAs (Stern 1997; Stern and Holder 1999; Thatcher 2002c, d; Wilks and Bartle 
2002). For instance, as regards utility regulation, Stern (1997) argued that a for-
mally independent regulator might not act impartially in practice, and that follow-
ing the US experience the introduction of formally independent regulators does 
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not guarantee the development of effective regulation. As a consequence, informal 
regulatory arrangements – namely related to the understanding of the custom and 
practice of regulation – appear to be at least as important as legal prescriptions. 
Similarly, Wilks and Bartle (2002) showed that European competition authori-
ties that were created essentially for constitutional and symbolic purposes were 
nonetheless able to reshape their design and redefine their mission over time, so 
as to exert an increasingly important impact on the regulation of market econo-
mies. In addition, it seems that, whereas several formal controls on agencies exist, 
such as the appointment of directors, the possibility of forcing early departures of 
IRA members, the overturn of IRA decisions, and the reduction of IRA budgets 
and powers, these powers are mostly unused to limit ‘agency losses’ in practice 
(Thatcher 2005a).
Therefore, we expect a disjuncture between formal and de facto independence 
of IRAs, while a number of organisational and institutional conditions should af-
fect the ‘repertoire of action’ at disposal to the relevant actors – IRAs, political 
decision makers and regulatees – by determining their structure of opportunities 
and constraints and shaping their preferences and behaviour (Tilly 1975, 2006), 
having thus critical consequences for the effectiveness of delegation and the im-
plementation of regulatory governance. 
H 1.1 High formal independence should be neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for a high level of de facto independence from politicians.
The second hypothesis pertains to the degree of de facto independence from 
politicians. First of all, one would expect de facto independence to be time de-
pendent. Indeed, following an historical institutionalist argument, institutions are 
embedded in temporal processes that shape their development and their role, high-
lighting the causal relevance of origins, ‘critical junctures’, sequences, and positive 
and negative feedback effects (Thelen 1999). Therefore, the impact of the ‘rules 
of the game’ may become visible only when we account for temporal variables, 
instead of paying attention only at slices of time or short-term phenomena (Pierson 
and Skocpol 2002). Accordingly, IRAs, probably even more than other public sec-
tor organisations, enjoy an incremental institutional development that permits the 
evolution of their relationships with elected politicians and with regulatees beyond 
the constitutional design that was set up at the time of their establishment. To be-
gin with, the influence of interest groups is said to increase over time, producing 
the accumulation of collusions that are detrimental to the ‘public interest’ (Olson 
1982). Regulatory agencies are indeed expected to go through a life cycle, setting 
out as protagonists of the ‘public interest’ and then gradually becoming routinised 
and increasingly bureaucratised (Martimort 1999) and protective of the interests 
of the actors they are supposed to regulate (Kahn 1988). In that sense, agencies’ 
functioning should be understood as a dynamic game in which politicians, interest 
groups, and IRAs interact repeatedly within regulatory regimes. Collusion might 
be self-enforcing, as the two partners, who share information that is not available 
to the political principals, may prefer the future benefits derived from continuing 
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to cooperate to the current gains derived from non-collusive behaviour. In fact, 
when examining different regulatory styles in Europe, it seems that the role of reg-
ulators has frequently diverged from initial prescriptions; in particular, the relation 
between regulators and stakeholders evolved over time, following both functional 
market developments and organisational learning processes (Coen 2005). 
These arguments would lead us to suppose that an older IRA will be more 
de facto independent from politicians and less independent from regulatees than 
will be a younger one. Agencies are indeed expected to benefit from a process of 
autonomisation from their principal, due to the accumulation of informational, 
material and symbolic resources in the course of the repeated interactions with the 
regulated sector. At the same time, they are expected to develop a possible col-
lusive behaviour, in the form of a structural dependency, or at least to undertake a 
socialisation process in front of those being regulated that reduces progressively 
their factual independence. Furthermore, I consider that another condition could 
be jointly relevant for explaining the outcome of interest, by applying the notion 
of ‘multiple and conjunctural causation’ (Ragin 2000). Following a rational choice 
institutionalist argument, the presence of veto players should be a factor enabling 
the occurrence of the higher level of de facto independence of agencies.
To begin with, it is worth noting that the concept of veto players permits to 
summarise and operationalise many institutional characteristics of the political 
systems under investigation, such as the regime type, the legislature type and the 
party system. Veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement is 
necessary to make political decisions and change the status quo. The presence of 
many veto players indicates a political and institutional context where changes are 
difficult to make. On the one hand, institutional veto points are constituted, for in-
stance, by presidential vetoing prerogatives, by the composition of parliamentary 
bicameralism, and by the existence of federalist representative arrangements. On 
the other hand, the number and ideological distance between partisan veto play-
ers, who are populating these veto points, depending on the different configura-
tions of political coalitions, determine the eventual potential for policy change 
(Tsebelis 2002). The consequences of veto players for the process of delegation 
are still empirically indefinite. According to prior research, this variable has an 
opposite effect on the formal independence of central banks and on that of IRAs, 
although the main theoretical rationale of delegation is supposedly identical: the 
creation of credible commitments to reduce the expected time-inconsistency of 
policies (Gilardi 2007). Following the empirical analysis of Gilardi, in the former 
case, veto players have a facilitating effect on formal independence (the more veto 
players, the more independence); in the latter, they are the functional equivalent 
of formal independence (the less veto players, the more independence). In other 
words, veto players constitute a necessary precondition for credible delegation 
to central banks (if delegation can be easily reverted, it is useless for improving 
credibility), while this does not hold for IRAs (delegation to formally independ-
ent IRAs is especially needed when credibility is not provided by the existence 
of veto players). The crucial point is that, instead, the effect of veto players on 
agencies’ de facto independence is expected to be univocal. The number (and, 
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implicitly, distance) of veto players in the political system makes it more difficult 
for the political decision makers to find an agreement and adapt their strategies to 
changing situations, producing a reduction in the steering capacity of the elected 
politicians over independent regulators (Tsebelis 2002). This condition leads to a 
situation where those agencies, which are the object of competing control by mul-
tiple, and possibly conflicting, political principals, may become able to exert in-
creased discretion in their day-to-day regulatory routine (Epstein and O’Halloran 
1999; Whitford 2005). To sum up, multiple or divided principals should be less 
capable of monitoring, controlling, and influencing the agent, allowing agencies to 
develop more de facto independence.
H 1.2 The combination of conditions that might give rise to high de facto 
independence from politicians is expected to be the old age of agencies 
and the presence of many veto players.
The third hypothesis is about predictors of low de facto independence of IRAs. 
Theoretical expectations concerning low de facto independence cannot be simply 
deduced from the reverse of those that regard high de facto independence. In fact, 
the presence of the preceding combination of conditions is expected to be suffi-
cient for the positive outcome, but its absence, although necessary, is not directly 
sufficient for predicting the occurrence of the negative outcome. Other explanatory 
factors must be mentioned. A frequent argument in comparative political science 
is that institutional reforms, when they occur, tend to produce different effects 
across countries according to their ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ with the domestic institutional 
context. In fact, even if powerful cross-national pressures can drive exogenous, 
homogenising institutional changes, producing formal convergence across nations 
(Thatcher 2005b), nevertheless the implementation and outcomes of the new in-
stitutional arrangements could vary from country to country (Crouch and Streeck 
1997; Hall and Gingerich 2004), and be affected by the behaviour the institutional 
context itself generates (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Therefore, the study of the 
effect of a single institutional reform implies considering the ‘embeddedness’ of 
political organisations in political economies and political systems (Polanyi 1983), 
requiring a methodological framework which allows the researcher to adopt a 
comprehensive view of institutions, economy and society (Gemici 2008).
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach (VoC) makes these insights operational 
(Hall and Gingerich 2004). The starting point is the observation that several mod-
els of capitalism exist in advanced industrialised democracies. To put it simply, 
the literature distinguishes between two basic ideal types of institutional mod-
els concerning the organisation of the political economy: the coordinated market 
economies (CMEs), based on extra-market coordination between economic and 
political actors, and the liberal market economies (LMEs), in which the architec-
ture of markets is expected to ensure coordination (Hall and Gingerich 2004). The 
German case represents the paradigmatic example of CME. As an illustration, the 
German financial system traditionally provides firms with access to credit accord-
ing to criteria that are not entirely dependent from immediate returns. This makes 
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it possible for firms to engage in long-term projects, while the monitoring of firms 
is achieved through the presence of banking managers on their boards of direc-
tors. At the same time, since the pursuit of long-term profitability may limit the 
maximisation of the shareholder value, the corporate strategies generally entail a 
number of regulations that are designed to prevent mergers and acquisitions, so as 
to avoid the prospect of hostile takeovers. Long-term development strategies also 
require the employment of a highly skilled, loyal labour force, that necessitates, 
on the one hand, setting wages through industry-level bargains and, on the other, 
the existence of an education system capable of providing high industry-specific 
skills. As this system also fosters the stability of the firm’s personnel, innovation 
and technology transfers tend to diffuse through dense inter-company networks. 
Conversely, the USA displays a typical LME, where firms rely more on competi-
tive markets. The organisation of US financial markets induces US firms to pay at-
tention to the current price of their shares on equity markets. Investors’ behaviour 
depends largely on public information on the performance of the firm. The labour 
market is weakly regulated, and firms can quickly adapt their strategies to macro-
economic conditions, by implementing flexible hiring policies. Consequently, the 
labour force has incentives to develop general, transferable skills. The constant 
relocation of professionals also ensures technology transfer from one firm to an-
other. Finally, inter-firm relations are mostly based on market relationships and 
are mediated through a highly formalised legal system, which should provide cer-
tainty and transparency. 
The concept of institutional complementarities underlines the fact that insti-
tutions must be analysed in a relational manner, and it operationalises a com-
prehensive view of institutions: Two institutions are complementary if the pres-
ence of one increases the ‘returns’ (i.e. positive outcomes) from the other. Thus, 
a system deploying a particular type of coordination in one sphere should tend to 
develop complementary coordination devices in other spheres. As a result, politi-
cal dynamics and adaptation strategies to global phenomena tend to differ across 
countries, reflecting the overall influence of the domestic institutional settings. 
According to a sociological institutionalist interpretation of this approach, these 
considerations might imply that IRAs created with very similar formal competen-
cies across countries could nevertheless function in different ways, as the role they 
play depends on the relationships they develop with other domestic organisations 
and institutions (Deeg and Jackson 2007). For instance, Deeg and Jackson show 
that the German system of co-determination, while displaying remarkable formal 
institutional continuity, has experienced in fact numerous substantial transforma-
tions that have converted it to different purposes. Here, we can expect that the web 
of intertwined relationships among the decision makers, the regulators and those 
being regulated should be denser in CMEs than in LMEs because of the need for 
extra-market coordination, relying on more informal devices for organising the 
national political economy. Hence, ceteris paribus, agencies in CMEs might be 
expected to have less de facto independence from politicians and regulatees than 
agencies in LMEs. 
At the same time, IRAs’ functioning could also be shaped by sector-specific 
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regulatory patterns.5 Indeed, (regulatory) capitalism varies not only across na-
tions but also across sectors, with significant effects on institutional outcomes. 
Accordingly, the focus on sectoral patterns should provide a great deal of intra-
national variation, while regulatory policy making in similar sectors is expected to 
exhibit strong international commonalities (Levi-Faur 2006b, c). In fact, political 
phenomena and organisational trajectories are frequently described as sectorally 
path dependent by historical institutionalists (Pierson 2000). The underlying as-
sumption is that the cost of switching from one alternative to another grows over 
time. In addition, adherents of this approach maintain not only that the probability 
of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path, 
but also that early events are more important than later ones and that the tem-
poral sequence could be causally relevant. The application of this argument to 
the study of institutions and organisations can, for instance, explain unrelenting 
divergences of Western market economies (North 1990), while also leading some 
scholars to affirm that organisations have a strong tendency to persist once institu-
tionalised (Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). This approach is helpful in the context of 
the examination of the functioning of IRAs, wherein one considers that an earlier 
sector-specific mode of regulation is likely to continue operating to a certain ex-
tent, namely because of the persistence of informal linkages among the relevant 
actors, constituting a durable policy community. Therefore, we may suppose that 
when IRAs are created (or reformed), the old regulatory arrangement will still 
partly determine their functioning. For instance, we can suppose that when IRAs 
are created in a former public sector, they will be less de facto independent from 
elected politicians than agencies regulating long-term privatised sectors.
H 1.3 A highly coordinated economy and sectoral path dependency will be two 
concomitant conditions for the low de facto independence of agencies 
from both the politicians and the regulatees.
The fourth hypothesis pertains to causal paths leading to high de facto in-
dependence from regulatees. The incorporation in agencies’ networks is the first 
condition that is expected to explain the outcome of high de facto independence 
from the regulated industries. Indeed, following a sociological institutionalist line 
of reasoning, it is plausible that organisations gain autonomy when they are able 
to legitimise their policies through their ability to locate themselves in multiple 
networks (Carpenter 2002a). For instance, previous research has shown that agen-
cies’ integration in regulatory networks largely explains the decisive institutional 
changes in the American postal system that occurred between 1890 and World War 
I (Carpenter 2001a). By taking advantage of their position, network-embedded 
agencies can enhance their independence by building a supporting coalition for 
5. It is worth noting that these two conditions correspond also to the pertinent features of the concept 
of ‘bureaucratic culture’ that are plausibly expected to influence the de facto independence of 
regulators.
48 regulation in practice
their policies and programmes, and providing the belief in their superior organi-
sational capacity (Carpenter 2001b). In addition, agencies’ networks are said to 
sustain the technical skills and the effective exercise of delegated competencies, 
while also allowing wide discretionary power to independent regulatory agencies 
(Majone 2001b). 
For the present study, the pertinent networks are those created following the 
expansion of EU regulation and governance, after the establishment of the sin-
gle market in the European Union and the liberalisation of the European finan-
cial markets and utilities (Coen and Thatcher 2006). Specifically, the European 
Commission has set out to coordinate the implementation of regulatory arrange-
ments in member states and to harmonise regulatory governance through agencies’ 
networks, such as the Committee of Euroepean Securities Regulators (CESR) 
(Coen and Thatcher 2008). This strategy was developed as a reaction to member 
states’ unwillingness to dismantle national IRAs in favour of prospected European 
regulatory bodies, following their strong concerns for sovereignty and control over 
their political economies (Coen and Thatcher 2007). At the same time, bottom-up 
networks emerged, such as the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) 
and the Independent Regulators Group (IRG), which are voluntary associations 
of national regulatory authorities, with the aim of facilitating consultation, coor-
dination, cooperation, information exchange and assistance amongst regulators 
(Maggetti and Gilardi 2011). As a consequence, a hybrid, multiple and intertwined 
set of European regulatory networks, federating national independent regulatory 
agencies, was created and institutionalised, regulating some crucial sectors, such 
as energy, telecommunications, railways, and financial services (Eberlein 2003; 
Coen and Heritier 2005). The network of European national competition authori-
ties (ECN) offers a good example of the potential consequences for national regu-
lators: According to some exploratory evidence, it offers greater implementation 
choices and additional resources to the domestic authorities, and, above all, it pro-
vides them with potential allies in front of domestic governments and regulatees 
(Majone 1996a; Wilks 2005).
Here, we shall expect that networks of regulators reinforce national agencies 
by providing them with a range of resources in terms of technical expertise, rel-
evant information, and legitimacy, altering thus the balance of power between 
IRAs, elected politicians, and regulatees. Specifically, weak national agencies 
should be empowered by a process of diffusion of information, policy learning and 
coalition building. In this sense, agencies’ networks may function as transnational 
epistemic communities – expertise-based networks – that dispose from consider-
able power and could promote policy coordination and influence in specific issues 
(Haas 1992). As a result, the incorporation of agencies into multiple networks is 
expected to enhance their independence from those they are regulating. It is worth 
noting that this condition should display a good deal of variation, as the degree of 
institutionalisation of these networks differs greatly across countries and sectors.
However, the de facto independence of agencies should also depend on the 
organisational strength of the regulatees. Following the classic argument of the 
rational choice version of the capture theory, which is incidentally analogous on 
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this point to some neo-Marxist views on firms’ strategies (Posner 1974), the regu-
latees have strong incentives for actively challenging agencies’ independence, and 
vice versa IRAs’ staff may anticipate the individual gains of capture (Stigler 1971; 
Pelzman et al. 1989). Accordingly, the regulated industries are expected to lobby 
policy-makers and agencies for obtaining the most favourable regulation, for in-
stance in order to be able to close their markets to new potential competitors or 
raise prices artificially; at the same time, regulators who might benefit from the 
expansion of their activities and are said to employ their regulatory powers to re-
locate wealth from less organised to more organised groups (James 2000). These 
privileged groups correspond to business sector interests, at the expense of the 
more disperse and less organised interests, such as consumers. Conversely, small 
and cohesive groups, such as coalitions of producers or employers, have greater 
incentives to form lobbies and influence regulatory policies in their favour, as they 
will face relatively low costs and anticipate high and concentrated benefits when 
they attempt to organise for collective action (Olson 1982). Here, a good indicator 
of the organisational strength of the regulatees is whether the regulatory target of 
IRAs is sector-specific rather than oriented towards general competition. 
The former type of regulation (regulation-for-competition) concerns a narrow 
set of regulated industries that faces relatively homogenous problems and gener-
ally disposes from institutionalised representatives, such as peak organisations, 
professional associations, lobbyists, think tanks, and other intermediation devices. 
The latter (regulation-of-competition ) relates to a vast and heterogeneous uni-
verse of small firms, medium business and large companies, displaying conflicting 
interests, for instance between export-oriented firms and those oriented toward the 
internal market, and no unique or coherent voice, favouring free-riding tendencies 
(Olson 1982). In the first case, highly organised regulatees are expected to be able 
to make a collective effort to reduce the de facto independence of agencies, unlike 
the second scenario, where incentives for lobbying are lower and collective action 
is more difficult. 
H 1.4 Intense participation of agencies in European networks and the 
organisational weakness of those being regulated are expected to lead to 
high de facto independence from regulatees.
The final hypothesis regards the interplay between independence from political 
decision makers and from regulatees. When IRAs are conceived as intermediary 
organisations (Braun 1993), we might suppose that their de facto independence 
from politicians and their de facto independence from regulatees should be di-
rectly related. On the one hand, when an agency is scarcely de facto independent 
from political decision makers, it is expected to be de facto independent from 
regulatees: It is indeed implausible that an agency could be the servant of two 
distinct masters.6 In theory, agencies cannot be devoted to two principals with 
6. ‘No one can serve two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be 
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conflicting regulatory aims at the same time: elected politicians look for efficient 
regulation following their conception of the ‘public interest’ and/or their prospects 
for re-election in front of their broader constituency; regulatees seek to obtain the 
most favourable regulation according to their narrower private interest concerns. 
Similarly, a high level of de facto independence from political decision makers 
should imply low de facto independence from regulatees. Moreover, following 
Bernstein, we might suppose that a lack of political intervention is the reflection of 
political disinterest in regulation and that, as a result, the agency could not rely upon 
its political principals for support vis-à-vis the regulated industries, thus favouring 
a capture process (Bernstein 1955). Finally, the existence of regulators that are 
factually independent both from elected politicians and regulatees is logically pos-
sible, and even desirable, as it constitutes the equilibrium that could allow agen-
cies to develop organisational legitimacy at both sides (Braun 1993; Braun 1997).
H 1.5 In cases of high de facto independence from politicians, a ‘footloose’ 
agency could become scarcely independent vis-à-vis the regulatees.
Methodology
Case selection
According to the theoretical expectations, two distinct analyses are applied. First, I 
test explanations about the de facto independence of agencies from political deci-
sion makers (‘defindpdm’), using the following as explanatory conditions: the for-
mal independence of IRAs, the regulatory life cycle, the presence of veto players 
in the political system, the type of coordination of the domestic political economy, 
the path dependence from the prior mode of regulation, and the inclusion in agen-
cies’ regulatory networks. Second, I test hypotheses regarding the variation of de 
facto independence from regulatees (‘defindreg’). This time, I use de facto inde-
pendence from politicians as an additional explanatory condition, whereas I ex-
clude formal independence and veto players, which refer only to the relationship 
with politicians. I also add another variable, namely, the organisational strength 
of regulatees.7 The investigated cases are sixteen IRAs, selected in ten Western 
European countries and three sectors according to the criteria for case selection 
outlined below and following the availability of data (see Table 3.1). 
The purpose of case selection is to obtain a relatively homogeneous sample 
with a consistent internal variety concerning the relevant variables. The main 
devoted to the one and despite the other’ (Matthew 6:24).
7. Please note that this model is slightly different from that used in my previous empirical work 
on the same topic (Maggetti 2007). Here, I employ the new and more precise algorithm for the 
fuzzy-set analysis (Ragin 2006a). Data are, therefore, recoded due to small differences in the 
application of the analytical procedure (namely following the need for minimising the occurrence 
of the .5 coding in the causal conditions). Results are nonetheless very similar.
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Table 3.1: Case selection
Sector Country Label Official names of the 
investigated IRAs
Banking and 
Financial sector
Belgium belbk Commission Bancaire, 
Financière et des Assurances
Germany gerbk Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungaufsicht
Finland finbk Rahoitustarkastus
Netherlands netbk Autoriteit Financiële Markten
Sweden swebk Finansinspektionen
Switzerland swibk Eidgenössische 
Bankenkommission
Competition
Netherlands netco Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit
Norway norco Konkurransetilsynet
Sweden sweco Konkurrensverhet
Switzerland swico Wettbewerbskommission
United 
Kingdom
ukico Competition Commission
Telecommunications
Austria austc Rundfunk und Telekom 
Regulierungs
Italy itatc Autorità per le Garanzie nelle 
Comunicazioni
Netherlands nettc Onafhankelijke Post en 
Telecommunicatie Autoritei
Norway nortc Post- Og Teletilsynet
Sweden swetc Sweden Post & Telestyrelsen
criterion for including a case in the dataset is the comparability within the agen-
cies’ organisational models: the presence of a structurally disaggregated formally 
autonomous public organisation with a chairperson or director, a governing board 
or similar body and its own secretariat. The other crucial criterion is the focus on 
the most institutionalised agencies, those that benefit from the greatest powers 
and the broadest array of regulatory competencies, concerning rule making, deci-
sion making, adjudication and sanctioning. Concretely, I started from Gilardi’s 
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(Gilardi 2002b, 2008) dataset on the formal independence of agencies focusing 
on three sectors: a long-standing privatised sector (banking and finance), a former 
public sector (telecommunications), and general regulation (competition). I sent 
a detailed questionnaire to all selected agencies’ chairpersons; I refined data with 
written and electronic documentation and interpreted it with the help of electronic 
and telephone interviews with the agency personnel.8
The operationalisation of the causal conditions
The next step is the operationalisation of explanatory variables, that is, causal 
conditions using QCA terminology. The formal independence of agencies (‘hfor-
malind’) is measured with Gilardi’s index (Gilardi 2002b, 2005a, c, 2008).9 In 
order to keep the richness and significance of this causal condition almost intact, 
the data were coded on a 6-point ordinal scale with the value ‘0’ for cases scarcely 
independent and ‘1’ for the highly independent cases.10 In this regard, a brief di-
gression about the coding procedure is required, as regards ‘calibration’ and the 
standard qualitative coding. In fact, the procedure of calibration has been devel-
oped for the precise adjustment of interval-scale measures in fuzzy-sets (Ragin 
2008a), extending the standard procedure, based on the qualitative appraisal of 
set membership (Ragin 2000). I applied the new procedure to Gilardi’s index of 
formal independence, using the ‘indirect method’ described by Ragin, in order to 
calibrate the interval scales for the fuzzy-set analysis, along a standard 6-point 
scale. Two possible qualitative ‘benchmark codings’ are tested: the one being very 
conservative (i) and the other using more relaxed parameters (ii). Data were cod-
ed as presented in Table 3.2. At the end of the day, however, the decision about 
the definition of the benchmark values as required by the procedure of calibra-
tion came out to be difficult. The consequences of this choice are not intuitively 
straightforward, and they appear quite arbitrary, while at the same time results 
seem excessively determined by the technical procedure.11 For instance, accord-
ing to my substantive knowledge about the cases under investigation, the first 
coding (i) underestimates the relative independence of some cases, such as the 
Belgian Commission Bancaire, Financière et des Assurances, and the German 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungaufsicht. Conversely, using the second cod-
8. The response rate was very high (80 per cent), with, however, the notable exception of the British 
Financial Services Authority (for the details, see the appendix).
9. This index summarises many different statutory features, such as the formal status of the agency 
head, the formal status of the members of the board, the formal relationship with government and 
parliament, the statutory financial and organisational autonomy, and the constitutional extent of 
regulatory competencies (Gilardi 2002b). 
10. For information about the construction of a fuzzy set-scale, see Ragin et al. (2006).
11. Anyhow, it is worth noting that in the present research study, the results of the fuzzy set QCA 
change only modestly for de facto independence from political decision makers, no matter what 
scale is adopted.
explaining de facto independence (i) 53
ing (ii), the independence of other cases is comparatively overrated, for instance 
the Sweden Post & Telestyrelsen. In conclusion, I decided to continue with the 
standard qualitative procedure, by defining six clusters of agencies. This proce-
dure is more transparent and it captures better the distinction between relevant and 
irrelevant variations of formal independence, so as to avoid the degreeism fallacy 
(Sartori 1991; Radaelli 2000c).12 Figure 3.2 presents a graphical illustration of 
the coding procedure. Raw values for continuous variables are ordered with the 
‘threshold setter’ function of the Tosmana package (Cronqvist 2007).
Then, the measurement related to the age of agencies (oldage), with reference 
to agencies’ life cycle, was constructed by simply subtracting the year of the crea-
tion of the agency from the year of the data collection (i.e. 2006). Sources are 
agencies’ Web sites and official archive documents. Seven clusters are identified, 
ranging from recently established regulators (less than 5 years old) to elderly IRAs 
(more than 50 years). Please note that one category remains empty (0.87), as no 
agency was created 30-40 years before data collection. The number of veto players 
(manyveto) was determined by using the Tsebelis dataset on number and distance 
(Tsebelis 2002), using a 3-point scale: few veto players (less than 2), some veto 
players (from 2.1 to 3.9), and several veto players (more than 4). Concerning the 
degree of coordination of the political economy, I adopted the index created by 
Hall and Gingerich (Hall and Gingerich 2004). This index extends the quite rough 
distinction between LMEs and CMEs by devising and combining several indica-
tors for the central concepts of the variety of capitalism approach, so as to meas-
ure the overall logic of coordination – the crucial dimension – in the key spheres 
of the political economy: shareholder power, dispersion of corporate governance 
control, size of stock market, level of wage coordination, labour turnover, and de-
gree of wage coordination. Here, the degree of coordination of the national econo-
mies (coordeco) is appreciated on a 6-point scale that also relies upon substantive 
knowledge of each case (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2004).
The operationalisation of the mode of regulation that was applied before the 
establishment or reform of the investigated agencies led to a distinction between 
general regulation, regulators of long-standing privatised sectors, and agencies 
regulating former public sector monopolies. I used ‘1’ to code prior public owner-
ship of the regulated industries (sectorpubl); otherwise, I used ‘0’ (Conway and 
Nicoletti 2006). Then, the variable ‘network’ was coded ‘0’ when the agency did 
not participate in European networks, ‘0.4’ in the case of partial membership (e.g. 
as observer), ‘0.6’ in the case of participation with one, and ‘0.8’ in the case of 
inclusion in two official networks. The organisational strength of those being regu-
lated (orgreg) was roughly approximated by a distinction between sectoral (‘1’) and 
general (‘0’) regulators. Finally, the operationalisation of de facto independence 
12. According to Sartori, ‘degreeism’ occurs when, instead of recognising qualitative differences 
among observations, the researcher insists on differences of degree. This conceptual mistake is 
nicely illustrated by the famous ‘cat-dog’ example: if we cannot conceptualise the difference 
between a cat and a dog, we see various degrees of cat-dogs.
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from politicians, which is conceived as a causal condition in the second model, is 
discussed in the next section (where the outcome conditions are presented). Table 
3.3 displays raw data and the coding scale for each causal condition; the charac-
teristics of each case are summarised in Figure 3.1. 
Descriptive outlook
A quick outlook to cases and conditions (see Figure 3.1) illustrates a good deal of 
variation within and across cases. To begin with, the degree of formal independence 
ranges from 0.34 of the German Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungaufsicht 
to 0.71 of the Austrian Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs, while the age of 
IRAs is situated on an interval between 72 years of the Swiss Eidgenössische 
Bankenkommission and 4 years of the Dutch Autoriteit Financiële Markten. It is 
interesting to observe that there is also considerable intranational variation. When 
we compare the Autoriteit Financiële Markten, the Mededingingsautoriteit and the 
Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoritei in the Netherlands, we can 
see that the crucial sector-specific conditions, namely, the former public regula-
tion, the organisational force and the regulatees and, above all, the participation 
in networks, display very dissimilar values. What is more, it seems that IRAs’ 
participation in European networks is more intense as regards competition than in 
banking and finance in the Netherlands, while the reverse is true in Sweden.
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The operationalisation of the outcome conditions
Starting from the prior conceptualisation of IRAs as intermediary agencies, two 
distinct measurements of the de facto independence of agencies are offered: one 
concerning the relationship with elected politicians and one concerning the rela-
tionship with those being regulated. Within each dimension, as stated above, the 
level of de facto independence can be assessed through the aggregation of two 
components: the self-determination of preferences and the autonomy of the activ-
ity of regulation. 
i) The self-determination of preferences
As organisations are open systems, agencies are neither fully independent from 
nor fully dependent on their environment, and their preferences are always shaped 
by their social interaction with other actors. Yet the present conceptualisation of 
independence points out the extent to which preferences are mostly internally 
formed or, conversely, externally affected. The underlying assumption is that these 
– relative – levels, situated on a continuum between the two extremes, may vary 
significantly across agencies, but are never absolute. Accordingly, agencies are de 
facto independent if their preferences are endogenous, that is, when the process 
of preferences formation is mostly determined by the internal organisational dy-
namic. Conversely, the minimum level of independence occurs when agencies’ 
preferences are predefined by the fundamental interests of external actors, beyond 
the official goals of delegation. This is the case when the investigated agency is ex 
ante decisively colonised by those external actors, which are able to promote their 
contingent and particularistic interests, instead of the ‘public interest’ (Pelzman et 
al. 1989; Buchanan et al. 2004). Thus, to ascertain the indicators of IRAs’ self-
determination of preferences, the organisation’s ‘black box’ must be unpacked. 
For this purpose, I have drawn inspiration from different research fields, specifi-
cally from the literature on the independence of central banks (Barro and Gordon 
1983; Grilli et al. 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992; Alesina and Summers 1993); the 
regulation after delegation to IRAs (Thatcher 2002c, d); the role of experts in 
public policy (Peters 2001; Papadopoulos 2003); the independence of courts of 
justice (Breton and Fraschini 2003); the capture theory (Stigler 1971; Pelzman et 
al. 1989); and the independence requirements in corporate governance (IOSCO 
2002; OCDE 2004). As a result, the nature of the relationships between IRA and 
elected politicians can be qualified by six indicators, which will be aggregated at 
the component level. First, I list indicators of staff independence.
1) The proportion of revolving door. This indicator measures the ‘rela-
tional distance’ between IRAs’ personnel and the civil service under 
the direct responsibility of the ministry in charge. A reduced ‘relational 
distance’ indicates low independence (Thatcher 2002d; Thatcher and 
Stone Sweet 2002). Indeed, revolving doors provide agencies with 
material incentives and, respectively, shared cultural assumptions and 
mindsets of external actors. On the one hand, IRAs’ personnel who 
anticipate a future career in the ordinary civil service have incentives 
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to adopt similar regulatory frameworks and follow the directives of 
ministries and high-level civil officials. On the other hand, IRA’s 
employees who have spent a career in the public administration are 
likely to continue to some extent to store up administrative routines 
and the cognitive framework that they constituted in the past. In the 
case of the lack of any apparent perceived distinction between the 
day-to-day work of the civil service under ministerial responsibility 
and the regulatory task of independent regulatory agencies, then the 
factual independence of the latter has to be considered to be the lowest 
according to that aspect.
2) The frequency of contacts. This indicator refers to the occurrence of 
ad hoc interactions, information exchanges, regular meetings, intern-
ships, and stable collaborations between the agency and the ordinary 
civil service. Close, durable and regular contacts of agencies’ staff and 
board members with elected politicians and the ordinary civil service 
can be considered functional equivalents of revolving doors. In fact, 
constant proximity and exchange favour the development of ‘epis-
temic’ communities of experts exchanging information, ideas, solu-
tions and arguments, eventually sharing similar regulatory goals and 
co-producing regulatory arrangements (Haas 1992; van Waarden and 
Drahos 2002). Below, I list indicators about resources’ independence.
3) Influence over IRAs’ budget. Elected politicians that can directly 
control agencies’ budget are crucially able to reduce the manoeuvr-
ing room of regulators (Carpenter 1996). Not only the effective 
manipulation but also the threat of budgetary cuts or shifts gives 
powerful signals to the agency and is likely to influence IRAs’ prefer-
ences and behaviour, constituting an important form of latent power 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Conversely, when the agency budget is 
fixed, neither subjected to the approval of elected politicians through 
governmental or parliamentary decisions, nor dependent from other 
unsecured sources, then the potential discretional power of agencies 
vis-à-vis elected politicians increases.
4) Influence over internal organisation. The leeway for elected politi-
cians to determine the organisational structure of regulatory bodies 
can have crucial effects on agencies’ preferences and behaviour (Wil-
son 1989; Egeberg 1999). In fact, politicians can influence agencies’ 
autonomous workflow by manipulating their internal organisation and 
bureaucratic hierarchy, namely their inter- and intra-organisational 
division of labour, the career plans of agencies’ personnel and board 
members, and the balance of power between the chairperson, the board 
and the secretariat. Then, the third category involves the individual 
and collective independence of the board members, and specifically, 
their political exposure.
5) The weight of partisan membership in nominations. The possibil-
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ity of political appointments by the government and parliament is 
an important instrument of political control over the bureaucracy; 
this point is consistent both with a perspective that focuses on the 
struggle for political power, and with the managerial conception of 
policy monitoring (Wood and Waterman 1991). Two elements should 
be considered. First, if board members are nominated according to 
a partisan logic, they are expected to be more inclined to follow the 
instructions of (some) elected politicians. Second, the existence of a 
balance of power between board members may mitigate the weight 
of partisan membership (Breton and Fraschini 2003). Finally, the last 
indicator concerns: 
6) The political vulnerability of IRAs as it is related to early departures 
of board members. The prospect of forcing early departures of IRA 
members constitutes another important mean of political control 
(Goodsell and Gayo 1970; Thatcher 2005a). Therefore, the frequency 
of the replacement of board members due to a decision by elected 
politicians in ministries and/or parliaments before the ordinary end of 
their statutory mandate is a good, although quite indirect, indicator of 
their material capacity of influencing agencies’ behaviour and prefer-
ences (obviously, when excluding any contingent or personal reason 
for departures). 
For the relationship between the IRA and the regulatees, I identify another 
six indicators of de facto independence. The indicators used for studying the first 
relation are, after some simple adjustments, once again useful in regard to the first 
category.
1) The proportion of revolving door. As mentioned above, this indicator 
refers to the phenomenon of agencies’ staff moving to the regulated 
industries and back, offering an indication of the ‘relational distance’ 
between IRAs and regulatees (Thatcher 2002d; Thatcher and Stone 
Sweet 2002). On the one hand, IRAs’ employees who anticipate the 
possibility of being hired in the regulated industries have incentives 
to favour regulatees, by anticipating enhanced prospects for employ-
ment, or higher salary benefits. On the other hand, staff members who 
are enrolled in agencies after a career in the regulated industries are 
expected to bring in not only their technical competencies but also 
their social ties, shared cultural assumptions, and set of mindsets (at 
least partially) in line with those of the regulatees.
2) The frequency of contacts, such as ad hoc interactions, information 
exchanges, regular meetings, internships, and ongoing collaborations 
between the agency and the regulatees. The close proximity between 
regulators and those being regulated do not only favour a process of 
rational learning to improve regulatory quality through the exchange 
of essential pieces of information and the improvement of technical 
skills. Plausibly, it also induces a socialisation process and the cre-
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ation of powerful coalitions of interests, which may try to reorient the 
official regulatory policies, in line with their own goals (Haas 1992; 
van Waarden and Drahos 2002). Then I consider:
3) The adequacy of agency’s budget with respect to their regulatory 
tasks. Agencies’ decision-making effectiveness depends largely on 
financial resources (Spiller 1990; Olson 1995). An inadequate budget 
invariably involves a reduced manoeuvring room when preparing and 
executing the required regulatory tasks. In the case of scarce resources, 
agencies are, for instance, obliged to rely on information and technical 
expertise directly provided by the regulated industries, producing a 
situation that can critically influence agencies’ preferences and behav-
iour and reduce their autonomous decision-making capacity.
4) The adequacy of the organisational resources in relation to those of 
the regulated industries must also be discussed. Human resources are 
crucial to sustain organisational performance and agency indepen-
dence (Brudney and Hebert 1987; Perry 1993). The management of 
human resources is indeed a decisive element, not only in quantitative 
terms but also as regards employees’ education and technical skills 
and with reference to agencies’ ability to apply their competencies of 
supervision and sanctioning. After that, the third category relates to 
the autonomy of the agency’s board, taking into consideration, first, 
5) The closeness of the professional activity of board members as re-
gards the regulatees. To begin with, one should determine if board 
members are full-time or part-time hired, considering that full-time 
professionals are usually more trained and skilled with respect to the 
execution of their day-to-day regulatory tasks, and less dependent 
on the potential influence of external actors through the prospect of 
additional remuneration.  On the other hand, the occurrence of pos-
sible conflicts of interests between the professional activity of board 
members and their regulatory duties should be considered (IOSCO 
2002). The second element refers to: 
6) Personal affairs and relationships. The so-called OECD principles 
of ‘good governance’ mention the existence of personal affairs or 
personal relations between regulators and regulatees as a factor re-
ducing the independence of the former (OCDE 2004). Specifically, 
this indicator concerns the existence of informal ties between board 
members and the regulated industries. However, given the practical 
difficulties of assessing this kind of relationships, only the noticeable, 
public, freely available information over these linkages can be taken 
into account, probably leading to an underestimation of the impact of 
these linkages.
All indicators of this first component are summarised in Tables 3.4-3.5, while 
the related survey questions are presented in the appendix of this chapter. Each 
indicator is appreciated on a 7-point ordinal scale from 0 (lowest level of de facto 
70 regulation in practice
independence) to 1 (highest level). Next, the second component of agencies’ de 
facto independence corresponds to their independence when executing their activ-
ity of regulation, namely concerning their autonomous capacity to produce regula-
tions (ordinances, directives, resolutions, recommendations, and so on) and make 
individual decisions (pieces of advice, authorisations, sanctions, etc.) (see again 
Tables 3.4-3.5 and the appendix). 
ii) The autonomy of the activity of regulation
The second component of agencies’ de facto independence is the autonomous con-
duct of their activity of regulation. In this view, we have a reduction of de facto 
independence of IRAs when external actors – the political decision makers and, 
respectively, the regulatees – whose preferences diverge from agencies’, can ex-
post crucially manipulate their activity of regulation in order to override the will 
of the relatable IRA. From this point of view, the agency has to be considered a 
black box, and then one shall try to determine whether these external actors can 
exogenously sway the regulatory process. Unfortunately, there is neither empirical 
feasibility nor any theoretical basis for measuring the agency’s independence di-
rectly during the process of supervising and possibly sanctioning the target sector.
Indeed, it is impracticable to highlight the informal pressures potentially ex-
erted by the elected politicians, or by those being regulated, with reference to 
any particular decision, as no suitable trace of such pressures exist. Unlike a full 
judiciary inquiry, a scientific research study cannot rely upon authoritative means 
or pervasive instruments to collect supplementary evidence, and does not allow 
the researcher to gain access to undisclosed documentation. These differences 
stem from not only obvious practical limitations or from ethical and deontologi-
cal concerns but also the need for guaranteeing, as far as possible, the replication 
of the empirical tests and the falsifiability of the argument (Popper 2002). Given 
these limitations, it is very difficult to establish the influence of external actors on 
specific decisions, following the inherent contingency of singular political phe-
nomena, while, at the same time, the significance of a specific decision or non-
decision cannot be easily deductively appreciated, as it entails serious difficulties 
of interpretation. In fact, the boundaries between ‘nonpositive’ negative cases and 
‘nonpositive’ irrelevant cases are extremely difficult to distinguish when exam-
ining non-decisions (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). A case of non-decision could 
suggest the non-occurrence of the investigated phenomenon, or it may constitute a 
deliberate decision not to act, such as decisions of non-sanctioning certain infrac-
tions. In this sense, a non-decision can favour some regulated industries or pro-
duce nuisances to other stakeholders, representing a form of latent power, while 
the rationale for non-deciding is necessarily undetermined (Lukes 1974; Bachrach 
and Baratz 1994).
However, the burden of proof still lies with the researcher who is formulat-
ing new hypotheses. Therefore, I decided to assess the independence of regula-
tors during their activity of regulation in a slightly more indirect manner, namely, 
through the study of independent regulatory agencies’ inner policy cycle (Howlett 
and Ramesh 2003). Specifically, I propose to examine the active participation of 
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external actors in the IRAs’ rule-making process in order to assess the extent to 
which these external actors affect the regulatory outputs, such as agencies’ ordi-
nances, directives, pieces of advice and recommendations. The basic idea is that 
the most prominent external actors in the inner rule-making process are then able, 
by this means, to crucially influence the activity of the IRAs in charge, at least 
during the investigated period. Conversely, the more exclusive the process is, the 
more factually independent the agency. Concretely, I divide the inner policy cy-
cle of independent regulatory agencies into six events, which are not necessar-
ily sequential, by adopting a quite inductive reasoning, based on my exploratory 
face-to-face and electronic interviews and preliminary investigation of the written 
documentation: 
(1) Impulsion
(2) Preparation of the draft of the regulation
(3) Consultation
(4) Final decision and adoption
(5) Monitoring
(6) Sanctioning of infringements
Then, I assess the de facto independence of IRAs from elected politicians dur-
ing the activity of regulation through the examination of their active participa-
tion in these six events, which are regarded as analytically distinct, considering 
involvement in no event as a proxy of very high independence (‘7’ on a 7-point 
scale) and active participation in all events as a proxy of very low independence 
(‘1’). Respectively, I examine the active participation of those being regulated in 
the agencies’ rule-making process in a similar manner. If the regulatees participate 
actively in several events of the inner policy cycle, the relevant agency is then con-
sidered scarcely independent from them, and vice versa; if they participate hardly 
at all, the agency is considered highly independent. 
Finally, results concerning (i) the self-determination of preferences and (ii) 
the autonomy of the activity of regulation, which, as illustrated above, are derived 
from the aggregation of the indicators measured and adjusted on the 7-point scale 
adopted in the questionnaire, can be once more aggregated by simply calculating 
the mean value of the two components to obtain one single measurement of agen-
cies’ de facto independence from elected politicians (‘defindpdm’) and one single 
measurement of agencies’ de facto independence from regulatees (‘defindreg’) on 
another 7-point ordinal scale.13 So I obtain two ‘dependent’ variables that will be 
tested separately with the comparative design.
13. From this scale, a simpler dichotomous coding can be derived to be used for the standard QCA 
crisp-set analysis, by considering that the presence of the condition of ‘high de facto indepen-
dence’, that is, the dichotomous code 1 corresponds to a value of ³ 0.5 on the 7-point ordinal scale, 
ranging from 0 to 1.
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The empirical analysis
The assessment of the de facto independence of IRAs
The results of the survey inquiry concerning the outcome conditions (i.e. the ‘de-
pendent variables’) are presented below, with the corresponding degree of de facto 
independence: Table 3.6, concerning the relationship with the elected politicians, 
and Table 3.7, concerning the relationship with the regulatees (see the appendix of 
the chapter for the details of the questionnaire). After case names and data labels, 
the third column of the tables presents the aggregated results concerning the in-
dicators of the self-determination of preferences, and, respectively, the autonomy 
of the activity of regulation (on 7-point scales); the fourth column specifies the 
level of de facto independence derived from these measures; and the fifth column 
displays the corresponding coding for the fuzzy-set analysis. Figure 3.3 offers a 
synthetic view of agencies’ de facto independence from the politicians and from 
the regulatees. This information, which is used for the fuzzy set analysis, has been 
collected with detailed questionnaires sent to the chairpersons of the investigated 
agencies, received between June 2006 and March 2007. It has been completed and 
refined with other data: semi-directive interviews with agencies’ board members 
between August 2005 and June 2006; and written and electronic documentation, 
namely annual agency reports and agencies’ Web sites, as briefly summarised in 
the following mini-case studies (sections 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2), so as to produce a 
‘thicker’ description of each case, to verify the validity of previous information 
and improve the interpretation of results.14 
Figure 3.3 presents the description of the two outcomes. It is apparent that 
factual independence varies greatly across agencies, especially when considered 
in front of elected politicians. Furthermore, the relation between factual independ-
ence from politicians and from regulatees seems quite intricate: the two outcomes 
do not co-vary in any visible manner nor do they configure any straightforward 
trade-off. Therefore, one can plausibly assume that they are determined by differ-
ent sets of explanatory conditions. Before the analysis, the following mini-case 
studies summarise the empirical assessment of the de facto independence of IRAs 
from politicians, and, subsequently, their de facto independence from the regu-
lated industries, as reported in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, according to the two dimensions 
14. This procedure guarantees higher robustness. For instance, in the case of the swico, the informa-
tion about the proportion of the ‘revolving door’ has been checked and confirmed with interviews 
and written documentation. As an illustration, I quote three excerpts: ‘Le secrétariat de la Comco 
aura perdu (…) 25 per cent de son personnel scientifique par rapport à fin 2004’ (Rapport an-
nuel Comco 2005); ‘Es kamen laufend frische Kräfte, direkt von der Uni, mit viel Dynamik. 
Die blieben zwei bis drei Jahre’ (Tages Anzeiger, 3 January 2007); ‘C’est difficile de retenir de 
personnes qui se voient offrir une situation plus intéressante dans le privé (…)’ (Interview) (this 
item generated an indicator that varies from ‘2’ in the case of the belbk to ‘6’ in the case of the 
netbk).
explaining de facto independence (i) 75
outlined above, (i) the self-determination of preferences and (ii) the autonomy of 
the activity of regulation.
de facto 
independence 
from politicians
de facto 
independence 
from regulatees
Figure 3.3:  synthetic view of agencies’ de facto independence
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Table 3.6: Coding the de facto independence of IRAs from the politicians
Case Data (1): defindpdm Scale: Total:
Coded 
as:
belbk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
4
6
5 0.67
gerbk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
4
4 0.5
finbk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
4
3
3 0.33
netbk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
4
4
4 0.5
swebk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
1
4
2 0.17
swibk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
4
4
4 0.5
netco (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
1
6
3 0.33
norco (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
3
4 0.5
sweco (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
4
7
5 0.67
swico (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
3
6
4 0.5
ukico (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
4
5
4 0.5
austc (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
7
5
6 0.83
itatc (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
6
6 
6 0.83
nettc (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
4
3
3 0.33
nortc (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
5
5 0.67
swetc (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
1
6
3 0.33
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Table 3.7: Coding the de facto independence of IRAs from the regulatees
Case Data (2): defindreg Scale: Total:
Coded 
as:
belbk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
6
5 0.67
gerbk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
6
5 0.67
finbk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
6
5 0.67
netbk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
3
4
3 0.33
swebk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
6
5 0.67
swibk (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
2
3
2 0.17
netco (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
6
5 0.67
norco (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
7
6 0.83
sweco (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
6
5 0.67
swico (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
2
5
3 0.33
ukico (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
5
5 0.67
austc (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
2
7
4 0.5
itatc (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
3
6
4 0.5
nettc (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
4
7
5 0.67
nortc (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
5
6
5 0.67
swetc (i) Self-determination of preferences
(ii) Autonomy of the activity of regulation
6
6
6 0.83
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De facto independence of IRAs from politicians
Commission Bancaire, Financière et des Assurances (Belgium)
(i) The revolving door phenomenon is less frequent than on average. In 
particular, former employees of the secretariat of this agency will rarely 
work in the ordinary services of the public administration in the future. 
Contacts and meetings between the agency and the public administration 
are also infrequent, except for reciprocal exchanges of expertise. The 
influence of government, parliament and ordinary public administration 
on agency’s budget is very low, while the government can determine the 
internal organisation of the agency to some extent. The overall weight of 
partisan membership on board members’ nominations is considered to be 
fairly high. However, political parties are homogenously represented in the 
board, and members enjoy equal powers. In addition, forced early depar-
tures of board members, before the end of their mandates, are rare. Lastly, 
the board functions according to a quite consensual mode, and decisions 
are made by deliberation, with some votes. 
(ii) The agency’s rule-making activity regards above all the implementing 
provisions for the minimal standards to which the supervised institutions 
must conform, and the promulgation of detailed technical circulars. Most 
regulation is initiated by the agency secretariat and the agency board itself. 
The drafts of the regulations are then prepared by the secretariat, and, after 
consultation, submitted to the government, who yields to parliament if 
applicable. The interventions of politicians during the rule-making activ-
ity are very infrequent and they are related only to the final step of the 
process when adoption them as pieces of legislation. Then, the secretariat 
is in charge of monitoring and supervising the regulated industries, while 
the board decides upon the individual actions to be taken where necessary. 
Namely, the board can adjudicate administrative sanctions in the applicable 
fields.
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungaufsicht (Germany)
(i) The employees of the secretariat of this agency will frequently work in the 
public administration in the future, but the reverse is not true. Informal con-
tacts and meetings between the agency’s staff and the public administration 
are rare. The government can partly influence the budget of the agency and 
it usually decides upon the structure of its internal organisation. Political 
parties, though, do not play an important role when deciding who should 
become a member of the agency board. The powers of board members 
are not homogenously distributed, as this agency is headed by a president, 
who holds the ultimate responsibility for the execution of the regulatory 
process, despite the fact that she/he actually often delegates some tasks to 
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her/his deputy or to other members of the management. Early departures of 
members and chair replacements are very rare.
(ii) During the activity of regulation, the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstle-
istungaufsicht ensures the application and supplies the implementation 
provisions for the legislation on banking, insurance and securities supervi-
sion, the secondary legislation and the supervisory minimum requirements. 
Government and parliament generally inspire the basic principles of the 
requirements that the regulated industries must satisfy. The agency, in col-
laboration with the ministry of finance, normally works out the draft of the 
regulations, making use of its specialised knowledge. The interventions 
of elected politicians are rather important for the approval of regulations. 
Then, however, monitoring, supervision, and sanctioning competencies are 
mostly delegated to the agency. 
Rahoitustarkastu (Finland)
(i) The revolving door phenomenon is very common for the employees of 
this agency’s secretariat, especially in the direction of the ordinary pub-
lic administration. Ad hoc contacts, regular meetings, and exchanges of 
expertise between the agency and the public administration are also very 
frequent and are considered very important for the agency. However, the 
government, the parliament and the public administration cannot control 
the agency’s budget, and their influence on its internal organisation is low. 
The weight of partisan membership is also low. Departures of members of 
the management board before the end of the mandate are rare, but the chair-
person was quite often replaced during the investigated period. Finally, it is 
worth noting that decisions of the board are made by a majority vote.
(ii) The crucial regulations issued by Rahoitustarkastus concern the prudential 
standards to which supervised institutions must conform, according to the 
capital requirements, risk management and internal control systems. The 
agency has the responsibility of the initiation of new regulations and it is in 
charge of the subsequent procedure of draft preparation, in addition to its 
common attributions concerning monitoring and sanctioning. The elected 
politicians participate actively in several phases of the inner rule-making 
process: impulsion, draft preparation, consultations, and final decision 
making about the adoption of the new regulations.
Autoriteit Financiële Markten (Netherlands)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon for the personnel 
between the agency and the ordinary public administration is not very 
common.  However, contacts with the public administration, and regular 
meetings, especially for expertise exchanges are quite frequent. Then, the 
ministry of finance must approve the final sum of the agency’s budget, 
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and the parliament can also have an indirect influence, through questions 
and pressures to the ministry of finance. The public administration has a 
certain influence on the budget of the agency, too. Conversely, neither the 
government nor the parliament can determine its internal organisation. The 
weight of political parties when deciding who should become a member 
of the board of the agency is considered to be low. Decisions of the board 
are usually made by consensus. Early departures of members are rare, but 
the chairperson was replaced quite frequently during the investigated time-
period.
(ii) Concerning the activity of regulation, this agency is in charge of the 
business conduct of the supervised institutions, whereas the responsible 
for prudential supervision is the central bank. The elected politicians par-
ticipate in some phases of the inner rule-making process, especially in the 
initiation phase and when deciding the adoption of regulations as pieces of 
legislation.
Finansinspektionen (Sweden)
(i) Employees of the secretariat of this agency have frequently worked in the 
ordinary public administration under ministerial responsibility, and they 
will often work there again in the future. Very frequently, different services 
of the public administration ask for the support of the agency for expertise 
purposes. Regular meetings between the agency and the public administra-
tion are constant. It is worth noting that, despite the formal prescriptions of 
structural disaggregation, the Finansinspectionen is considered to be actu-
ally incorporated into the structure of the ordinary public administration, 
as with other public sector agencies. In addition, the influence of govern-
ment and parliament on agency’s budget and on its internal organisation is 
very high. Similarly, political parties are very influential on board member 
nominations. Normally, one half of the representatives is directly appointed 
by the government, and the other half by the opposition. The board is ho-
mogeneous in composition and in power. Early departures of the members 
of the board are rare, and decisions are made by consensus.
(ii) The main regulations concern the prudential specifications of minimum 
capital requirements, internal controls, risk management systems, and 
compliance issues. These regulations are often prepared by specific com-
missions and then submitted to consultations. The agency is the crucial ac-
tor for monitoring and sanctioning, while the inner rule-making processes 
are to a certain extent influenced by the elected politicians, for example 
with reference to their initiation, in the course of draft preparation, and 
when finally deciding to adopt them.
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Eidgenössische Bankenkommission (Switzerland)
(i) The revolving door phenomenon between this agency and the ordinary public 
administration is rare, while ad hoc contacts and regular meetings are quite 
common. Specifically, the public administration frequently asks for the sup-
port of the agency for expertise purposes. The government, the parliament 
and the public administration can partly influence the agency’s budget, and 
they can also determine the agency’s internal organisation to some extent. 
Political parties have a moderate impact when deciding who should become 
a member of the board. Political parties are not homogenously represented, 
while board members enjoy equal powers, except from the president, which 
can be considered a primus inter pares. Decisions are generally made by a 
majority vote. The frequency of early departures of board members is aver-
age, and the chairperson’s position is stable over time.
(ii) Rule-making processes include the provisions for the application of the 
legislation, regulatory circulars and ordinances. The Eidgenössische 
Bankenkommission usually provides inputs for new regulations and works 
out the drafts and propositions. In collaboration with other bodies, it also 
ensures the supervision and sanctioning of the regulated industries. The 
elected politicians participate in some phases of the inner rule-making 
process, such as the initiation, the draft preparation, and the adoption of 
new regulations.
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Netherlands)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon between the agency’s 
personnel and the public administration is common. Ad hoc contacts and 
meetings are also very frequent, especially for expertise purposes. More-
over, the influence of the government and the parliament over the size of 
agency’s budget and its internal organisation is very high. Partisan mem-
bership is considered crucial for board member nominations. In addition, 
the representatives of political parties are not homogenously represented in 
the board, while they enjoy equal powers. The deliberations and the related 
decisions of the board are generally quite consensual.
(ii) The regulations issued by the agency consist of administrative law 
guidelines, recommendations and advice, and opinions on request of the 
regulated companies. The Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit initiates 
the development of regulations, works out the draft and then also detains 
the competencies of monitoring and sanctioning. The elected politicians 
participate sporadically, specifically in consultations for the preparation 
and adoption of new regulations.
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Konkurransetilsynet (Norway)
(i) The frequency of the revolving door phenomenon for employees between 
the agency’s secretariat and the public administration is moderate. Ad hoc 
contacts are not very frequent. The government can to some extent influ-
ence the budget of the agency, but it has almost no chance of determining 
its internal organisation. Parliamentary influence on budget and organisa-
tion is, overall, modest. Political parties do not play any important role 
when deciding who should be nominated as a member of the agency board. 
The director general was replaced only once during the investigated time 
period, and early departures of members are also rare.
(ii) Regulations comprise circulars, recommendations, and regulatory guide-
lines. The agency is in charge of the preparation of the drafts, monitoring 
respect for the regulations, and sanctioning, in the case of non-compliance. 
Elected politicians affect quite intensively the regulatory activity: They 
participate actively in the initiation, the draft preparation, the consultation, 
and the adoption of new regulations.
Konkurrensverhet (Sweden)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon for the agency’s staff in 
the direction of the public administration is on average. The public admin-
istration asks quite frequently for the support of this agency for expertise 
purposes. Regular meetings between the agency and the public administra-
tion are also quite frequent. The influence of government and parliament 
on the budget of the agency is fairly high, but their influence on its internal 
organisation is very low. Political parties do not play an important role in 
the procedure of nomination of the board. Early departures of members are 
rare, and the director general also enjoys a stable position.
(ii) The activity of regulation, namely, the inner rule-making process, spe-
cifically concerns directives and guidelines for the interpretation of the 
competition rules. It appears to be autonomously executed by the Konkur-
rensverhet. Elected politicians intervene rarely, above all during the initial 
consultation phase.
Wettbewerbskommission (Switzerland)
(i) The phenomenon of the revolving door between the agency’s secretariat 
and the ordinary public administration is moderate. Conversely, ad hoc 
contacts and regular meetings are rather frequent. The public administra-
tion quite often asks the support of the agency for expertise purposes. The 
government can determine the budget of the agency, but its actual influence 
on the internal organisation is considered quite low. The parliament has 
almost no weight concerning budget and organisation. However, partisan 
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membership is fairly important for board members nominations. The 
representatives of political parties are not homogeneously represented in 
the board, while members possess equal powers.  Board discussions are 
quite consensual, but most decisions are made by a majority vote. Early 
departures of board members are moderately common, and the chairperson 
was replaced quite frequently.
(ii) The main regulations issued by the Wettbewerbskommission comprise 
circulars, directives and communications. The agency normally initiates, 
prepares and ensures the implementation of regulations. The elected politi-
cians do not significantly affect the regulatory activity, except during the 
phase of consultations.
Competition Commission (United Kingdom)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon for the personnel be-
tween the agency and the public administration is rather frequent. Regular 
meetings and ad hoc contacts are also quite common. The budget of the 
agency is entirely determined by the government, while governmental 
influence on its internal organisation is low. The parliament has almost no 
importance as regards budget and organisation. Partisan membership is also 
irrelevant for nominations. Powers are equally distributed, but the chair-
person has the final decision. Decisions are, however, generally made by 
consensus. Early departures of deputies and directors are very rare, but the 
replacement of the chairperson is rather frequent in the investigated period.
(ii) Regulations principally include rules of procedures, guidelines, advices, 
reports and documents on individual inquiries. These texts are normally 
drafted internally and circulated to third parties for consultation before 
being finalised. The agency has the competence of inquiry in the case of 
non-compliance and can impose sanctions. The political decision makers 
are able to participate in the initiation and the adoption of regulations.
Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs (Austria)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon between the agency 
and the public administration is rare in both directions. Ad hoc contacts 
and regular meetings are moderate, whereas the public administration 
occasionally asks the agency’s support for expertise purposes. The influ-
ence of government and parliament on budget is low and, similarly, their 
influence on the internal organisation is very small. Political parties do not 
play any role when deciding who should become a member of the board 
of the agency. Powers are equally distributed among board members, and 
their discussions and decisions are generally consensual. Early departures 
of board members and the replacement of the chairperson are both very 
infrequent.
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(ii) The Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs issues a number of regulations 
and communications for the regulated industries. The board inspires the 
basic principles of the regulations, together with other independent agen-
cies, and the involved actors. The agency also works out the drafts and 
makes decisions about the adoption of regulations. The relevant services of 
the public administration participate in some later phases of the activity of 
regulation, that is, in monitoring and sanctioning.
Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (Italy)
(i) Employees of the secretariat of this agency have not frequently worked in 
the public sector beforehand, nor they will work for the public adminis-
tration in the future. Ad hoc contacts for expertise purposes between the 
agency and the public administration are moderate, and so are regular 
meetings. The influence of government and parliament on the budget of the 
agency is considered quite low at this time, and it is very low concerning 
its internal organisation. The influence of political parties when deciding 
who should become a member of the board is also considered quite low. 
Powers are equally distributed, and decisions are made by consensus after 
deliberation. Early departures of members or departures of the chairperson 
are very rare, and the latter’s position is rather stable.
(ii) The activity of regulation usually unfolds as follows. The secretariat of 
the agency is in charge for drafting regulation, doing preliminary inquiries 
and adopting regulations. Operational services supervise and refer to the 
board, which is in charge of final decisions. The elected politicians do not 
significantly affect the regulatory activity, apart from participating in the 
initiation of the inner rule-making process.
Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoritei (Netherlands)
(i) Employees of the secretariat of this agency have quite frequently worked 
in the ordinary public administration beforehand, and they will often return 
there in the future. Regular meetings between the agency and the public 
administration are common, and the latter frequently asks for the support 
of the agency for expertise purposes. The influence of the government on 
agency’s budget is quite high, while it is quite low concerning the structure 
of its internal organisation. However, the parliament has no prerogatives 
on the Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoritei. Political par-
ties have a certain influence on nominations of the members of the board, 
while their representatives are not homogeneously represented in the board 
and powers are unequally distributed. Decisions are, however, generally 
consensual. Early departures of board members are very rare, whilst the 
chairperson was occasionally replaced during the investigated period.
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(ii) The most important regulations issued by the agency consist of guidelines, 
circulars and communications about decisions and sanctions. The agency 
works out the draft and adjudicates sanctions in the case of non-respect 
to the supervised institutions. The elected politicians significantly affect 
the activity of regulation: They participate actively in the initiation, draft 
preparation, consultation, and adoption of regulations.
Post- Og Teletilsynet (Norway)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon between the agency and 
the public administration is quite frequent in both directions. Ad hoc con-
tacts and regular meetings are rather rare, even if the public administration 
relies frequently on this agency for expertise purposes. Governments and 
parliaments have a certain influence on the budget of the agency, but they 
cannot determine its internal organisation. The weight of partisan member-
ship on nominations is very low. The director enjoyed a stable position 
during the investigated time period.
(ii) The regulations developed by the Post- Og Teletilsynet concern, in essence, 
the implementing provisions for national legislation and secondary law. 
This agency prepares drafts and organises consultations, makes decisions, 
also ensuring supervision and adjudication. The elected politicians par-
ticipate in some phases of the rule-making process, namely initiation and 
monitoring.
Sweden Post & Telestyrelsen (Sweden)
(i) Agency’s staff frequently worked in the public administration in the past, 
and will return there in the future. Ad hoc contacts, regular meetings and 
exchanges of expertise are continuous. The government and the parliament 
can entirely determine the budget of the agency. Concerning the internal 
organisation, this agency is perceived as a branch of the ordinary public 
administration. Political parties play a quite important role when decid-
ing who should become a member of the board of the agency. They are 
homogeneously represented, and members possess the same competencies. 
Discussions in the board are generally consensual. Early departures are 
quite rare.
(ii) Regulations issued by this agency concern specific regulations, guidelines, 
and communications about decisions. The agency initiates the procedure, 
works out the drafts, adopts the regulations, and ensures supervision and 
sanctioning. The intervention of elected politicians during the activity of 
regulation is moderate and focused on the initiation of the rule-making 
process.
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De facto independence of IRAs from regulatees
Commission Bancaire, Financière et des Assurances (Belgium)
(i) The revolving door phenomenon between this agency and the regulated 
industries is moderate in both directions. In particular, former employees 
of the secretariat of the agency will rarely work for the regulated industries 
in the future. Ad hoc contacts and expertise exchanges with the regulatees 
are not very frequent, and the frequency of regular meetings is on average. 
The regulated industries cannot influence the budget of the agency. Budget-
ary and human resources are regarded as satisfactory. The chairperson, a 
former professor, was hired full-time. Four members of the board out of 
seven were hired full-time (two former employees of the secretariat of the 
agency and two former professors) and three are not full-time, as they work 
as directors of the central bank.
(ii) Those being regulated do not intervene significantly during the rule-making 
process, apart from consultations before adopting the new regulations.
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungaufsicht (Germany)
(i) The employees of the secretariat of this agency occasionally worked in 
the private sector beforehand, while agency’s staff will rarely work in the 
regulated industries in the future. The exchanges of expertise and ad hoc 
contacts are moderate, but informal meetings are regular and frequent. The 
private sector can partly determine the budget of the agency. Budgetary 
resources are, however, satisfactory, and human resources are regarded as 
largely sufficient. The president was hired as the head of the former federal 
banking supervisory authority, which was merged with the insurance and 
securities supervisor in 2002. He is now full-time. The board members 
were also hired full-time, and they held former positions as public officials 
of the ministry of finance (50 per cent), employees of the secretariat of the 
agency (25 per cent), and employees of foreign supervisory authorities (25 
per cent).
(ii) The regulatees usually take part in a single phase of the activity of regula-
tion: namely, the peak association representing the supervised institutions 
is consulted during the draft preparation of the new regulations.
Rahoitustarkastus (Finland)
(i) The employees of the secretariat of this agency occasionally worked in the 
private sector beforehand. They will rarely work in the regulated industries 
in the future. The number of ad hoc contacts is average, while regular meet-
ings are frequent. The private sector sometimes asks for the support of the 
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Rahoitustarkastus for expertise purposes. It has no influence on the budget 
of the agency, and financial and human resources are considered abundant. 
The chairperson and the members of the board were not hired full-time, as 
they are simultaneously enrolled in the ordinary civil service.
(ii) Those being regulated do not intervene significantly during the activity of 
regulation, apart from consultations when preparing the draft of the regula-
tions on minimal prudential standards.
Autoriteit Financiële Markten (Netherlands)
(i) The revolving door phenomenon between the agency’s secretariat and the 
private sector is frequent in both directions. Ad hoc contacts are recur-
rent and regular meetings with the representatives of the private sector are 
rather frequent. The budget is always discussed with the representatives of 
the banking and financial sector. The quantity of financial and human re-
sources appears satisfactory. The chairperson, a former public official, was 
hired full-time. Board members are also hired full-time, and they consist of 
50 per cent of former civil servants and 50 per cent of former managers in 
the private sector.
(ii) Those being regulated intervene moderately in the activity of regulation of 
the Autoriteit Financiële Markten. Specifically, they participate actively in 
the preliminary discussions for the new regulations, and they are consulted 
for the preparation of all the secondary legislation drafted by the agency.
Finansinspektionen (Sweden)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon between this agency 
and the regulated industries is moderate. The number of regular meetings, 
expertise exchanges, and ad hoc contacts is average. The private sector 
can hardly influence the budget of the agency. Budgetary resources are 
considered to be largely sufficient, and human resources are adequate. The 
chairperson, a former civil servant, was hired full-time. Board members are 
not hired full-time; the majority of them have positions as public officials 
(55 per cent), while 11 per cent are employees, executives, and managers 
in the private sector, 11 per cent are liberal professionals (namely lawyers) 
and 22 per cent are members of the parliament.
(ii) The regulatees do not have significant influence over the inner rule-making 
process of Finansinspektionen. They intervene only in consultations during 
the draft preparation of the new regulations.
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Eidgenössische Bankenkommission (Switzerland)
(i) The employees of the secretariat of this agency have quite frequently 
worked in the private sector in the past, and they will work for the regulated 
industries in the future remarkably often. The agency regularly asks for 
the support of the regulated industries and their representatives for exper-
tise purposes, and regular meetings are common. The private sector has 
a limited influence of the budget, but the financial and human resources 
are regarded as barely sufficient. The chairperson, a former executive in 
the private sector, was hired full-time. Members are not full-time, and the 
board composition is as follows: 50 per cent of employees, executives 
and managers from the banking and financial sector, 17 per cent of liberal 
professionals, 33 per cent of professors.
(ii) The regulatees intervene intensively during several phases of the activity 
of regulation, namely through their peak association. They inspire the basic 
principles of the regulations, and participate  in the consultation process 
concerning the draft preparation of regulations. They are also very active 
in monitoring and sanctioning.
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Netherlands)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon between the secretariat 
of this agency and the regulated industries is on average. Regular meetings 
and ad hoc contacts involving personnel of the Nederlandse Mededinging-
sautoriteit are fairly frequent. Those being regulated can hardly influence 
the budget of the agency. Financial and human resources are considered to 
be barely sufficient. The chairperson, a former judge, was hired full-time. 
Members of the board are full-time, and they are all former public officials.
(ii) The regulatees do not influence significantly the activity of regulation. Pro-
ducers’ peak associations intervene only during the phase of open consulta-
tion and during the draft preparation of the regulations issued by the agency.
Konkurransetilsynet (Norway)
(i) The revolving door phenomenon between the agency and the regulatees 
is not very common. Ad hoc contacts, regular meetings and exchanges of 
expertise between this agency and the regulated industries are moderately 
frequent. The private sector cannot influence the budget of the agency. 
Financial and human resources are considered abundant. The director gen-
eral, a former public official, was hired full-time and so were the deputies.
(ii) The activity of regulation of the Konkurransetilsynet is autonomous from 
those being regulated. They do not participate in the development of regu-
lations issued by the agency.
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Konkurrensverhet (Sweden)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon between the agency 
and the regulated industries is on average. Expertise exchanges and ad hoc 
contacts with the private sector are rare, except for some customary meet-
ings between the agency and the representatives of the private sector. The 
regulated industries have almost no influence on the budget of the agency, 
and financial and human resources are regarded as abundant. The director 
general, a former public official and director of another agency, was hired 
full-time.
(ii) The regulatees do not intervene significantly during the activity of regula-
tion. They only participate in the consultations for the draft preparation of 
the regulations issued by the agency.
Wettbewerbskommission (Switzerland)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon between the agency and 
the regulated industries is high in both directions. Contacts and exchanges 
of expertise are also frequent, and so are regular meetings with the repre-
sentatives of the private sector. Even though the private sector has a limited 
influence on the budget of the agency, financial resources are considered to 
be insufficient, and human resources are considered to be barely sufficient. 
The chairperson, a professor and former liberal professional, was not hired 
full-time. Board members are not full-time, either: 6 per cent are public of-
ficials, 22 per cent are representatives of producer associations, 6 per cent are 
representatives of consumers associations, and 66 per cent are professors.
(ii) The regulatees intervene in some stages of the activity of regulation of 
the Wettbewerbskommission. They are especially influential as regards the 
initiation of rule-making processes and during the procedure of consulta-
tion about the draft of the new regulations issued by the agency.
Competition Commission (United Kingdom)
(i) A number of this agency’s staff members have previously worked in the 
private sector and may work in the regulated industries in the future. The 
number of ad hoc contacts and regular meetings is average. Financial 
resources are considered to be abundant and are not influenced by those 
being regulated. Human resources are also adequate. The chairperson, a 
former member of the board and liberal professional, was hired full-time. 
The deputy chairs work four days per week, so are considered part-time. 
They are public officials, employees of the secretariat, employees in the 
private sector, liberal professionals, and professors. The non-executive 
directors sit on the council for one day every two months, but the chief 
executive is a full-time employee.
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(ii) Concerning the activity of regulation of the Competition Commission, the 
regulatees participate in the preparation of the draft of new regulations is-
sued by the agency and are involved in public consultations.
Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs (Austria)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon is common, especially 
in the direction of the private sector. Ad hoc contacts for expertise pur-
poses and regular meetings between the agency and the representatives of 
the regulated industries are very frequent. The regulatees have a limited 
influence on the budget of the agency. Financial and human resources are 
considered adequate. The chairperson and the members of the board are all 
former employees, executives, and managers in the private sector, and they 
are now full-time.
(ii) The regulatees are not involved in the development of regulations issued by 
the Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs; therefore, the activity of regula-
tion is essentially autonomous.
Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (Italy)
(i) Former employees of the secretariat of this agency will quite frequently 
work in the private sector in the future. The exchanges of expertise are 
modest, but informal meetings are very frequent. The budget of the agency 
is strongly determined by those being regulated and it is considered to be 
barely adequate. Human resources are regarded as insufficient. The chair-
person, a former administrative judge, was hired full-time. Members are 
also full-time. The 80 per cent comes from the public sector, 10 per cent 
are former employees, executives and managers in the private sector, and 
10 per cent are professors.
(ii) The regulatees do not significantly influence the regulatory activity of the 
Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, apart from their active par-
ticipation in consultations concerning the regulations issued by the agency.
Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoritei (Netherlands)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon between the agency 
and the private sector is proportionally medium. Ad hoc contacts, expertise 
exchanges and regular meetings are moderately frequent. The regulated 
industries can influence the budget of the agency to a good extent, while fi-
nancial resources and human resources are considered to be sufficient. The 
chairperson, a former liberal professional, was hired full-time. Members 
of the board are not full-time: 50 per cent of them come from the private 
sector, 25 per cent from a liberal profession, and 25 per cent are professors.
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(ii) The activity of regulation of this agency is autonomous as regards the 
influence of those being regulated. They do not intervene in the inner rule-
making process.
Post- Og Teletilsynet (Norway)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon between the agency 
and the public administration is on average. Ad hoc contacts, expertise 
exchanges and regular meeting are quite frequent. The private sector has 
a limited influence on the budget of the agency. Financial and human re-
sources are regarded as largely sufficient. The director, a former employee 
of the secretariat of the agency, was hired full-time.
(ii) The regulatees do not have a significant influence on the regulations issued 
by the Post- Og Teletilsynet. They are integrated in the process only during 
consultations concerning the preparation of the drafts.
Sweden Post & Telestyrelsen (Sweden)
(i) The occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon between the agency and 
the private sector is moderate. Ad hoc contacts and expertise exchange are 
modest, but regular meetings are fairly common. The regulated industries 
have hardly any influence on the budget of the agency. Financial and hu-
man resources are adequate. The chairperson, a public official and former 
professor, was not hired full-time. Board members are not full-time, either, 
and the board is composed as follows: the 60 per cent consists of public 
officials, the 10 per cent of employees of the secretariat of the agency, and 
the 30 per cent of professors.
(ii) The intervention of the regulatees during the activity of regulation is 
moderate, basically limited to the participation in consultations for the 
development of the draft of the new regulations issued by the Sweden Post 
& Telestyrelsen.
Fuzzy-set analysis and discussion
(i) The fuzzy-set analysis is used to assess the necessity and sufficiency of 
each combination of causal conditions for the two distinct outcomes: 
agencies’ de facto independence from the political decision-makers, and 
agencies’ de facto independence from the regulatees.15 I am especially 
interested in the analysis of sufficiency (that is, the identification of the 
combinations of causal conditions that constitute a subset of the outcome), 
15. The second version of the ‘Quine - McCluskey’ algorithm included in the fs/QCA software is 
applied (Ragin et al. 2006).
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while I will employ very restrictive criteria for the test of necessity (that is, 
the examination of whether instances of the outcome represent a subset of 
a specific cause) (Ragin and Giesel 2006).16 According to Ragin, a fuzzy 
set can be considered a variable that has been ‘purposefully calibrated’ to 
indicate the degree of membership in a specified set.17 Researchers can 
adjust partial membership in sets using interval scales between 0 (non-
membership) and 1 (full membership) (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000; 
Ragin 2008b). Then, the fuzzy subset relation is assessed using the fuzzy 
set algebra implemented in software packages such as the above mentioned 
fs/QCA, as follows. After coding raw data, the first analytical step is to dis-
cover all causal conditions (i.e. ‘independent variables’) with membership 
scores that are consistently greater than or equal to outcome (‘dependent 
variable’) membership scores, in order to determine the possible necessary 
conditions (Jackson 2005). The second step is to examine the sufficient 
conditions by means of the comparison of membership scores in the out-
come with the scores of all possible combinations of conditions.18 Then, I 
use the procedure described by Ragin for the assessment of consistency and 
coverage, respectively indicating reliability, that is, how closely the subset 
relation is approximated (i.e. the degree to which the cases sharing a given 
combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome), and validity, 
that is, the empirical relevance of a consistent subset (i.e. the proportion of 
cases following a specific path) (Ragin 2006a).19
16. In set-theoretic terms, the examination of causes shared by cases with the same outcome is 
appropriate for the examination of necessary conditions, while a condition (or combination of 
conditions) is considered sufficient for the outcome if the former is a subset of the latter, i.e. the 
membership score in the cause is less than or equal to the membership score in the outcome (Ra-
gin 2008b). The study of set relations, which are asymmetrical by nature, permits to decompose 
the information that is normally pooled and conflated in symmetrical correlations, in order to fill 
the gap between theory and empirical testing of real-world phenomena that are potentially set 
theoretic (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000; Ragin 2008b).
17. A fuzzy set is a ‘class of objects with a continuum of grades of memberships’, characterised by ‘a 
membership function that assigns to each objects a grade of membership between zero and one’, 
which extends and generalises the Boolean logic grounded in the examination of the presence/
absence of a given condition (Zadeh 1965). In dichotomic Boolean algebra a case is either in or 
out of a set, with 1 indicating the presence and 0 the absence of the condition, while when using 
fuzzy-set theory the membership in sets can be partial, with membership ranging from 1 indicat-
ing full membership and 0 indicating non-membership (Ragin 2000). Using Ragin’s example, 
an Eastern European country might have a membership score of .68 in the fuzzy set of «rich 
countries», whereas this attribute (richness) can be less easily translated in mere dichotomous 
terms.
18. Sufficient combinations of causal conditions are substantially relevant both for case-oriented and 
population-oriented research, because independent variables that exert partial mean effects in 
well-specified statistical models are in fact INUS causes (Mahoney 2008).
19. Consistency and coverage are ‘descriptive measures for evaluating the strength of the empirical 
support for arguments specifying set-theoretic connections’ (Ragin 2008b). The procedure for 
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Results: Agencies’ de facto independence from elected politicians
Results of the fuzzy set analysis of necessary conditions are reported in Table 
3.8 and presented below.20 The most consistent condition is the ‘high coordination 
of the economy’ (0.87). This is a quite important score, but it almost certainly 
does not fulfil the very stringent conditions for the assessment of necessity (i.e. an 
absolute value that is strictly major than 0.95) (Ragin 2006a). Moreover, it makes 
little theoretical sense. No necessary causes are then retained for high de facto 
independence from the elected politicians.
Table 3.8: Necessary conditions for de facto independence from politicians
Outcome: high de facto independence from the politicians
Condition Consistency
manyveto 0.74
oldage 0.75
hformalind 0.86
coordeco 0.88
networks 0.65
sectorpubl 0.36
Afterwards, the fuzzy-set/QCA analysis generates two combinations of con-
ditions, which jointly possess an adequate score of consistency (i.e. an absolute 
value that is strictly major than 0.8) and significant coverage for the test of suffi-
calculating consistency, implemented in the fuzzy-truth table algorithm of fs/QCA (Ragin et al. 
2006), is the following: first, the consistent cases are differentiated from the inconsistent ones 
when their membership score in the causal condition is less or equal to membership in the out-
come; then, the sum of the consistent membership scores in a (combination of) causal condition(s) 
divided by the sum of all membership scores of the (combination of) causal condition(s) produces 
the final measure of set-theoretic consistency (that can be refined further with credit for near 
misses and penalties for scores that largely exceed their mark) (Ragin 2006a). The set-theoretic 
measurement of coverage corresponds to the number of cases that display the outcome following 
a specific path divided by the total number of instances of the outcome in crisp-set analysis ; and, 
similarly, to the proportion of the sum of the membership scores in the outcome in the case of 
fuzzy-set analysis (Ragin 2008b).
20. The standard terminology of the Boolean algebra and fuzzy set theory is adopted. The logical 
AND (set intersection) is represented by the * symbol (multiplication). The logical OR (set union) 
is represented by the + symbol (addition). The à symbol (arrow) indicates the causal connection 
between the conditions and the outcome. An upper case letter represents the value 1 for a given 
variable (presence for binary variables, respectively strong membership for interval-scale vari-
ables). A lower case letter represents the value 0 for a given variable (absence for binary variables, 
respectively weak membership for interval-scale variables) (Rihoux and Ragin 2008).
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ciency, using the following model (see Table 3.9 for the truth table and Table 3.10 
for the solution): 21
DEFINDPDM = SECTORPUBL + MANYVETO + HFORMALIND + 
COORDECO + NETWORKS + OLDAGE:
OLDAGE+
MANYVETO*HFORMALIND 
 DEFINDPDM
The coverage score of the overall solution is excellent (0.92). However, two 
unique solutions must be discarded, as they display a null empirical relevance: 
SECTORPUBL and HFORMALIND*COORDECO. The two remaining combina-
tions of conditions can be retained (OLDAGE and MANYVETO*HFORMALIND), 
given their consistency score, (0.80 and respectively 0.85), that is, above the 
benchmark level 0.8 (Ragin 2006a).
Table 3.9: Truth table – de facto independence of IRAs from the politicians
sector-
publ
many-
veto
hfor-
malind
coor-
deco
net-
works
oldage n
defind-
pdm
Consis-
tency
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.77
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.96
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.78
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.79
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.86
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.91
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.95
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.94
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.81
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.96
21. The procedure for obtaining a crisp table from fuzzy sets is recommended, in order to improve 
transparency and to consent the computation of the measures of consistency and coverage (Ragin 
2005b). Table 3.9 is a fuzzy-set truth table (Ragin 2008b).
explaining de facto independence (i) 95
Table 3.10: Truth table solution – de facto independence of IRAs from the 
politicians
Raw 
coverage
Unique 
coverage
Consistency
OLDAGE+ 0.75 0.18 0.80
MANYVETO*HFORMALIND+ 0.64 0.01 0.85
SECTORPUBL+ 0.36 0.00 0.59
HFORMALIND*COORDECO 0.63 0.00 0.88
Solution coverage: 0.92
Solution consistency: 0.68
The results of the fuzzy set analysis can be interpreted as follows. As high for-
mal independence is neither a necessary nor a single sufficient condition for high 
de facto independence, we can confirm Hypothesis 1.1 about the causal disjunc-
ture between formal and de facto independence. Indeed, agencies can enjoy a high 
level of de facto independence even without regard to formal independence. See, 
for example, the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungaufsicht in Germany, the 
Norwegian Konkurransetilsynet, and the Konkurrensverhet in Sweden. 
Crucial conditions in both expressions leading to high de facto independence 
are the old age of IRAs and the presence of many veto players, the latter in com-
bination with high formal independence. Therefore, agencies are highly de facto 
independent when they are old and when the politicians have to cope with several 
veto players. This means that the presence of multiple veto players fosters the for-
mal independence of agencies, as it becomes more difficult for divided principals 
to sway the regulatory action. Moreover, agencies may benefit from a process of 
autonomisation when ageing. This finding is clearly in line with Hypothesis 1.2 
about the positive effect of veto players and old age of agencies. This is the case, 
for instance, of the Belgian Commission Bancaire, Financière et des Assurances.
The third sufficient combination (HFORMALIND + COORDECO) presents 
poor coverage, therefore it should be interpreted with some care. However, it is in-
teresting to note that, quite surprisingly, the presence of highly coordinated econo-
mies turns out to be a jointly sufficient condition for independence. My theoretical 
expectations on this point are thus not confirmed. In contrast to Hypothesis 1.3, 
the presence of a coordinated economy comes out as a condition leading to high 
de facto independence from politicians, likewise the case of the Rundfunk und 
Telekom Regulierungs in Austria and the Italian Autorità per le Garanzie nelle 
Comunicazioni. This is quite unexpected, as we may reasonably suppose that in 
a coordinated economy, the network of relationships among the politicians, the 
regulators, and the private actors will be denser, suggesting a lower de facto inde-
pendence of agencies. However, an alternative explanation could be that the need 
for coordination among the relevant stakeholders may favour a sort of horizontal 
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control, implying that the elected politicians cannot critically sway the agencies. 
Incidentally, note that the path dependence from the prior mode of sectoral regula-
tion has no effect. In that regard, it is worth noting that there is no apparent sector-
specific or country-specific pattern, suggesting thereby the limited significance of 
explanations in terms of ‘bureaucratic culture’ (as predicted by my exploratory 
studies based on different model specifications, too).
Results: De facto independence from the regulatees
Pertaining to explanations for high de facto independence from the regulatees, 
again, no necessary causes are included in the analysis, given the restrictive condi-
tions for the assessment of necessity (see Table 3.11).
Table 3.11: Necessary conditions for de facto independence from politicians
Outcome: high de facto independence from the regulatees
Condition Consistency
networks 0.65
sectpubl 0.33
oldage 0.66
coordeco 0.81
orgreg 0.68
defindpdm 0.72
Nevertheless, we obtain two significant combinations of jointly sufficient con-
ditions (according to Tables 3.12 and 3.13), for the model:
DEFINDREG = COORDECO + NETWORKS + OLDAGE + DEFINDPDM + 
ORGREG:
The solution coverage score is very satisfactory (0.88), indicating a very high 
empirical relevance of the subset relations under examination. Concerning the 
level of consistency, three combinations of conditions present a sufficient consist-
ency score to be considered, that is, above the benchmark value of 0.8: OLDAGE 
(0.83), NETWORKS*defindpdm (0.96), and  coordeco*NETWORKS (0.98). The 
latter, however, can be discarded, as it displays a null unique coverage.
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Table 3.12: Truth table – de facto independence of IRAs from the regulatees
coordeco networks oldage defindpdm orgreg n defindreg Consist
1 1 0 1 1 2 0 0.88
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.93
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.98
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 3.13: Truth table solution – de facto independence of IRAs from the regulatees
Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency
OLDAGE+ 0.66 0.16 0.83
orgreg+ 0.33 0.06 0.63
NETWORKS*defindpdm+ 0.53 0.06  0.96
coordeco*NETWORKS 0.48 -0.00 0.98 
Solution coverage: 0.88
Solution consistency: 0.72 
NETWORKS appears to be a sufficient causal condition for agencies’ de facto 
independence in combination with low de facto independence from the politi-
cians (or, respectively, coordeco, even if this latter solution possess a poor cover-
age). To begin with, the fact that agencies are highly de facto independent from 
regulatees when they participate in European networks of agencies confirms 
the pertinence of Hypothesis 1.4. See, in this regard, the cases of the German 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungaufsicht, the Finnish Rahoitustarkastus, the 
Swedish Finansinspektionen, and the Dutch Mededingingsautoriteit. Plausibly 
these agencies are reinforced by the diffusion of expertise and information coming 
from other regulators, while gaining potential allies in front of third parts. In other 
words, networks seem to offer a range of technical and symbolic resources to IRAs 
that enhance their emancipation from the regulatees. Furthermore, the concomi-
tant presence of the condition ‘defindpdm’ is in line with the conceptualisation of 
IRAs as intermediary agencies: The relationship between agencies and politicians 
and, respectively, the relationship between agencies and those being regulated are 
mutually related, in line with Hypothesis 1.5. To be precise, it appears that an 
agency cannot be a servant of two masters: if it is scarcely independent from the 
politicians, it should be highly independent from those being regulated. Moreover, 
interestingly, and against some pessimistic insights of the theory of agencies’ life-
cycle, OLDAGE seems also to support their independence vis-à-vis the regulatees. 
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Conclusion
The primary aim of this chapter was to develop a sound approach for conceptu-
alising and assessing the de facto independence of IRAs from elected politicians 
and, respectively, from regulatees, so as to explore the complex causal relations 
between formal independence, as prescribed in the constitutions of agencies, and 
de facto independence, as it is effectively implemented in practice. To this end, or-
ganisational, institutional, and political explanations were examined with a cross-
national and cross-sectoral comparison of sixteen Western European IRAs using 
fuzzy-set analysis. The heuristic power of this technique was illustrated by the 
empirical analysis, pointing to the advantages of applying a framework of com-
plex causation on a small-to-medium number of cases. The results demonstrate 
that formal independence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for ex-
plaining variations in the de facto independence of agencies. Other factors have a 
decisive impact.
The high level of agencies’ de facto independence from elected politicians can 
be explained with two combinations of jointly sufficient conditions. First, formal 
independence combined with the presence of many veto players leads to high de 
facto independence. Second, agencies can enjoy a high level of de facto independ-
ence, even regardless formal independence, when they are in place for a long time. 
The high de facto independence from regulatees can also be explained by two 
combinations of causal conditions. Agencies are highly de facto independent from 
those being regulated when they are old and when they are part of official net-
works of agencies at European level. This is the case when agencies are scarcely 
de facto independent from elected politicians, corroborating the hypothesis about 
the conceptualisation of IRAs as intermediary agencies: an agency cannot be the 
servant of two masters.
To sum up, with a quite robust and parsimonious empirical analysis, this 
chapter showed that de facto independence matters and divergence from formal 
independence reflect a significant range of causal conditions. Three main theo-
retical insights can be derived from this research study. First, it suggests that for-
mal independence alone is insufficient for explaining variations in the de facto 
independence of IRAs. This point is critical for the study of the consequences of 
agencification, as the disjuncture between statutory and effective independence 
will render the structural disaggregation and consequent separateness from the 
representative institutions problematical, making the democratic deficit even more 
questionable (Majone 2002). Similarly, the delegation of public authority to IRAs 
could be challenged, as their capacity to deliver ‘better’ regulatory outputs would 
be potentially reduced in relation to the expectations, given that the effective im-
plementation of formal independence is seen as the precondition for high-quality 
regulation. Thus, special attention should be given to factors that enable the proper 
implementation of statutory prescriptions; otherwise, the accountability structure 
of the regulatory regime could become unintelligible and hardly lead to legitimacy 
gains (Majone 1999).
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Two explanatory conditions have special theoretical relevance. On the one 
hand, the impact of agencies’ networks: the embeddedness of IRAs into inter-
national networks promotes de facto independence, while ideally also producing 
a situation where ‘no one controls the agency, yet the agency is under control’ 
through ‘peer pressures’ and reputational mechanisms (this state of affairs be-
ing still an open empirical question) (Moe 1985; Majone 1994a; Majone 1996a; 
Majone 1997b). On the other hand, the role of veto players: As mentioned before, 
the theory of delegation seems incomplete on this point, because veto players are a 
precondition for delegation according to the literature on central banks while they 
can be a functional equivalent of delegation in the case of IRAs (Gilardi 2007). 
Following the empirical analysis, the findings of this chapter would suggest that 
the political strategies before delegation differ in the two cases: elected politicians 
might anticipate that they will be able to informally steer agencies to some extent, 
whereas the same would be more difficult in the case of central banks. In fact, the 
mandate of central banks is clearer, simpler and more difficult to reorient than the 
complex mix of overlapping tasks that is usually attributed to IRAs. Therefore, 
politicians, when they can choose, are comparatively more eager to delegate com-
petencies to IRAs that enjoy high formal independence, in order to enhance regu-
latory credibility, while in the case of central banks a broad delegation of powers 
is more likely in the case of the presence of many veto players that prevent further 
policy changes. Above all, the results of this empirical analysis are also relevant 
because it appears that the presence of veto players is a crucial condition for effec-
tively translating high formal independence into factual independence. This im-
plies a possible dilemma: countries with less veto players are said to give agencies 
more formal independence, but veto players constitute one of the (sufficient but 
not necessary) conditions for implementing high formal independence in practice.
Second, it appears that actors other than the elected politicians, namely the 
representatives of the regulated sector, may have a decisive influence on agen-
cies’ de facto independence. This finding sustains the conceptualisation of IRAs 
as intermediary organisations, which are involved in a double relationship with the 
political decision makers and with those being regulated, whereby the two double 
relations are significantly influencing each other (Braun 1993). This finding is 
particularly relevant because an agency can hardly survive in the long run if it is 
not capable of avoiding the trap of being captured by the elected politicians or the 
regulatees (Braun 1997). Third, in that regard, the analysis shows that regulators 
are neither constantly under direct political control nor are they systematically 
captured by the regulated industries, challenging thus a crucial argument of the 
economic theory of regulation (Stigler 1971; Pelzman  et al. 1989). Rather, they 
constitute a relatively new, important player of regulatory governance, that, more 
often than not, enjoy a considerable level of de facto independence, while cu-
mulating competencies of rule-making, monitoring, sanctioning and adjudication, 
even if, under some circumstances, external actors may be occasionally able to 
influence the agencies’ conduct of regulatory tasks.

chapter 
four
the role of independent regulators 
in lawmaking (II)
Summary
This chapter examines the role of IRAs in policy making, focusing on six cases 
concerning the revision of crucial laws related to the competencies of independent 
regulators. These cases were selected from three small European countries (the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland) and two policy areas (banking/finance 
and competition). After collecting survey and documental information on the 
participation and weight of each actor, the actor-process-event scheme (APES) 
was used to obtain a synthetic measure of agencies’ centrality in the course of 
each policy process. My hypotheses on the centrality of agencies are then tested 
with a ‘two-step’ qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Results suggest that de 
facto independence from political decision makers is a necessary condition for the 
maximal centrality of agencies in policy making, whilst non-professionalisation 
of the legislature and low independence from regulatees are jointly sufficient for 
explaining this outcome.
Introduction: IRAs and policymaking
This chapter focuses on the role of independent agencies in policy-making 
beyond their regulatory competencies. It should be noted that not all public sector 
organisations that participate in policy making are regulatory agencies: some have 
executive tasks; others are simple consultative organisations for policy makers. 
Not all agencies are formally independent; some are in subordinate relationships 
with ministries and the ordinary public administration. The most institutionalised 
IRAs are those promoting market regulation: general competition authorities, utility 
regulators, and banking and financial commissions (Thatcher 2002d, 2005a). The 
political decision makers delegated to those IRAs several regulatory competencies, 
for instance, the issuing and enforcement of licenses for operating in the market; 
the regulation of important market operations, such as mergers and takeovers; the 
prevention of anti-competitive behaviour of the regulated firms; the prudential 
supervision of the financial institutions; the setting of minimal quality standards to 
which those being regulated should conform; the elaboration of directives, circulars, 
and guidelines; and the prospect for imposing fines and other measures to sanction 
the infringements of the rules they issue (Majone 1994b; Gilardi 2002b; Coen and 
Thatcher 2005; Levi-Faur 2005a; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005).
However, beyond their regulatory attributions, agencies also represent a new 
type of political actor in Western Europe. Following the process of delegation, 
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they obtain not only considerable public authority for executing their regulatory 
tasks, but they also gain exclusive competencies involving material and symbolic 
resources, constituting valuable political capital (Sørensen 2002; Sørensen and 
Torfing 2003). In fact, IRAs should not be considered neutral technocratic devices, 
but institutions that are created through a process of collective choice among the 
‘insiders’ and imposed on society as a whole, hence also to the ‘losers’ of the 
coordination games, being thus directly involved in political struggles for attaining 
a number of political goals (Moe 2005). In this context, IRAs have incentives for 
involving themselves in policy making. On the one hand, they are likely to look 
for institutional legitimacy as a major resource for securing their survival within 
the social and economic environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). On the other 
hand, once they are in place, according to their organisational logic, agencies are 
expected to seek political power, defined at the most basic level of signification, 
that is, instrumental participation in decision making for the resolution of political 
issues (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Accordingly, one shall expect that agencies 
play an important role in policy making. First, agencies can be included in decision 
processes in order to legitimise a preformatted solution developed by the political 
actors in favour of a given reform. Second, they should possess the technical 
expertise and exclusive pieces of information that can be considered useful for 
developing the ‘best solution’ to a given problem. Third, their agreement can be 
considered necessary by the political decision makers in order to ensure the proper 
implementation of the new laws. 
The empirical literature in political science typically deals with the question 
of the governmental and parliamentary influence on agencies, and the balance 
between control and discretion over executive bureaucracies (Weingast and 
Moran 1983; Weingast 1984; McCubbins et al. 1987; Bawn 1995; Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1996; Hammond and Knott 1996; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Huber 
et al. 2001; Huber and Shipan 2002). The question about the policy discretion 
of agencies is considered particularly relevant, as delegating powers involves a 
constant tension between effectiveness and responsiveness, and the place where 
policy is actually made may have significant impact on policy outcomes (Epstein 
and O’Halloran 1999). The role of IRAs in the core of the policy process, namely, 
lawmaking, has been less intensively investigated.  However, some general 
insights can be mentioned, starting from the radical position of Lowi who argued 
that delegation to unelected regulatory agencies corresponds to the abdication 
of the parliament’s policy-making role, resulting in an opaque process where 
the particular interests are gaining power at the expense of the legislature (Lowi 
1969). The counterarguments are numerous; first of all, several authors suggested 
that delegation to agencies is politically efficient (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). 
Accordingly, the process of delegation, in theory, is scattered by a series of control 
mechanisms, such as opportunities for oversight, parliamentary hearings and 
reports requirements (McCubbins et al. 1987; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). At 
the same time, according to Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast, bureaucrats are 
active participants in the (American) policy-making process, conceptualised as a 
strategic game, where legislators, the chief executive, and bureaucratic agents to 
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whom authority is delegated interact constantly and develop durable relationships 
(Calvert et al. 1989). Other scholars came to similar conclusions, applying a 
principal-agent transaction cost approach to study the relations among the elected 
politicians and autonomous agencies in policy making (Huber and Shipan 2002). 
After the development of the regulatory state in Europe (Majone 1997a; 
Moran 2002) and the transformation of West European policy styles (Richardson 
2000) a new wave of research on the impact of agencification on political systems 
emerged. A common finding is that the expansion of regulatory governance may 
lead to unintended consequences as regards the hierarchy and the relationships 
among political actors (McGowan and Wallace 1996; Gehring 2004; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004). Wilks and Bartle argued that competition agencies, although 
created essentially for symbolic purposes and not expected to be active in 
rulemaking or implementation, have gradually redefined their roles so as to 
exert a material impact on market economies. There is also evidence showing 
that contextual factors shape the functioning of agencies and imply potential 
implementation problems (Hood et al. 2001; Peters 2001; Pollitt et al. 2004; 
Christensen and Yesilkagit 2005; Christensen and Lægreid 2005). Similarly, 
some studies emphasised the changes introduced by IRAs in decision-making 
processes, which have dramatically opened up, in contrast to closed processes 
before delegation (Thatcher 2002d; Coen and Thatcher 2005). As a consequence, 
it appears that independent regulatory agencies have become the ‘third force’ in 
regulation, constituting a set of political that is more or less differentiated from 
elected politicians and regulatees (Thatcher 2005a).
Nonetheless, a number of crucial questions are still on the table, namely 
concerning the factors explaining the role of IRAs in policy making, from a 
systematic comparative perspective that entails an investigation of the whole 
policy process. The research questions guiding this chapter can be summarised 
as follows:
1. Are IRAs more central in the policy-making process than other 
actors?
2. In which stages of the policy-making process are IRAs the most 
central?
3. What explains the expected variations in the centrality of IRAs 
in policy making?
Plausibly, one of the major reasons of these research gaps is the absence of 
a way of conceptualising the role of agencies that can be used in cross-national 
and cross-sectoral studies. In an effort to address these issues, the role of agencies 
will be made operational in this chapter with a measure of agencies’ centrality in 
policy making. 
The measure developed here combines a structural perspective with a 
reputational approach, assuming that the aggregated information on the 
‘participation’ and ‘perceived importance’ of actors indicates their overall 
influence in policy making. To be precise, central actors are considered to hold 
a key role in the lawmaking process. The rest of this chapter is structured as 
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follows: first, I will present five theoretical expectations to explain variations 
in the centrality of agencies in policy making. Second, I will present the logic 
of the comparison. After discussing how to compare different decision-making 
processes and case selection, I will operationalise the ‘dependent’ variable—
the centrality of IRAs in the course of the decision-making processes—with the 
actor-process-event scheme (APES). The qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 
follows. According to the analysis, de facto independence from political decision 
makers is a necessary condition for the maximal centrality of agencies in policy 
making, and the combination of non-professionalisation of the legislature and low 
independence from the representative of the regulated sector is jointly sufficient 
for explaining this outcome. 
Theoretical expectations
Analytical framework
This first step is to seek to identify the explanatory factors for the higher centrality 
of IRAs in policy making. As for the first empirical part, I will use a configurational 
method to discern the different combinations of competing or complementary 
conditions leading to the outcome, assuming that causal complexity is the rule 
instead than the exception (Rihoux and Ragin 2008). Here, due to the nature of the 
causal conditions, which can be dichotomised, and to the number of cases, which 
is limited to six for reasons of feasibility and comparability of the policy making 
processes, the crisp sets version of QCA is adopted (Ragin 1987, 2005a, b). This 
time, hypotheses about each explanatory factor are presented separately. In fact, 
the main aim of this chapter is to discern the effect of de facto independence 
of IRAs on their role in lawmaking, and not to fully explain agencies’ centrality 
in policy-making. Nonetheless, the possibility of finding other complex causal 
patterns is open, in line with the partially inductive focus of the QCA technique, 
oriented towards exploration and discovery (Schneider and Wagemann 2003). 
Hypothesis 1, as outlined below, does not refer to a particular causal relation but it 
is essentially descriptive; Hypotheses 2 and 3 relate to ‘remote’ explanatory factors 
(i.e. structural or contextual factors that enable the occurrence of the outcome); 
and Hypotheses 4 and 5 refer to ‘proximate factors’ (i.e. factors closely linked 
to the outcome that connote the causal relationship) (Schneider and Wagemann 
2006) (see Figure 4.1). 
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Outline of the hypotheses:
H 2.1 IRAs hold the most central role in policy making.
H 2.2 Monocratic system Æ higher centrality of IRAs.
H 2.3 Non-professionalised legislature Æ higher centrality of IRAs.
H 2.4 Sector-specific expertise Æ higher centrality of IRAs.
H 2.5 a) High de facto independence from political decision-makers  Æ higher 
centrality of IRAs.
b) Low de facto independence from regulatees Æ higher centrality of 
IRAs.
4.3.2 Hypotheses
The overall centrality of IRAs in policy making
The literature on agencies and policy making typically examines the ability of 
elected politicians to control agencies and shape the regulatory outcomes, and, 
respectively, the discretion of agencies when carrying out their regulatory duties in 
front of their political principals (Bernstein 1977; Weingast 1984; McCubbins et al. 
1987; Calvert et al. 1989; Spiller 1990; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Hammond 
and Knott 1996; Spence 1997; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Gerber and Teske 
2000; Bendor et al. 2001; Carpenter 2001b; Peters 2001; Moran 2002). However, 
it is worth looking at the question also from the reverse angle, starting from the 
observation that the capacity of independent regulatory agencies to take part in 
policy making and influence lawmaking has been much less investigated. This is 
a crucial question for policy analysis, when presuming that regulatory agencies, 
even though they are formally independent – and perhaps precisely because of 
their high independence from elected politicians – should play a key role in policy 
making as well. In fact, as mentioned in the introduction, besides the execution 
of regulatory tasks in a narrow sense, the delegation of public authority led to the 
establishment of a new, distinct and apparently powerful kind of political actor. 
The study of post-delegation relationships showed that IRAs hold distinctive 
functions in regulatory policies, hence representing a crucial actor in regulatory 
governance, along with governments and regulatees (Thatcher 2005a). IRAs are 
likely to initiate new legislative procedures, offer their expertise to the decision 
makers, and ensure implementation of the new rules. IRAs dispose from essential 
resources for policy making in terms of technical expertise, and they benefit from a 
unique acquaintance with the regulated sector that is critical for collecting relevant 
information and gaining political support (Majone 2001a). As a consequence, 
IRAs are expected to be integrated extensively in the political processes, more 
than extra-parliamentary commissions, in which experts and interest groups 
participate mainly for consultative purposes, and more than ordinary agencies, 
which are subordinated to the ministry in charge, being determinant in the course 
of policy making. 
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H 2.1 IRAs are expected to hold the most central role in the course of the 
political decision-making processes in their area of competence.The 
political-administrative culture
This study concentrates on agencies that enjoy formal independence from elected 
officials, that is, those that benefit from statutory prescriptions of separateness. 
The formal structure of bureaucracies has well-known consequences on their 
relations with the government and other political actors (Egeberg 1999). 
However, not only formal rules but also informal norms are expected to affect the 
role of agencies in substantive policy making, following the so-called political-
administrative culture (Peters 2001). The sociological institutionalist literature 
shows that institutions function as routines and procedures that entail taken-for-
granted norms for action (Berger and Luckmann 1966; March and Olsen 1989; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1991). According to a ‘logic of appropriateness’, political 
actors go through a socialisation process and follow rules that associate particular 
identities to specific situations, whereby ideational factors shape the appropriate 
rule for a given situation (March and Olsen 2004). In this sense, the perceptions 
of the appropriate role of organisations are encapsulated in the institutional ethos, 
practices, and expectations about the proper behaviour of actors at individual 
and collective level. These shared understandings influence the way actors 
define their goals and what they perceive as rational action, and redefine their 
interests and identities accordingly (Börzel and Risse 2000). It follows that similar 
organisations may function differently in practice, according to the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ surrounding their respective institutional framework. The official 
organisational means and ends could be reinterpreted and incorporated into the 
institutional norms, ideas, meanings, and practices. Concretely, we can distinguish 
between a vertically integrated system, called ‘monocratic’, and a dual model in 
which a strict separation between political decision-making and administrative 
implementation exists. In the former case, no ‘cultural’ limitation to the inclusion 
of IRAs in the policy-making process exists. Conversely, we may expect that in 
the latter case, equally formally independent agencies have fewer opportunities to 
influence the policy-making process because of a different logic of appropriateness, 
which characterises the decision-making process as an exclusive competence of 
ministerial departments and executive agencies.
H 2.2 The presence of a ‘monocratic’ system is expected to lead to the higher 
centrality of IRAs in policy making, unlike a dual model.
The professionalisation of the legislature and public administration 
According to the core assumption of rational choice institutionalism, institutions 
represent structures of incentives that enable and constrain actors’ behaviour, 
which can be in turn modelled as strategic games eventually leading to ‘structure-
induced’ equilibria (Ostrom 1986; Shepsle 1995; North 1998). In this context, 
policy makers have two types of rational incentives for integrating regulatory 
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agencies in policy making, in line with the notion of epistemic communities, that 
is,  ‘networks of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within 
that domain or issue-area’ (Haas 1992). On the one hand, following a problem-
solving perspective, agencies’ expertise can be considered crucial to find the ‘best’ 
solution to a given problem; on the other hand, from a strategic point of view, the 
role of agencies in policy making may depend on the varying need for legitimising 
the solution preferred by policy-makers in a number of policy issues. In both cases, 
the relevant institutional feature that shall determine the magnitude of the pressures 
for including agencies in policy making is the degree of professionalisation of the 
legislature and the ordinary civil service.
Concretely, we can distinguish between specialised, professionalised 
legislatures and a less professionalised parliamentary model in terms of resources 
and staff (Huber and Shipan 2002). In countries where the legislature is more 
professionalised, legislators should have the capacities, resources and ability 
to write detailed, policy-specific legislation. This also depends on the extent to 
which political decision makers can directly rely on civil servants for dealing with 
technical issues on the political agenda. On the contrary, if members of parliaments 
only have part-time positions that are relatively low paying, independent agencies 
should be intensively included in the course of the decision-making processes 
because of the constant need for expertise or technocratic legitimacy. Agencies are 
indeed highly specialised bodies that possess a distinctive expertise capacity in 
the field due to their vast resources, their technical competencies, and their regular 
interaction with the regulated sector.
H 2.3 IRAs are expected to be highly central in policy making where the 
legislature is non-professionalised.
Sector-specific expertise
Following a crucial argument of historical institutionalism, policy-making processes 
are largely determined by specific historical trajectories. This phenomenon is due, 
on the one hand, to the self-reinforcing effect of existing structures and patterns of 
behaviour; on the other, to the distributional effects of institutions that reproduce 
the existing allocation of power in specific time junctures (Thelen 1999; Pierson 
2000; Pierson and Skocpol 2002).  According to this view, regulators are likely 
to develop different policy-making roles over time, as processes of political 
feedback may occur, reinforcing the political functions of those agencies that 
already enjoy important tasks in regulation. In other words, the relative ‘force’ 
of IRAs in regulation should also foster their influence in lawmaking. Given the 
differential levels of institutionalisation across regulatory fields, the magnitude of 
this phenomenon is expected to vary from sector to sector.
The starting point is the consideration that legislatures, governments and 
ordinary bureaucracies rarely dispose from the resources required to make 
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effective responses to specific policy problems (Papadopoulos 2003), so they 
must increasingly rely on presumably independent experts to shape public policy 
(Majone 2001a; Pollack 2002; Héritier and Eckert 2008). Accordingly, the 
need for expertise that results from a state of imperfect information and scarce 
resources of the political decision makers, and the related lack of capacity to 
perform crucial tasks, is an important justification for delegation to IRAs (Pollack 
2002; Pollack 2003). Agencies are expected to develop and employ expertise in 
order to produce, or help their ‘principals’ to produce, appropriate public policies 
(Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). According to the argument developed above, 
one can distinguish between sector-specific regulation and general regulation. In 
the first case, namely in areas perceived as technically complex, agencies enjoy 
a structurally important position, due to their unique expertise in regulation that 
may, in turn, affect their role in policy making. One might suppose that sector-
specific IRAs are the taken-for-granted technocratic tool for developing the ‘best’ 
regulatory policy by providing reliable pieces of advice to decision makers, due 
to the prior experience in regulation. Conversely, the second case, that is, general 
competition regulation, is considered a more politically salient and a less technical 
issue, for which agencies’ participation should be less important. These IRAs are 
thus expected to be less involved in the development of new legislation. To sum 
up, we can expect that the agencies’ centrality in policy making should be higher 
in a very technical sector, such as finance, than in general competition regulation.
H 2.4 IRAs possessing sector-specific expertise are expected to play a very 
central role in policy making, unlike general regulators.
De facto independence
De facto independence characterises the effective autonomy of agencies during 
their day-to-day regulatory action (Maggetti 2007). This variable, which is 
determined not only by formal prescriptions for independence but, above all, 
from organisational and institutional factors, constitutes in turn a critical resource 
for regulators that is expected to influence their role in policy making. To be 
precise, factually independent IRAs should also be key political actors. Rational 
choice institutionalist and sociological institutionalist logics are expected to be 
complementarily or alternatively present, depending from whether efficiency-
driven or legitimacy-driven behaviour can be considered prevalent. First, a high 
level of de facto independence from political decision makers should be related 
to an instrumental argument for including agencies in the policy process, as 
independent agencies are considered to retain crucial pieces of information that 
are seen as essential for policymakers. Instead, non-independent agencies should 
not necessarily be integrated in policy making because due to the permanent 
contacts and structural commonalities with the political decision makers, the latter 
would previously possess the relevant information. What is more, when IRAs are 
included in policy-making processes in order to legitimate the prior position of the 
political actors that are in favour of a given reform, they are not expected to be 
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truly influential to the development of the new law. Finally, a low level of de facto 
independence from regulatees is also expected to lead to the inclusion of agencies 
in the decision-making process, in order to overcome ex-ante their potential 
veto in later stages of policy making. Indeed, the political decision makers will 
plausibly perceive those agencies, which are ‘captured’ by regulatees’ interests, as 
credible veto players (Tsebelis 2002) that might challenge the implementation of 
the new rules.
H 2.5 a) High de facto independent IRAs from political decision makers should 
be central actors in policy making.
 b) Low de facto independent IRAs from regulatees should be central 
actors in policy making.
Agencies’
MAXCENTRALITY
dual
profess
EXPERT
DEFINDPDM
defindreg
*
*
*
*
Remote
factors
Proximate
factors
Figure 4.1: The explanatory model
Methodology
First, a comparative logic close to a ‘most similar system design’ (Przeworski 
and Teune 1970) is adopted to select a set of countries by comparing cases as 
similar as possible, those that differ only in those ‘independent’ variables (‘causal 
conditions,’ in QCA terms), which could explain the variation of the ‘dependent’ 
variable (‘outcome condition’). This method, combined with a qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987), can be used to identify necessary 
and sufficient causes leading to the outcome (Mahoney 2007). Here, the causal 
conditions derived from the above mentioned hypotheses refer to the existence 
of a dual/monocratic political-administrative system; the professionalisation 
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of the legislature; the sector-specific expertise of the agency in charge; the de 
facto independence from elected politicians; and the de facto independence from 
regulatees. The (positive) outcome is the maximal centrality of the investigated 
agency, compared to the centrality of the other actors involved in lawmaking.
The crisp set QCA technique relying on Boolean algebra is used to perform 
a diversity-oriented systematic comparison. Each case is conceived as a 
combination of dichotomised (present/absent) causal conditions that lead to the 
outcome. Given the number of cases and the nature of variables, this method is 
particularly suitable for the present study. Following the approach developed by 
Schneider and Wagemann (2006), a two-step QCA analysis will be executed. This 
implies first the identification of contextual conditions (remote factors) that enable 
the occurrence of the outcome. Second, the remote factors are combined with 
more specific conditions (proximate factors) in a more precise analysis in order 
to find out necessary and sufficient combinations leading to the outcome. The 
goal is to reduce complexity so as to mitigate the problem of limited diversity and 
accurately model the causal structure of the argument (Schneider and Wagemann 
2006). Here, the remote factors are the conditions related to the structure of the 
political-administrative system (dual, profess), while the proximate factors are 
the conditions that refer to the characteristics of the investigated agency (expert, 
defindpdm, defindreg).
Next, the analysis requires a number of policy-making processes ‘as similar as 
possible’ in which a relevant indepependent regulatory agency is expected to be 
steadily included. 
Modelling and comparing the decision making processes
Here, policy making is conceived in its core dimension as lawmaking and 
conceptualised as the entire decision-making process of adopting/revising a 
new law in the domain of the related IRA, from the agenda setting to the policy 
implementation. How can we compare different political decision-making 
processes? A cross-countries and cross-sectoral comparison of decision-making 
processes is considered feasible. However, this enterprise is not straightforward 
because the existent models of decision making are extremely heterogeneous (Peters 
1998). What is more, when comparing the role of public sector organisations in 
decision-making, three additional difficulties exist: the first is the absence of a shared 
theoretical language, which is useful for the comparison of public administrations; 
the second refers to the absence of precise indicators for the behaviour of 
public sector organisations. The third relates to the fact that small structural 
differences appear to make a great deal of difference in practice (Peters 1990).
In particular, it has been noted that any notion defining processes or institutions 
can hardly be applied as such to different cases because its meaning is decisively 
contingent to the context in that processes and institutions are embedded (Rose and 
Mackenzie 1991). When thinking  about  research design for comparative analysis 
it is thus essential, at the most basic level, to avoid any ‘trap of nominalism’ that 
would induce to attribute similar implications to processes or institutions that 
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actually perform very different functions (Petiteville and Smith 2006). Notions 
and concepts should be precise and abstract enough to ‘travel’ across countries 
and policy sectors (Radaelli 2000b), as the literature on policy transfer specifically 
underscores (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Radaelli 
2000a). Similarly, we should be aware of the risk of ‘conceptual stretching,’ which 
Sartori derived from the inherent trade-off between the number of cases to which 
a concept can be applied and the precision of the categorisation (Sartori 1970). 
The excessive ‘intension’ would imply a limited generalisation of the typology 
and the impossibility  of reaching broader knowledge; the excess of ‘extension’ 
would reduce the number of attributes defining the category hence the accuracy of 
the conceptualisation.
It is possible to deal with these shortcomings. First, we shall start from a 
number of decision-making processes that are structurally ‘as similar as possible’ 
across and within countries in order to distinguish the relevant variations due to the 
pertinent variables from ‘background’ phenomena (Przeworski and Teune 1970). 
This reserve is crucial to avoid any ‘scientific colonialism’ that would impose 
a unifying theoretical framework to non-suitable cases, resulting in ‘seeking, 
examining and comparing non-existing phenomena’ (Allardt 1990). Similarly, 
in order to exclude any endogenous selection bias, we need to focus on some 
comparable pieces of legislation. Legislation coming from different jurisdictions 
should be selected to be formally and substantially similar, while the application 
of a number of reasonable simplifying assumptions can be useful to keep things 
manageable (Boer et al. 2003). Third, we have to compare processes by dividing 
them into a number of events, which can be considered functional equivalents 
across cases (Collier and Mahon 1993). Therefore, the policy cycle can be 
divided into a number of stages, which are not necessarily sequential (Howlett 
and Ramesh 2003); for instance, the formulation of a solution does not always 
follow the emergence of a specific problem (Olsen 2001). This way, it is possible 
to adopt a self-conscious thinking in terms of ideal-types, by using a system-
specific contextual approach involving analytical techniques that do not assume 
that all members of a category share a full set of attributes (e.g. QCA) (Collier and 
Mahon 1993). Fourth, we must compare our findings with the empirical literature 
in the field in order to benefit from previous knowledge so as to distinguish trivial 
from relevant explanatory factors. To be precise, non-trivial conditions are those 
that invoke factors that may vary across the values of the dependent variable and 
that are potentially sufficient for the outcome (Goertz 2006a).1 Finally, it should 
be noted that several biases could be avoided when data are generated directly by 
the researcher, as it is the case in the present research study (Przeworski 2007).
As a result, this study focuses on a peculiar type of decision-making processes, 
1. Following Goertz, the most trivial necessary conditions are those that are invariably present (such 
as ‘oxygen’ for predicting the success of revolutions), while the most trivial sufficient condi-
tions are those that never occur (such as ‘alien invasion’ for predicting the occurrence of wars) 
(examples are mine). 
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that is, those in small corporatist European states. Here, many shared characteristics 
among models of policy making ensure a high level of comparability. These 
countries display an open economy to international trade associated with developed 
welfare states (Katzenstein 1985). They also show a constant cooperation between 
the government and administration, the representatives of economic and social 
interest groups, and political parties, in many crucial policy areas (Lehmbruch 
and Schmitter 1982). It should be noted that even if corporatist arrangements 
have to face tensions generated by several political developments, such as 
economic internationalisation and European integration, some studies emphasise 
the ‘greater not lesser reliance on previous structures of national intermediation’ 
in these countries (Schmitter and Grote 1997). Specifically, the need to re-
coordinate policies across policy fields implies a renewed importance of ‘tripartite 
concertation’ and similar arrangements in many cases (Ebbinghaus and Hassel 
1999, 2000). 
Beyond their political economies, these countries tend to be associated with 
political systems presenting different forms of power-sharing arrangements 
(Lijphart 1999). In these countries, an ideology of ‘perceived vulnerability’ 
together with a number of structural factors – such as the existence of multiple 
cultural and social cleavages, the political need for grand coalitions, the presence 
of geographically concentrated minorities – lead to some kind of consensus 
democracy (Rae and Taylor 1970; Rogowski 1987; Katzenstein 2003). In 
this context, the ‘pre-parliamentary’ phase of consultation, discussion and 
negotiation among the representatives of the main political and economic actors is 
traditionally considered crucial, as it predefines, to some extent, the scope of any 
possible decision made by the more politicised parliamentary arena (Kriesi 1994; 
Papadopoulos 1997). 
Case selection and causal conditions
Hence, a number of small corporatist countries are identified, with a similar ideal-
type of decision-making process. Three countries are selected, which fulfil these 
criteria: the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.2 The three countries can be 
considered political regimes characterised by collegial governments indirectly 
elected by the parliamentary assembly (Siaroff 2003), while also displaying  a 
similar economic structure (Schnyder 2008). We can assume that the political 
decision-making process in Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands is, on the 
whole, corporatist-oriented and consensual (Lijphart 1984, 1999). On the one hand, 
2. There are some important differences not to be neglected—on the one hand, the varieties of 
corporatism (Falkner et al. 2004) and, on the other, the ongoing reconfiguration of national 
decision-making structures in consensus democracies (Häusermann, Mach and Papadopoulos 
2004). However, beyond these important developments, concertation and social partnership in 
the policy-making processes seems still very much alive (Schmitter and Grote 1997; Baccaro 
2003).
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a specific ‘institutionalised pattern of policy-formation’ (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 
1979) is present, as the political decision making in all the selected countries is 
traditionally open and includes administrative actors and representatives of 
organised interests, according to a logic of dialogue and social partnership. On 
the other hand, the three countries present the fundamental characteristics of a 
consensus democracy, where cooperation between political parties and groups is 
institutionalised in order to simultaneously achieve a number of goals relating to 
economic and social policy (Armingeon 2002). 
As required by Hypothesis 2.1, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland 
have a long tradition of extra-parliamentary commissions and expert committees 
that detain crucial tasks in the course of the decision-making processes. Appointed 
economic and legal experts are consulted when formulating policy reforms and 
drafting the initial bills; they act as norm entrepreneurs, together with administrative 
actors, and often follow interest groups concerns (Papadopoulos and Benz 2006). 
These procedures are crucial coordination devices, also leading to the constitution 
of sectoral policy communities in particular policy areas. In the Netherlands, 
associations, representatives of organised interests and experts committees are 
usually involved in parliamentary policy making and policy implementation 
(Compston 1994; Andeweg and Irwin 2005). In Sweden, administrative agencies 
hold crucial expertise capacities that empower them not only in implementation 
but also in prior stages of policy making (Pierre 1993; Svensson and Oberg 2002); 
at the same time, the government traditionally integrates experts in commissions 
to draft law proposals (Lindvall and Rothstein 2006). In Switzerland, new 
pieces of legislation are typically prepared in expert committees and submitted 
to consultation before they reach the parliamentary discussions (Kriesi 1995; 
Häusermann et al. 2004).
The type of the political-administrative culture (Hypothesis 2.2) is made 
operational through the following distinction. The Dutch civil service is habitually 
presented as relatively depoliticised and shaped by a high level of formalism and 
legalism. It is comparatively quite small and fragmented (Andeweg and Irwin 
2005). While agencies normally enjoy a high level of formal autonomy, the system 
is described as ‘monocratic,’ that is, the public administration is subordinated 
to ministers, who are political executives with strong decision-making powers 
within their portfolio (Christensen and Yesilkagit 2005). In Sweden, the system 
is characterised by a principle of dual functioning that implies a strict separation 
between policy formulation, relying on ministries, and policy implementation. 
Agencies are perceived as autonomous, and often they are performing semi-
judicial functions, even if informal linkages with politicians exist (Peters 2001; 
Pierre 2004). In Switzerland, many implementation competencies are delegated to 
the cantonal level, but they often overlap with the central administration, which is 
under the political responsibility of the federal government (Kriesi 1995). The civil 
service, even if relatively depoliticised, is subordinated to the relevant departments 
and enjoys an important role in ordinary legislative processes (Ruffieux 1975). 
Hypothesis 2.3 refers to the professionalisation of the legislatures. In The 
Netherlands, the Second Chamber is composed of full-time members who enjoy 
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a high level of professionalisation. Specifically, the parliamentary committees are 
composed of parliamentary members that are considered valid policy specialists. 
Concerning the public administration, the recruitment is based on a position 
principle, which implies a high level of specialisation (Andeweg and Irwin 
2005). In Sweden, the parliament is strong (Colomer 1996) and disposes from 
considerable resources and overall professionalism (Copeland and Patterson 
1994). The public administration is centralised, professionalised, and coherent 
(Kriesi 1994). Conversely, the Swiss parliament is a semi-professional institution 
where each legislator combines their professional activity with parliamentary 
duties and disposes from limited resources and staff.3 According to Kriesi, this 
weakens the assembly that lacks time, information, and competences (Kriesi 
2001). Public administration is small and decentralised, frequently relying on 
extra-parliamentary commissions and quasi-state implementation agencies 
(Varone 2007).
Next, two different policy areas are selected so as to introduce more variation 
in the dataset and precisely to test Hypothesis 2.4. The need for relying on 
agencies’ expertise in policy making is expected to follow the level of technicality 
attributed to the related regulatory domain, no matter how effectual or politically 
constructed. It can be assessed through the distinction between highly technical 
sector-specific regulation and general regulation (Maggetti 2007). Therefore, 
two different kinds of IRAs are chosen, which are comparable pertaining to their 
organisational model and statutory competencies (Thatcher 2002c; Gilardi 2008), 
that is, sector-specific banking and financial commissions and general competition 
authorities. The former are regulating a sector perceived as highly technical, 
requiring sector-specific experts and the use of detailed knowledge. The latter, 
conversely, are regulating a more politically salient and a less technical issue.
The selected agencies must also possess a similar level of formal independence 
– to avoid any potential problem of exogenous influence of this variable – (Gilardi 
2002b, 2005a), for which they should display a consistent variation concerning 
de facto independence from political decision makers and, respectively, from the 
representative of the regulated industries (see Table 4.1). For the operationalisation 
of this latter condition, which is needed to test Hypotheses 2.5a and 2.5b, data 
derived from the survey-based dataset on de facto independence presented in the 
previous chapter is used, in which de facto independence is seen as a synthesis 
of two components: the self-determination of agencies’ preferences and their 
autonomy during the activity of regulation. Following the standard procedure 
of the qualitative comparative analysis, a dichotomous coding is proposed 
(Ragin 1987, 1994), where ‘1’ corresponds to the condition of agencies’ de facto 
independence from elected politicians, while ‘0’ denotes agencies that cannot be 
considered strictly speaking as highly factually independent. 
3. Comparatively, this argument seems to hold even in the face of recent trends towards a modestly 
increased professionalisation. 
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Table 4.1: Formal and de facto independence of IRAs
IRA Label
Formal 
independence
De facto 
independence 
from the 
politicians
De facto 
independence 
from the 
regulatees
Konkurrensverhet sweco 0.41 1 1
Wettbewerbskommission swico 0.45 1 0
Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit
netco 0.46 0 1
Eidgenössische 
Bankenkommission
swibk 0.48 1 0
Autoriteit Financiële 
Markten
netbk 0.53 1 0
Finansinspektionen swebk 0.54 0 1
Selected pieces of legislation
Each one of the six cases corresponds to a decision-making process that refers to 
the development of a crucial piece of legislation in the range of competencies of 
the related IRA in the years 2000-2006 (see Table 4.2). Three pieces of legislation 
concern IRAs regulating the banking and financial sector in each country. First, 
the act on the disclosure of major holdings and capital interests, issued in the 
Netherlands in 2006 (Wmz 2006).4 The Wmz 2006 replaced the act on disclosure 
of major holdings in listed companies of 1996 (Wet melding zeggenschap in ter 
beurze genoteerde vennootschappen), which the Autoriteit Financiële Markten 
(AFM) has employed since 1996 as the basis for its supervision of the disclosure 
and registration of major holdings and capital interests, and since 2002 as the basis 
for its supervision of disclosures by directors and supervisory board members. 
4. Sources: Act of 28th September 2006, on rules relating to the financial markets and their supervi-
sion (Financial Supervision Act); AFM, The most important amendments to the supervision of 
conduct following the introduction of the Act on Financial Supervision (Wft) 2006; AFM, Act on 
the disclosure of major holdings and capital interests in securities-issuing institutions - Informa-
tion brochure for securities-issuing institutions, directors and supervisory board members 2006; 
Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden Besluit van 25 augustus 2006, houdende vaststel-
ling van het tijdstip van inwerkingtreding van de Wet melding zeggenschap en kapitaalbelang 
ineffectenuitgevende instellingen; Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Wet van 5 juli 
2006, houdende regels betreffende de melding van zeggenschap en kapitaalbelang in, alsmede de 
melding van het geplaatste kapitaal van effectenuitgevende instellingen (Wet melding zeggen-
schap en kapitaalbelang in effectenuitgevende instellingen); Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
Regels betreffende de melding van zeggenschap en kapitaalbelang in, alsmede de melding van 
het geplaatste kapitaal van effectenuitgevende instellingen (Wet melding zeggenschap en kapita-
albelang in ter beurze genoteerde vennootschappen), 23 mei, 23, 26, 27 juni 2006.
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The aim of the new act is to increase transparency regarding major holdings and 
capital interests in securities-issuing institutions and to simplify the disclosure and 
registration process for the regulated industries. Namely, the Wmz 2006 imposes 
a duty to disclose on all parties that acquire or lose shares in a company, and 
the obligation to disclose ownership of shares with special controlling rights. 
The AFM was given the competencies of implementation of the Wmz 2006, and 
almost all tasks and powers of the Minister of Finance under the Wmz 2006 have 
been ultimately delegated to the agency. 
Second, the banking and finance business act, promulgated in Sweden on 
2004 (Banking Act 2004).5 This new piece of legislation is part of the large-scale 
reform of the regulations concerning banking and financial business in Sweden, 
which were drafted with the goal of contributing to the overall stability and 
efficiency of the financial system. On the one hand, new pieces of legislation 
deregulated further banking and financial operation. For instance, the activity of 
credit provision, without financing by the means of deposits, no longer requires a 
licence. On the other, hand, the new banking and financing business act redefined 
and extend the competencies of the Finansinspektionen (FI). To begin with, the 
notification requirements to this IRAs are made stricter. Not only bank institutions, 
but also unlicensed activities where the principal activity is to provide financial 
advice should have to be notified to the agency, and any changes in relation to 
owners and management of the supervised institutions must be notified as well. In 
addition, the Finansinspektionen reinforces its statutory responsibility to directly 
supervise the individual institutions operating in the financial market, and acquire 
the competence of issuing general guidelines, while also being in charge of 
investigating whether the requirements are fulfilled on a regular basis.
Third, the stock exchange and securities traders act, revised in Switzerland in 
2006 (Stock Exchange Act 2006).6 This law extends the regulatory competencies 
of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC/EBK – Eidgenössische 
5. Sources: Swedish Chambers of Commerce An overview of the Swedish securities market 2006; 
Banks in Sweden - Facts about the Swedish banking market, Swedish Bankers´ Association 
2004; Ministry/Agency: Ministry of Finance, The Banking and Finance Business Act 2004:297, 
promulgated on 19 May 2004; Supervisory developments in Sweden, Finansinpektionen 2006.
6. Sources: Loi sur les bourses: entrée en vigueur de la disposition révisée sur l’assistance admin-
istrative, Département fédéral des finances DFF, novembre 2005; La CFB souhaite une modi-
fication des reègles relatives à l’entraide boursière, EBK, 23 janvier 2002; Loi fédérale sur les 
bourses et le commerce des valeurs mobilières (Loi sur les bourses, LBVM) Modification du 7 
octobre 2005; Bulletin officiel, Conseil des Etats, Loi fédérale sur les bourses et le commerce 
des valeurs mobilières (…); Bulletin officiel, Conseil National, Loi fédérale sur les bourses et 
le commerce des valeurs mobilières (…); Message concernant la modification de la disposition 
sur l’assistance administrative internationale de la loi fédérale sur les bourses et le commerce 
des valeurs mobilières du 10 novembre 2004; Révision de la loi sur les bourses: résultats de 
la  consultation et message du Conseil fédéral, DFF, 10 novembre 2004; Rapport concernant la 
modification de la disposition sur l’assistance administrative internationale dans la loi fédérale sur 
les bourses et le commerce des valeurs mobilières, DFF, janvier 2004; Révision des modalités de 
l’assistance administrative dans la loi sur les bourses (archives), DFF, 09  fevrier 2007.
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Bankenkommission) concerning the supervision of stock exchange and securities, 
and it simplifies the procedures for information exchange and administrative 
assistance. Before the revision of the law, this agency could not provide 
administrative assistance to foreign authorities if they used the information requested 
exclusively for direct supervision of stock exchanges and trade in securities. It 
followed that the applicant supervisory authority could not provide information 
to another authority before the Swiss Federal Banking Commission had given his 
consent. In this context, information could be transmitted only when the crime 
was punishable in both the country of the foreign agency and Switzerland, which 
was typically not the case for certain types of fiscal fraud. The revision relaxes the 
principle of confidentiality and permits the transmission of information to a second 
foreign authority provided that it is responsible for enforcing regulations on stock 
exchanges, securities trading and securities dealers. Moreover, the requirements 
of double criminality are lifted. Finally, the procedure relating to clients of 
traders is simplified and accelerated. The cooperation with foreign authorities 
is thus considerably improved, following the increasing pressures coming from 
several governments, international institutions and foreign regulatory authorities 
for improving the international cooperation, and to promote the transparency 
and disclosure of the Swiss banking and financial regulatory framework.
Then, three other laws relate to general competition regulation. First, the 
competition act, revised in the Netherlands in 2005 (Competition Act 2005).7 This 
law enhances the statutory independence and competences of the Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa). According to the previous status, the NMa was not 
fully independent. The minister for economic affairs detained powers to set policy 
lines and give specific instructions in individual cases, while the NMa had the 
organisational form of a specialised administrative body, which was exclusively 
responsible for enforcement under the Competition Act. The primary aim of the 
new law is to make NMa decisions in individual cases fully independent. The board 
is given the responsibility for the running of the NMa with discretion in day-to-day 
decision making. The position of director-general is replaced by a three-person 
board, which is responsible for the running of the NMa. Above all, independence 
is reinforced as the Ministry lose the power to give instructions in individual cases, 
although remaining responsible for the broad lines of competition policy. 
Second, the competition act, revised in Sweden in 2004 (Competition Act 
2004).8 Conventionally, the Swedish Competition Act prohibits cooperation 
7. Sources: International Competition Network, Implementation Handbook, Examples Of Legisla-
tive Text, Rules, And Practices That Conform To Selected ICN Guiding Principles And Recom-
mended Practices For Merger Notification And Review Procedures, April 2006; Competition Ex-
traNews, De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, 4/4, July 2005; More Power for Dutch Competition 
Authority, Press release, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 23 October 2003; Wijziging Mededin-
gingswet om oneerlijke concurrentie te voorkomen, Ministerie van Economische Zachen, 17 
February 2006; De Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer, Aanbieding van de onderzoeksrapportages 
evaluatie Mededingingswet, 31 mei 2002.
8. Sources: The Swedish Competition Act, Kkv, 075/03; OECD Competition Committee, Annual 
Report On Competition Policy Developments In Sweden – 2003; Directorate For Financial And 
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between companies that significantly limits or distorts competition, such as 
price collaboration, market sharing between competing companies, and abuse 
of dominant market positions, and it also includes provisions on the control of 
mergers. This revision of the competition act deeply redefines the competencies 
of the independent regulatory agency in charge of its implementation, the 
Konkurrensverhet (KKV). For instance, undertakings can no longer apply for 
so-called negative clearance and exemption from the Competition Authority 
decisions. This revision also enhances the capacity of the agency: it increases the 
resources for ensuring supervision and improves the competencies of raids and 
investigations, while also permitting the issuance of new general guidelines for 
regulation-of-competition.
Third, the act on cartels, revised in Switzerland in 2003 (Cartels Act 2003).9 
The act on cartels of 1995 has been considered quite ineffective in practice by 
the political decision-makers, as the Competition Commission was only enabled 
to detect the infringements to the law, and sanctions were possible only in the 
case of repeated offence to the law. The preventive effect of the regulatory action 
of the agency was thus considered very feeble. With the revision of the act on 
cartels, a number of incentives against cartels have been introduced, so as to 
favour companies that disclose illicit behaviour of cartels. In addition, the so-
called vertical cartels have been prohibited, whereas a number of clarification 
clauses have been introduced to improve the effectiveness of ComCo. At the same 
time, the attributions and the capacity of the Swiss Competition Commission are 
strengthened. On the one hand, the new act reinforced the means and resources at 
disposal for supervising the activities of the supervised firms. On the other, direct 
sanctioning capacities were attributed to the agency, which constitute crucial pre-
emptive regulatory instruments, in line with the majority of OECD countries.
Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee Annual Report On Competition Policy Developments 
In Sweden 2004, 10 May 2005; Motion Till Riksdagen 2003/04:N14, Med Anledning Av Prop. 
2003/04:80 Moderniserad Konkurrensövervaknin; Motion 2004/05:N413 Näringspolitik; Betän-
kande 2003/04:Nu13; Näringsutskottets Betänkande 2003/04:Nu13mer Information, Modernise-
rad Konkurrensövervakning.
9. Sources: Révision de la loi sur les cartels: Le résultat des débats parlementaires, La Vie 
Economique, Revue de politique économique   octobre 2003; Révision de la loi sur les cartels 
et révision totale de la loi sur la banque nationale: la commission a achevé l’examen dans les 
délais impartis, Commission de l’économie et des redevances du Conseil des Etats (CER-E), 
28 février 2003; La révision de la loi sur les cartels est en cours Modification de la loi sur les 
cartels Résultats de la consultation et suite de la procédure Communiqué de presse, Berne, 4 avril 
2001; Messagerelatif à la révision de la loi sur les cartels du 7 novembre 2001; Commission de 
l’économie et des redevances du Conseil des Etats, La commission préconise la lutte contre les 
cartels et les abus en matière de biens immatériels, 31 janvier 2003; Bulletin officiel, Conseil 
National, Loi fédérale sur les cartels et autres restrictions à la concurrence (…); Bulletin of-
ficiel, Conseil des Etats, Loi fédérale sur les cartels et autres restrictions à la concurrence  (…); 
Loi fédérale sur les cartels et autres restrictions à la concurrence (Loi sur les cartels, LCart) 
Modification du 20 juin 2003; Révision de la loi sur les cartels: entrée en vigueur  1 avril 2004, 
Commission de la concurrence.
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Table 4.2: Case selection
Sector Country Piece of legislation IRA Label
Banking 
and 
financial 
sector
Netherlands Act on the 
Disclosure of 
Major Holdings 
and Capital 
Interests in 
Securities-Issuing 
Institutions, of 
2006  
Autoriteit 
Financiële 
Markten (AFM)
netbk
Sweden Banking and 
Finance Business 
Act, promulgated 
on 2004
Finans-
inspektionen 
(FI)
swebk
Switzerland Stock Exchange 
and Securities 
Traders Act, 
revised in 2006
Eidgenössische 
Bankenkom-
mission (EBK)
swibk
Competition
Netherlands Competition Act, 
revised in 2005 
Nederlandse 
Mededingings-
autoriteit (NMa)
netco
Sweden Competition Act, 
revised in 2004 
Konkurrens-
verhet (KKV)
sweco
Switzerland Act on Cartels, 
revised in 2003 
Wettbewerbs-
kommission 
(WeKo)
swico
Conceptualising the outcome condition 
The ‘explanandum’ of this chapter is the specific role of IRAs during the political 
decision-making processes under investigation. In order to obtain a single measure, 
a structural and a reputational approach are combined by asking the crucial actors 
the following questions: 
(1) Which actor participated in a given phase of the decision-making process? 
(2) What was the (political) weight of each actor? 
The derived synthetic measure, aggregating participation and weight, 
represents the centrality of IRAs in the course of the selected decision-making 
processes. Concretely, the centrality of the political actors in the course of each 
decision-making process will be systematised and compared with the actor-
process-event scheme (APES) (Serdült and Hirschi 2004; Serdült et al. 2005), 
an analytical tool that allows transforming process information from case studies 
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into structural data in order to execute some simple operations of social networks 
analysis (SNA). The APES is a two-dimensional graph that links the participating 
actors with the different stages of the lawmaking process under investigation. In 
the process axis, we need to select the crucial events that comprise one or more 
stages of a policy cycle (Howlett and Ramesh 2003).10 In the actor axis, we can 
distinguish whether an actor participates in an event and places a value on the 
weight of his participation. The second step is the transformation of the APES into 
a policy network.
The APES gives us information allowing us to create a data matrix containing 
data about event participation (two mode actor-event matrix). This first matrix is 
built by filling the cells with a zero (0) in case an actor did not participate in an 
event or with a value (e.g. 1) if an actor participated. Then, we have to transform 
this matrix into an actor-actor one, with the adequate procedure in UCINET 
(Borgatti et al. 2002), to obtain the symmetric relations between all pairs of actors 
(excluding the diagonal, which is meaningless here). The result should represent 
the policy network derived by process data. We then have a matrix that provides 
parsimonious, clear, and comparable data that we can analyse using the classical 
social network analysis tools. Here the centrality degrees of all participating actors 
are calculated to compare the range of values as ordinal categories within each 
policy network, with the aim of discovering which ones play a crucial role in each 
decision-making process. 
Degree centrality is a measure of ‘local popularity’ that can be used to highlight 
the relative prominence of focal points, so as to identify the most important actors 
within the network (Everett and Borgatti 2005). This measure of centrality was 
chosen, among other possible, more structural, options because we cannot assume 
that the actors’ participation in different phases of policy making processes 
constitute a relational network possessing holistic properties. Therefore, the 
analysis focuses on the so-called ego-networks of participants, that it, concerning 
nodes that are directly connected to each participant, in order to ensure the validity 
of the measurement, even if this choice may imply a loss of accuracy. In addition, 
the assessment of local centrality is helpful, as it does not imply the existence of 
a single central point in the network (Scott 2000b). Instead, several local centres 
may emerge from the APES, according to the idea that different actors can hold 
central positions in the different events of the political decision-making process. 
Finally, the degrees of actors’ centrality can be compared, by bearing in mind one 
limitation: the comparison of centrality scores are meaningful only among the 
members of the same graph, or between graphs of similar size, since the degree 
of a point depends also on the size of the graph. A simple solution for comparing 
the actors’ degrees across networks is to analyse not their absolute values but the 
relative scores of the participants when situated on an ordinal scale of centrality.
In addition, it is worth stressing that, in the current application of the APES, 
10. The definition of these events depends on the parameters of the political system and on the pecu-
liar characteristic of the process under investigation.
the role of independent regulators in lawmaking (ii) 121
an encompassing conceptualisation of centrality is adopted, which is not only 
structural but also reputational. Both actors’ ‘participation’ and ‘weight’ are taken 
into account (Adam and Kriesi 2007). According to a structural approach, central 
individuals are those that dispose from positional power, so that they are the able 
to shape the policy process. For instance, they control the essential information, 
they perform key integrative and coordinating activities, and they represent the 
best functional partner for any subsystem. Following a reputational perspective, a 
reputation for influence indicates a latent capacity to affect the outcome of events 
in which the actor has an interest or stake (Knoke 1990; Diani 2003). Finally, 
the measurement of actors’ centrality can be further interpreted thanks to detailed 
contextual information on the participation and weight during any phase of the 
processes, which is synthesised in the APES graphs.
The assessment of the outcome condition
To assess the outcome condition, which refers to the centrality of each agency, 
every actor who participated in the decision-making process is examined, using 
both theoretical literature and existing documentation about the specific cases, 
namely: the government, first chamber of the parliament, second chamber (if 
any), parliamentary committee of the first chamber, parliamentary committee 
of the second chamber (if any), public administration, IRA, other agencies and 
courts, employers and producers peak associations, consumer associations, liberal 
professionals, academic experts, trade unions, supervised institutions, the EU, and 
other actors (expert committees, individual companies, international organisations, 
etc.), as presented in Tables 4.3 - 4.8. The next step is the partition of the policy 
process into a series of discrete events. The mapping procedure starts with the 
existing literature over each type of decision-making process: (Colomer 2002; 
Andeweg and Irwin 2005) for the Netherlands; (Kriesi 1994; Peters 2001) for 
Sweden; (Kriesi 1994; Papadopoulos 1997; Sciarini 2002; Sciarini et al. 2002) for 
Switzerland. Then, the reading of the story is improved by information given by 
the actors themselves in a short series of electronic interviews, and with archive 
documents. The functional sequence of events is as follows: 
1) agenda-setting
2) preliminary investigations
3) working out the draft
4) consultation
5) draft modification
6) decision
7) monitoring/implementation
8) sanctioning/evaluation
Then, for each process, an exploratory empirical investigation was executed, 
starting from a small number of electronic and telephone interviews, and written 
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documentation.11 In that way, ii was possible to identify a number of crucial 
ministerial officials, civil servants, elected politicians, and agency board and 
staff members in the course of the investigated decision-making processes. Then, 
different categories of those crucial actors were interviewed by survey inquiry 
in order to gain knowledge about the ‘participation’ and ‘weight’ of each actor: 
The relevant services within the investigated agency; the offices in charge in the 
public administration; the chancellor/ chairperson/ members of the parliamentary 
commissions in charge.12 Non-participation in a given event is coded 0. According 
to the reputational data, participation is coded 1 when the actor is in a merely 
passive phase (e.g. consultations) and when the actor is considered scarcely 
influent on the event (i.e. an average value of 1, 2, or 3 on the aggregated 7-point 
weight scale from the survey inquiry). Participation is coded 2 when the actor is 
considered influential to a certain extent (4, 5), and it is coded 3 when the actor is 
considered to be strongly influential (6, 7) with respect to the process.
Individual answers are aggregated first at the level of each category and then 
among categories. Concerning ‘participation’, any actor is taken into account 
even if only one interlocutor mentions him. Concerning ‘weight’, the simple 
average is calculated at the higher value. If a respondent does not mention an 
actor who is, however, mentioned by others, we consider that the former gives 
him the lowest weight. In the case of a huge discrepancy among answers, those 
cases would have needed a deeper examination with semi-directed interviews, 
11. Written sources are annual agencies reports; agencies’, public administration’s, and parliaments’ 
Web sites; drafts of the new pieces of legislation; expert commissions’ reports; parliamentary 
debate documentation; and specialised press articles; agencies’, public administration’s, and 
parliaments’ press releases.
12. Sources of data concerning the outcome conditions are as follows: Netbk: three questionnaires 
to the relevant services within the agency in charge; three questionnaires to the offices in charge 
in the public administration/ministry; two questionnaires to the chancellor/chairperson/members 
of the parliamentary commissions in charge; received between 22 May–14 June 2007; Swebk: 
two questionnaires to the relevant services within the agency in charge; two questionnaires to 
the offices in charge in the public administration/ministry; two questionnaires to the chancellor/
chairperson/members of the parliamentary commissions in charge; received between 18 May–19 
June 2007; Swibk: two questionnaires to the relevant services within the agency in charge; two 
questionnaires to the offices in charge in the public administration/ministry; two questionnaires 
to the chancellor/chairperson/members of the parliamentary commissions in charge; received 
between 29 May–30 July 2007; Netco: three questionnaires to the relevant services within the 
agency in charge; three questionnaires to the offices in charge in the public administration/
ministry; two questionnaires to the chancellor/chairperson/members of the parliamentary com-
missions in charge; received between 22 May–24 July 2007; Sweco: two questionnaires to the 
relevant services within the agency in charge; three questionnaires to the offices in charge in 
the public administration/ministry; two questionnaires to the chancellor/chairperson/members of 
the parliamentary commissions in charge; received between 8 June–19 July 2007; Swico: two 
questionnaires to the relevant services within the agency in charge; two questionnaires to the 
offices in charge in the public administration/ministry; three questionnaires to the chancellor/
chairperson/members of the parliamentary commissions in charge; received between 26 April–9 
July 2007.
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but that was not the case. Questionnaires were precise and case-specific, non-
anonymous, accompanied by electronic interviews, prepared and confirmed with 
written documentation, and without any reference to a research interest in the role 
of IRAs. Therefore, the information can be considered reliable (see the appendix 
for the details). 13  
The Analysis
Assessing centrality
The APES software was employed (Serdült et al. 2005) to draw the actor-process-
event schemes (Tables 4.3 to 4.8) and derive the corresponding data matrices 
(reported in the appendix). The centrality degrees of participating actors were 
then calculated using the appropriate procedure in UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002) 
so as to compare the relative centrality of actors within each policy network (as 
illustrated in Figure 4.2 and by the corresponding centrality values). As a result, 
we obtain the following typology concerning the agency’s centrality in the 
investigated decision-making process:14
1.
The agency is clearly 
the unique central actor 
(maxcentral).
Æ Eidgenössische 
Bankenkommission
(swibk)
Æ Wettbewerbskommission (swico)
2.
The agency is a central 
actor together with 
another actor (normally, 
the government).
Æ Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit
(netco)
Æ Finansinspektionen (swebk)
Æ Autoriteit Financiële 
Markten
(netbk)
3.
The agency is still 
important, but it is 
definitely not the central 
actor.
Æ Konkurrensverhet (sweco)
13. The overall rate response was about 62 per cent (almost entirely due to a high non-response rate 
of members of parliaments, nearly equally distributed across countries and sectors).
14. The typology comprises three qualitatively different degrees of centrality. The QCA analysis 
focuses on the outcome of ‘maximum centrality’, because of the theoretical relevance of this re-
sult, and following a deliberate methodological choice: The output ‘centrality with another actor’ 
would be difficult to interpret; The outputs ‘maximum centrality+ centrality with another actor’ 
and ‘not the central actor’ display a single negative outcome for the former, and respectively, a 
single positive outcome for the latter, both not corresponding to ideal situations in terms of the 
required variety of configurations.
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Each agency holds an important position in the investigated decision-making 
processes, thus supporting Hypothesis 2.1. To be precise, it appears from the 
detailed information summarised in the APES that IRAs are not only central in the 
ordinary phase of policy implementation through the application of their regulatory 
competencies, but they are extensively included during lawmaking processes. 
The Dutch act on the disclosure of major holdings and capital interests of 2006 
(Wmz) was initiated by several actors, among which the most influential were the 
EU and the Autoriteit Financiële Markten. The centrality of the EU is not surprising, 
as the Wmz 2006 partly implements the European directive 2004/109/EC of 15 
December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to 
information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market. The agency was the other key player during the preliminary investigations 
for preparing the draft, and when working out the new bill. The government and the 
relevant offices of the public administration were able to modify the draft before 
adopting the new law, with the aim of increasing transparency and simplify the 
disclosure process. Professionals, independent experts and the supervised institutions 
were extensively consulted throughout the policy-making process. Finally, the 
agency was given the competencies of implementation, and sanctions in the case of 
non-respect of the new law are delegated to the agency together with courts. 
The Dutch competition act of 2005 concerns above all the transition of the 
regulatory agency to an autonomous body. This revision was inspired by the 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, the parliament, and the minister of economic 
affairs, following the existing EU model. The initial draft was also prepared with 
the support of this agency and subsequently modified by the government. It was 
decided that initially the agency should not be fully independent, but the bill was 
heavily amended in parliament and then put on hold while a more pressing bill was 
dealt with the aim to bring the Competition Act in line with EC competition law. The 
parliamentary committees held several hearings and a number of academic experts 
was consulted, which influenced the new act through the report in the evaluation of 
the Competition Act 2002. Monitoring and sanctioning were ultimately established 
as shared competencies among the agency, the parliament, and the government, 
while appeals to agency’s decisions are possible in administrative tribunals.
The banking law committee promoted the development of the Swedish banking 
and finance business act of 2004, to reform financial and banking regulation and 
achieve uniformity with EU regulations. To this aim, an independent committee 
was charged with drafting a preliminary proposal for the new law. The ministry 
of finance worked out the draft, which had been circulated to interested parties for 
comments. The most important actors that modified the draft of the new law were 
the parliamentary committee of finance and a number of major Swedish companies. 
At the end of the day, the Finansinspektionen was given the responsibility for 
adopting the suitable regulations in order to implement the new framework, and it 
is in charge of the procedure of authorisation and notification and the day-to-day 
supervision of the regulated industries.
Concerning the Swedish competition act of 2004, we observe that the 
Konkurrensverhet participate in several events of the decision-making process, 
but it seems truly important only in the phase of implementation and monitoring. 
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The EU was crucial for inspiring the basic principles of the new law, that is, 
prohibiting companies from anti-competitive cooperation, concerning for instance 
prices and market sharing arrangements. Specifically, the act provides the Swedish 
Competition Authority with the power to carry out investigations and inspection of 
companies in order to collect evidence of practices contravening these prohibitions. 
The agency can order infringements of the prohibitions of the Act to be terminated, 
with the attachment of a fine. The government, namely through an executive 
committee of inquiry, is the most important actor in several crucial events, such 
as draft preparation and adoption, together with a number of independent experts. 
Courts are involved in competition law enforcement and can impose sanctions, the 
city court in first instance and the market court in final instance. 
The Eidgenössische Bankenkommission was very important in setting 
the new act on the political agenda of banking regulation in Switzerland. The 
basic principles of the legal framework were inspired in accordance with key 
international organisations, namely the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), following 
the internationalisation of financial markets. The crucial point was the necessity 
to improve the exchange of information with foreign authorities, for instance 
concerning insider trading crimes and other markets infringements. The agency 
was the most influential actor in draft preparation and when working out the draft 
of the Swiss stock exchange and securities traders act of 2006, in collaboration with 
the department of finance, academic experts and representatives of the regulated 
industries. After extensive external consultations, the government and parliament 
guided the phases of draft modification and adoption of the bill. The agency is 
the crucial actor for monitoring the respect of the new law, whilst the supervised 
institutions detain still important competencies of self-regulation. Sanctions in the 
case of non-respect can be decided by the agency and by courts.
The Swiss act on cartels of 2003 was largely determined by the 
Wettbewerbskommission, namely in its early stages: agenda-setting, preliminary 
investigations, consultations, and implementation and monitoring. The goal of the 
reform was to avoid any market distortion by extending the range of application of 
the act on cartels to each firm whatever its legal status, specifically by enhancing 
the competencies of the agency, through the possibility of new direct sanctions 
and more effective investigation capacities. Foreign experts invited by the extra-
parliamentary committee, the public administration (notably the state secretariat 
for economic affairs – SECO) and the representatives of the regulated industries 
(through their peak association, Economiesuisse) had as well a certain impact in 
inspiring the principles of the new law. The offices of the public administration 
participated in the preparation and working out of the draft of the new law, with the 
help of external actors, such as the academic experts. The government participate 
extensively in the course of the decision-making process, but at the end of the day 
it appears hardly influential. Finally, the draft was quite importantly modified by 
the parliamentary committees, before the definite adoption and promulgation. 
Tables 4.3-4.8 summarise each lawmaking process in great detail, with the help 
of the Actor-Process-Event Schemes. The policy networks derived from the APES 
are plotted in Figure 4.2, with corresponding centrality degrees of participating actors.
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Table 4.3: The Netbk
Time                06
Actors
’
Table 4.4: The Netco
Time                05
Actors
’
’
Tables 4.3 - 4.8: APES Legend
• Low weight (1,2,3) / passive participation
• Medium weight (4,5)
High weight (6,7)  maxcentral
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Table 4.5: The Swebk
Time                04   05
Actors
’
’
Table 4.6: The Sweco
Time                04
Actors
’
’
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Table 4.7: The Swibk
Time                06
Actors
’
’
Table 4.8: The Swico
Time                03
Actors
’
’
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Actors Centrality
1. Government 72
2. IRA 70
3. Public Administration 53
4. European Union 42
5. Academic Experts 35
6. Supervised Institutions 35
7. Parliament 34
8. Parliamentary Comm. 28
9. Other Agencies or Courts 25
10. Liberal Professionals 21
11. Empl./Prod. Associations 21
4.2a The Netbk
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Actors Centrality
1. IRA 90
2. Government 87
3. Parliament 68
4. Academic Experts 62
5. Other Agencies or Courts 32
6. European Union 30
7. Empl./Prod. Associations 27
8. Consumers Associations 16
9. Liberal Professionals 11
10. Trade Unions 11
4.2b The Netco
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Actors Centrality
1. Government 37
2. IRA 37
3. Parliamentary Comm. 34
4. Other Agencies or Courts 29
5. Supervised Institutions 29
6. Empl./Prod. Associations 29
7. European Union 23
8. Other Actors 20
9. Parliament 16
10. Trade Unions 11
11. Liberal Professionals 11
12. Academic Experts 11
13. Consumers Associations 11
4.2c The Swebk
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Actors Centrality
1. Government 43
2. IRA 36
3. Academic Experts 19
4. European Union 12
5. Other Agencies or Courts 11
6. Other Actors 11
7. Consumers Associations 8
8. Trade Unions 8
9. Liberal Professionals 8
10. Public Administration 8
11. Empl./Prod. Associations 8
12. Parliament 6
13. Parliamentary Comm. 4
4.2d The Sweco
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Actors Centrality
1. IRA 81
2. Supervised Institutions 47
3. Government 40
4. Other Agencies or Courts 40
5. Public Administration 37
6. Parliament 34
7. Other Actors 26
8. Liberal Professionals 9
9. Academic Experts 9
10. Consumers Associations 9
11. Empl./Prod. Associations 9
12. European Union 8
13. Parliamentary Comm.  5
4.2e The Swibk
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Actors Centrality
1. IRA 168
2. Government 120
3. Parliamentary Comm. 94
4. Public Administration 93
5. Parliament 91
6. Academic Experts 80
7. Other Agencies or Courts 73
8. Consumers Associations 71
9. Empl./Prod. Associations 51
10. Other Actors 40
11. Trade Unions 37
12. Liberal Professionals 32
13. Supervised Institutions 30
14. European Union 30
4.2f The Swico
Figure 4.2: Policy networks
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QCA and results
Data, as prepared for the QCA analysis, are presented in Table 4.9. The explanatory 
conditions are coded as follows. For the first condition, the Swedish case is coded 
1, as agencies are incorporated in a dualist system, while the code 0 corresponds 
to the Dutch and Swiss ‘monocratic’ models. The Netherlands and Sweden have 
specialised and professionalised legislatures; hence the second condition is coded 
1 for these countries. Switzerland, conversely, which has a semi-professional 
parliament, is coded 0. The agencies regulating the banking and financial sector, 
where the need for technical expertise is expected to be the higher, are coded 1 
for the third condition, while general competition agencies are coded 0. Finally, 
agencies possessing a medium/high level of de facto independence from the elected 
politicians and, respectively, from the regulatees are coded 1, whereas agencies 
possessing a lower level of de facto independence are coded 0. Concerning the 
outcome conditions, the code 1 corresponds to the maximal centrality of the 
agency.
Table 4.9:  Data
Remote conditions Proximate conditions Outcome
case dual profess expert defindpdm defindreg maxcentral
sweco 1 1 0 1 1 0
swico 0 0 0 1 0 1
netco 0 1 0 0 1 0
swibk 0 0 1 1 0 1
netbk 0 1 1 1 0 0
swebk 1 1 1 0 1 0
Then, the results of the analysis for remote factors and proximate factors are 
presented, using the Quine-McCluskey algorithm included in the Fs/QCA software 
(Ragin et al. 2006). As suggested by Schneider and Wagemann (2006), a two-step 
analysis is executed in order to reduce complexity so as to mitigate the problem 
of limited diversity and accurately model the causal structure of the argument. 
First, we discover remote factors that enable the occurrence of the outcome (see 
Table 4.10). Second, we combine proximate factors with the remote conditions in 
a more precise analysis in order to find out necessary and sufficient combinations 
of conditions (see Table 4.11).
Remote Factors
In this step, outcome 1 is explained, while outcome 0 is set as ‘false’; remainders 
are set as ‘don’t care’ in order to obtain a parsimonious statement on outcome-
fostering context (Schneider and Wagemann 2006). At this stage, no necessary 
conditions are discovered. However, the analysis shows that a single remote 
condition is potentially sufficient for the outcome of maxcentral: ‘profess,’ 
that is, the non-professionalisation of the legislature. Following Schneider and 
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Wagemann, this condition is then included into the dataset for analysing proximate 
factors.
Table 4.10: Truth table - remote factors
Remote conditions Outcome
case dual profess maxcentral
sweco, swebk 1 1 0
swico, swibk 0 0 1
netco, netbk 0 1 0
Proximate Factors
In this second step, we explain outcome 1; outcome 0 is set as ‘false,’ and remainders 
are also set as ‘false’ (which means that no simplifying assumptions are allowed 
on the logical remainders), applying stricter analytical criteria and parameters in 
order to obtain the more complex and precise solution (Schneider and Wagemann 
2006). The QCA solution shows that a single sufficient combination of conditions 
leads to the outcome of maximal centrality of IRAs. Specifically, the combination 
of conditions that (in the population here represented) jointly explains the 
maximal centrality of agencies in policymaking is: the non-professionalisation of 
the legislature, coupled with scarce de facto independence from the regulatees and 
agencies’ high de facto independence from the political decision makers. This result 
is very robust, because I tested in the first step 3 of the 4 possible combinations (the 
unique non-observed combination being theoretically implausible and empirically 
very rare). In the second step, I tested 6 of the 16 possible combinations. However, 
when the necessary condition (defindpdm) is excluded from the dataset, I obtain 
the combination profess*defindreg, which is virtually identical to the one offered 
above and is based on 6 observed cases out of 8. In addition, the non-observed 
cases refer mainly to a number of combinations that are, as said, not empirically 
plausible (or irrelevant) (e.g. a low de facto independence from both the political 
decision makers and the regulatees) (Maggetti 2007).
Table 4.11: Truth table - proximate factors
Remote c. Proximate conditions Outcome
case profess expert defindpdm defindreg maxcentral
sweco 1 0 1 1 0
swico 0 0 1 0 1
netco 1 0 0 1 0
swibk 0 1 1 0 1
netbk 1 1 1 0 0
swebk 1 1 0 1 0
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The latter condition (DEFINDPDM) also appears to be individually necessary 
for the outcome. This point is consistent with prior knowledge, because the two 
latter conditions could be mutually constitutive (Maggetti 2007). In other words, 
a low de facto independence from the regulatees usually implies a high de facto 
independence from the political decision makers. This is the case of the swibk and 
the swico, in opposition to the sweco, where both conditions are present.  
The solution can be summarised with the following expression:
profess * defindreg * DEFINDPDM Æ MAXCENTRAL (swico+swibk)
Discussion
This solution must be interpreted as a causal whole. The non-professionalisation 
of the legislature, the scarce de facto independence from the regulatees and the 
high de facto independence from the political decision makers are to be considered 
as individually necessary parts of the unique sufficient combination (X) that leads 
to the maximal centrality of agencies in policy-making (Y). Adopting a more 
formalised QCA terminology, X is a sufficient condition of Y when X is a subset 
of Y (Goertz 2003), where X = profess * defindreg * DEFINDPDM, and Y = 
MAXCENTRAL (see Figure 4.3). Here, X can also be considered as a relevant 
condition. We demonstrated indeed that this combination occurs quite frequently in 
the real world (2 instances out of 6), while, conversely, trivial sufficient conditions 
are those where X tends to 0 for all the possible cases.
Maxcentral
Profess
defindreg
DEFINDPDM
X Y
Figure 4.3: Graphical representation of the solution
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Before concluding, it is worth discussing the individual role of each single 
condition in relation with the theoretical expectations. The results of the QCA 
analysis do not support Hypothesis 2.2; the presence of a monocratic system 
does not lead to higher agencies’ centrality. Hence, the organisational logic of 
appropriateness, with reference to the political-administrative culture, is not 
helpful for explaining the outcome of maximal centrality of agencies. Similarly, 
there is no data to maintain the idea that sector-specific IRAs regulating technical 
issues are more central in political decision-making than general regulators. 
This means that sectoral patterns of regulation are not decisive for including 
IRAs in policy-making, disconfirming our Hypothesis 2.4. Conversely, evidence 
corroborates Hypothesis 2.3, showing that a non-professionalised parliamentary 
system, which is a characteristic of the Swiss political system, seems to lead to 
higher centrality of agencies in lawmaking. The other condition that is jointly 
sufficient to explain the outcome of maximal agencies’ centrality is the low de 
facto independence from the regulatees, and the related necessary presence of high 
de facto independence from the political decision makers, which is in line with 
our expectations with reference to Hypotheses 2.5a and 2.5b. Those agencies are 
plausibly perceived as credible veto players by the political decision-makers. This 
is the case of the swibk, the swico, and to a certain extent, the netbk.
This result can be interpreted as follows. When non-professional legislators 
that suffer from a lack of material and symbolic resources must cope with a 
regulator that might challenge the later stages of the policy-making process, due 
to its low de facto independence from those being regulated, they will have strong 
incentives to include ex-ante this agency in policy-making for obtaining relevant 
information and in order to overcome any possible conflict or resistance during the 
implementation process. Given the above mentioned result, we can also conclude 
that agencies are actually influential in substantial policy-making processes and 
do not simply perform a political function of legitimisation. However, the ultimate 
empirical validation of the causal relations identified above will imply a further 
step, that is, a qualitative and systematic study of sequences of causal mechanisms 
influencing the role of each participating actor in the course of the political 
processes, such as the ‘process tracing’ analysis (George and Bennett 2005). 
Conclusion
Formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), together with their regulatory 
competencies of rule-making, monitoring, adjudication, and sanctioning, often 
participate in policy making, from policy formulation to implementation. In fact, 
IRAs, due to their broad competencies, vast resources, and acquaintance with the 
regulated sector are likely to initiate new pieces of legislation, offer expertise to 
parliaments and governments, and ensure the implementation of the new laws. 
They are thus expected to hold a key role in lawmaking. Yet IRAs have hardly been 
the target of systematic policy analyses, possibly for the reason that it is difficult 
to assess and compare their role in cross-sectoral and cross-national comparisons.
This chapter focused on the assessment and examination of IRAs’ political 
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influence in policy making. Specifically, six decision-making processes were 
studied in three small corporatist European countries – the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and Switzerland – and two policy domains – finance and competition, related to 
the development of a crucial piece of legislation in the range of competencies of 
the related IRA in the years 2000-2006. A structural approach is combined with 
a reputational approach, drawing from both survey and documental information 
about the participation and weight of each actor in the course of the decision-
making process under investigation, in order to calculate the degrees of centrality 
of IRAs in the course of lawmaking. The theoretical expectations were then tested 
with a two-step qualitative comparative analysis (Schneider and Wagemann 2006).
The analysis shows two crucial empirical findings. First, in line with the first 
hypothesis, IRAs are highly central in the course of each political decision-making 
process under scrutiny. As the actor-process-event schemes (Serdült and Hirschi 
2004) clearly illustrate, not only are agencies crucial in the implementation phase, 
but also they actively participate in the whole process, especially in agenda-setting 
and pre-parliamentary discussions. Second, following the qualitative comparative 
analysis, a combination of conditions that is jointly sufficient to explain the maximal 
centrality of agencies in policy making is identified, confirming Hypotheses 3 and 
5: the effect of the non-professionalisation of the legislature and scarce de facto 
independence of the IRA in charge from those being regulated. Moreover, the high 
de facto independence from political decision makers is a necessary condition for 
the outcome. This is the case of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission in the 
course of the revision of the stock exchanges act of 2006 and the Swiss Competition 
Commission during the revision of the act on cartels of 2003. In addition, it should 
be noted that Hypothesis 2, on the role of the politico-administrative culture, and 
Hypothesis 4, on the distinction between sector-specific and general regulation, 
are not supported by the results.
From this empirical chapter, we can derive three main insights. To begin 
with, IRAs are the most central actor in policy making related to their area of 
competence, more than expert commission, organised interest representatives, and 
ordinary agencies subordinated to the ministerial level. This point corroborates 
the arguments about the rise of an age of ‘regulocracy’ (Levi-Faur 2005a) and 
‘agencification’ (Christensen and Lægreid 2005). Yet the influential role of 
agencies in lawmaking epitomises the ambivalence of the concepts of regulatory 
state and regulatory capitalism. The term ‘regulation’ does not only connote the 
shift from state’s interventionism to the decline of public authority in favour 
of market freedom, which would imply at best mere steering functions. It also 
illustrates the proliferation of a relatively new type of public body that endorses 
new regulatory functions to promote stricter, more transparent and more formalised 
rules, that should constrain the markets and sustain the so-called public interest 
(whatever this notion is defined by the political decision makers), representing 
thus an expansion of public authority.
At the same time, the centrality of IRAs in lawmaking, both from the point 
of view of their structural participation and their reputational weight, suggests 
that the activity of formally independent regulators is not limited to the execution 
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of the delegated regulatory competencies (i.e. market supervision and technical 
regulatory functions). Interestingly, it shows that they are also developing a key 
political role and may exert significant political power in practice. They hold 
distinctive lawmaking functions, being particularly influential in agenda-setting 
and when preparing the drafts of the new bills. At the end of the day, the distinction 
between the political arena and the supposedly depoliticised, technocratic activity 
of specialised bodies offering technical expertise appears to be blurred.
Finally, it appears that the level of de facto independence – the distinctive 
feature of IRAs – may affect their centrality in policy making, in combination 
with other variables. On the one hand, the analysis suggests that the level of de 
facto independence from elected politicians is positively related to the need for 
including IRAs in policy making for problem-solving reasons, while their de facto 
independence from regulatees modifies the structure of incentives for including 
them strategically in policy making, in order to avoid any possible implementation 
failure. On the other hand, external factors, such as the professionalisation of the 
legislature, can alter the influence of IRAs in the course of lawmaking processes, 
by shaping their policy relevance for political decision-makers. 
The conditions of generalisation of these results require a short comment. In 
fact, the relative centrality of IRAs could (also) be conditional on the structure 
of the decision-making process under investigation, which was purposely kept 
constant in the present comparison. Nonetheless, it is plausible that the causal 
connections identified above will hold independently of the type of political system 
and political economy, because they do not seem contingent on specific features 
of the selected countries and sectors. In fact, the relation between agencies’ de 
facto independence and their centrality in policy-making constitutes a ‘meso-level 
effect’ that is mostly due to organisational-level variables, under ceteris paribus 
conditions (Ricart et al. 2004). However, in this regard, further in-depth research 
is welcome, especially concerning the mechanisms underlying the causal relations 
identified above.
chapter 
five
the media coverage of agencies 
(III)
Summary
Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), besides the expected benefits in terms 
of credibility and efficiency, are said to bring about a ‘democratic deficit’, 
following their statutory separateness from democratic institutions. Consequently, 
a ‘multi-pronged system of control’ is required. This chapter focuses on a specific 
component of this system, that is, the media. The goal is to determine whether 
media coverage of IRAs meets the necessary prerequisites to be considered a 
potential ‘accountability forum’ for regulators. The results of a comparison of two 
contrasted cases – the British and Swiss competition commissions – mostly support 
the expectations, since they show that media coverage of IRAs corresponds to that 
of the most relevant policy issues and follows the regulatory cycle. Furthermore, a 
systematic bias in media coverage can be excluded.
Introduction
IRAs epitomise a mode of governance in line with the observation that ‘the real 
work of running democracies is now carried out by the unelected’ (Vibert 2007). 
This apparent imbalance between power and responsibility led to the identification 
of a ‘democratic deficit’ in the European regulatory state (Majone 1999; Roberts 
2001; Majone 2002; Follesdal and Hix 2006). Whereas the diagnosis of the 
intensity of this deficit may vary, it has been observed that governments can 
delegate regulatory authority to independent regulators, but not their democratic 
legitimacy, leading to a ‘net loss’ of democratic legitimacy for the political system 
(Majone 1999, 2001b, 2005; Maggetti 2009b, 2010).
In response to these considerations, it was argued that ‘majoritarian standards’ 
of legitimacy are not appropriate for independent regulators (Majone 2002). Their 
legitimacy should instead be appreciated with reference to alternative standards, 
especially through the revivification of the concept of ‘accountability’. Majone 
points repeatedly to the need for a ‘multi-pronged system of controls’ to keep 
regulatory bodies accountable (Majone 1996b, 2002). This system consists of 
a variety of control mechanisms, such as (1) specification of clear and narrow 
objectives; (2) oversight by governmental and parliamentary committees; (3) 
procedural requirements like hearings and reporting duties; (4) judicial review; (5) 
professionalism and peer review; and (6) transparency and public participation. 
Academic research has focused so far on the first four points, which refer to 
traditional accountability arrangements between bureaucracy and other branches 
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of the state (Schedler 1999; Mulgan 2000, 2003; Lodge 2004; Verschuere et al. 
2006; Busuioc 2009), and, to a lesser extent, to the fifth mechanism, which is 
distinctive of independent bodies (Maggetti and Gilardi 2010). Conversely, the 
last solution has been either neglected or dismissed as scarcely relevant, because 
direct public participation in regulatory governance is considered empirically 
negligible and even normatively undesirable (Sosay 2006). In particular, it is 
believed that the participation of an increased heterogeneous number of actors 
would undermine the decision-making capacity of IRAs, i.e. their raison d’être 
(Majone 1999).
The goal of this chapter is to examine another, indirect, possible venue for 
securing transparency and responsiveness in regard to independent regulators, 
that is, their media coverage (Arnold 2004; Voltmer 2010). In this context, a 
specific question is explored: can the media help to hold independent regulators 
accountable, in line with the observation that ‘in many countries, the media are 
fast gaining power as informal forums for political accountability’ (Bovens 2007)? 
The next two sections discuss the relevance of media scrutiny for the accountability 
of regulators and, respectively, present some exploratory expectations about the 
frequency and tone of media coverage. Then, these expectations are operationalised 
for two contrasted cases: the British and Swiss competition commissions. The 
empirical analysis and conclusions follow. The main findings indicate that the 
media coverage of agencies corresponds to that of the most relevant policy 
issues and follows approximately the regulatory cycle. Furthermore, a systematic 
negative or positive bias in media coverage can be excluded.
Accountability and the Media
Thomas Jefferson, in the spirit of the first amendment to the US’ Constitution, 
notoriously stated that ‘the functionaries of every government have propensities 
to command at will the liberty and property of their constituents. There is no 
safe deposit for these but with the people themselves, nor can they be safe with 
them without information. Where the press is free, and every man able to read, 
all is safe’ (Thomas Jefferson to Charles Yancey, 1816. ME 14:384). In this 
vein, recent studies have shown that mass media are ‘by far the most important’ 
source of information about officials’ performance (Arnold 2004), representing a 
‘necessary condition’ for the existence of democratic government (Dahl 1989) and 
a precondition for accountability (Coglianese and Howard 1998; Lee 1999; Besley 
and Burgess 2001; Besley et al. 2002; Voltmer 2010). The media can play a key role 
in enabling citizens – who have imperfect information about government activities 
– to monitor the actions of ministers and civil servants, leading to government 
that is more accountable and responsive to its citizens (Besley and Burgess 2001; 
Besley et al. 2002; Besley and Prat 2006) and rendering elected politicians more 
accountable (Roberts 2002; Strömberg 2004; Louw 2005; Snyder and Strömberg 
2008). Ideally, free media are expected to act as the societal institution that 
‘contributes to public accountability without being under the control to any other 
actor’ (Fox 2000), that is, following a relatively endogenous logic stemming from 
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market incentives and journalistic goals (Besley and Prat 2006). In particular, 
active and persistent media coverage encourages the formation of an informed 
public opinion (O’Donnell 1998), while press criticism and support are considered 
crucial for obtaining justifications from governments and civil service (Meyer 
2004). The media could theoretically provide an ‘accountability forum’ (Bovens 
2007) that is particularly suitable for IRAs, constituting ‘one element of a complex 
accountability system’ (Hodge and Coghill 2007), which would not hinder their 
independence (Majone 1996b, 2002).
Accountability means that an actor who is in a position of responsibility in 
relationship to the interests of another actor is required to give an account of 
the conduct of his duties, while the second actor can either reward or sanction 
the former (Schedler 1999; Castiglione 2006). Bovens underlines the fact that 
accountability should be conceptualised as a social relationship between an actor 
and its ‘accountability forum’, which can be an individual or collective actor through 
whom the first actor is held accountable (Bovens 2007). Following Bovens, in 
many countries, the media are fast gaining power as informal forums for political 
accountability (Bovens 2007). The media might constitute a particularly relevant 
accountability forum for IRAs for two reasons. First, public communication is 
a requisite for the accountability of political institutions (Sarcinelli 1987; Dahl 
1989), which is particularly important when policy-making takes place behind 
closed doors and scarce democratic responsiveness exists (Voltmer and Eilders 
2003). In fact, the media do guide opinion formation and perception (de Vreese 
et al. 2006), especially when they cover issues that are overly technical or with 
which individuals are less familiar (Zaller 1992; Vogel 1996; Bryant and Zillmann 
2002). This is the case of independent regulators, whereby citizens derive most of 
what they know about the issues from the media, and in turn the media might help 
to ‘extend’ the accountability of these bodies (Scott 2000a).
Second, the media represent a venue for policymakers for the appraisal 
of regulatory outcomes, performing a ‘fire-alarm’ function (McCubbins et al. 
1987). Because the political principals suffer from a structural informational 
disadvantage vis-à-vis independent regulatory agencies, they must rely on external 
sources of information to monitor whether the agency is acting according to the 
predefined notion of the ‘public interest’ before eventually deciding to engage 
in costly political-oversight activities (Hopenhayn and Lohmann 1996). As such, 
media coverage constitutes an important ‘linkage mechanism’ between regulatory 
agencies and policy-makers (Waterman et al. 1998; Waterman and Rouse 1999; 
Carpenter 2002b), by playing a key role in communicating policy ideas and 
framing issues (Coglianese and Howard 1998). At the same time, the media affect 
the setting of the political agenda (Walgrave et al. 2008), given that decision-
makers, for instrumental reasons, look for regulatory policies that reflect so-called 
public opinion (Stimson et al. 1994).
Therefore, the accountability of IRAs in front of the media can be examined 
by operationalising the two components of the definition outlined above: on the 
one hand, (1) the extent to which the media give an account of IRAs’ conduct can 
be measured with the amount of media coverage with reference to the official 
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goals of delegation, that is, the expected credibility of regulators associated with 
their supposed independence and the aspiration of enhancing decision-making 
efficiency thanks to their technical expertise (Majone 1994b, 1996a, 1997a, 
b; Gilardi 2002b; Moran 2002; Thatcher 2002a, b, c; Elgie and McMenamin 
2005; Levi-Faur 2005a). Policy credibility is the expectation that an announced 
policy will be properly carried out (Drazen and Masson 1994) in order to create 
credible policy commitments vis-à-vis stakeholders (e.g. foreign investors), 
consumers, and citizens (Shepsle 1991). It is considered a crucial condition for 
solving the time-inconsistency problem related to the political cycle (Kydland 
and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983). Decision-making efficiency refers 
to the resource-saving implementation of predetermined goals (Blühdorn 2006). 
That is, it involves reducing decision-making costs by taking advantage of 
agencies’ expertise, while avoiding the enactment of policies that are different 
from those preferred by the political decision-makers (Epstein and O’Halloran 
1999; Bendor et al. 2001; Majone 2001c)1. On the other hand, (2) the positive or 
negative tone of media coverage relating to agencies’ credibility and efficiency 
can be considered an important symbolic sanction or reward, both of which have 
crucial consequences on their activeness, effectiveness and prospect for survival. 
In fact, ‘not only performance but also the perceived appearance of performance 
[…] challenges the organisation’s legitimacy and potential survival' (Lodge 2002). 
The tone of the media’s coverage is particularly important from a reputational 
perspective. On the one hand, the media represent a point of view that is socially 
relevant for building a reputation of credibility; that is, a point of view that is 
relevant when regulatees, stakeholders and the public at large believe in the proper 
implementation of the announced policies and make choices based upon these 
expectations (Brabazon 2000). By analogy, in business management literature it 
is widely accepted that media-provided information affects the credibility of firms 
and, consequently, investors’ behaviour, influencing such performances as price 
rate and stock turnover (Pollock and Rindova 2003). In fact, the media constitute 
a crucial element of the process of contagion that proceeds from the level of 
individual cognition to the level of social propagation and back to that of individual 
cognition, transmitting the image of the corporation through an informal network 
1. The explanatory power of these normative arguments is limited, as there is cumulative evidence 
supporting the relevance of non-functional factors for the establishment of independent regulators, 
drawing from organisational theory and sociological institutionalism (Gilardi 2005b; Christensen 
and Yesilkagit 2006). In particular, emulative processes and strategies for coping with politi-
cal uncertainty and blame shifting are frequently highlighted (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002; 
Gilardi 2005b; Christensen and Yesilkagit 2006; Gilardi 2008). However, the official goals of 
delegation in terms of credibility and efficiency represent a relevant analytical benchmark when, 
instead of examining why agencies are created, the focus is on the consequences of delegating 
public authority to IRAs, such as in the present research study. These official goals are further 
relevant because, from a new institutional perspective, although created following dynamics of 
symbolic diffusion, once in place, agencies are expected to ‘take on a life of their own’ (Pollack 
1996), and exert also a direct impact on regulatory practices (Christensen and Lægreid 2003).
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and eventually affecting its credibility (Balboni 2008). On the other hand, the tone 
of the media’s evaluation of efficiency is crucial for IRAs. The media provide a 
forum for debate and dissemination of information, recording evaluations, reducing 
information asymmetry, and influencing the opinion of stakeholders by reputational 
mechanisms (Deephouse 2000), while organisational reputation is an essential 
property of regulators that largely influences the effectiveness of their actions (i.e. 
the factual delivery of their intended outcomes) (Blühdorn 2006). Specifically, a 
reputation for efficiency allows agencies to build networks and coalitions, exert 
political influence, increase their room for maneuvering vis-à-vis elected politicians, 
and reinforce their position before those being regulated (Carpenter 2001b; 
Carpenter 2001a). In addition, it is instrumental in gaining support from interest 
groups concerned with regulatory reforms (Krause and Douglas 2005).
Expectations about the Media Accountability of Agencies
It has been noted that political communication is increasingly ‘mediated’: political 
actors depend on the mass media to reach and mobilise citizens (Manin 1996), 
and citizens ever more frequently form their political opinions based on what they 
learn from the news media (Swanson and Mancini 1996; Gerber 1999; Hallin 
and Mancini 2004). Furthermore, it has been observed that the media can act as 
a partially autonomous actor that shapes political institutions and informs the 
public with growing independence from governments, parties and interest groups 
(Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Kepplinger 2002; Strömbäck and Esser 2009). 
However, one should recognise that the media is not necessarily impartial when 
evaluating agencies’ functioning. On the one hand, politicians and representatives 
of organised groups can try to use the media strategically to convey their points 
of view. On the other hand, they also follow their commercial and/or ideological 
goals. Therefore, the media are neither neutral evaluators reflecting reality nor 
mere channels of communication for political actors (Strömbäck and Esser 2009). 
They are indeed involved in the process of constructing reality, and impose their 
views on the story (Swanson 1981; Mazzoleni 1987; Altheide and Snow 1988). In 
addition, media are selective, that is, media do not cover everything that political 
actors do, but do focus on those issues that have ‘the most direct impact on the 
public’ (Coglianese and Howard 1998), and on ‘important and interesting news’ 
(Cook 1998). Whether the media can however provide the minimal conditions to 
render IRAs accountable – notwithstanding the above mentioned shortcomings and 
variations in the institutional settings, political-administrative factors, varieties of 
media systems and agencies characteristics – constitutes the main empirical question 
of this chapter, similarly to previous research on the media coverage of the U.S. 
congress (Arnold 2004). Nonetheless, the actual influence of the media on public 
opinion, politicians and regulators is beyond the scope of this piece of research, 
which is limited to the exploration of the subsistence of minimal prerequisites for 
considering the media as a potential accountability forum for IRAs.
As anticipated in the previous section, the first component of media 
accountability corresponds to evidence of regular media scrutiny of IRAs with 
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reference to their official goals, credibility and efficiency, consistently with the 
ideal account of media as watchdogs of the political process (Besley et al. 2002; 
Curran 2005). However, establishing an absolute benchmark for the level of media 
coverage would be arbitrary. Instead, it can be appraised with the following three 
indications, which are in line with previous research on media accountability 
(Arnold 2004; Voltmer 2010): (1) the average frequency of news regarding IRAs’ 
credibility and efficiency should be roughly comparable to that of other politically 
relevant issues; (2) given the growing role of independent regulators, the frequency 
of media coverage, at aggregated level, should follow a positive trend; and (3) 
media attention is expected to follow the regulatory cycle: news are expected to 
peak around events that are relevant for the investigated IRAs, such as the opening 
of a new important inquiry or the publication of the annual report.
The other component of accountability is even trickier to detect. The solution 
adopted in this chapter is to consider that media do apply symbolic sanctions 
and rewards when they consistently employ a negative or positive tone in news 
stories that have an evaluative focus regarding the credibility and efficiency of 
IRAs. Three minimal expectations regarding the tone of media evaluation can 
be mentioned: (4) the evaluation of agencies’ credibility should vary across 
cases and not be systematically conditioned by a positive bias, which could stem 
from the widespread perception of the independent regulator as a ‘taken for 
granted’ organisational model and ‘socially valued’ solution for creating credible 
commitments (Gilardi 2005b); (5) while it has been observed that political news 
that explicitly evaluates performance is typically negative in tone (Kepplinger and 
Weißbecker 1991; Lee 1999; Clark 2005), the consistent evaluation of agencies’ 
efficiency requires media to avoid an unconditional negative bias; and (6) since 
the media are simultaneously the most important channel of communication for 
agencies and its most attentive observer (Coglianese and Howard 1998; Lee 1999; 
Besley and Burgess 2001; Besley et al. 2002; Voltmer 2010), the media coverage 
is expected to frame IRAs’ credibility and efficiency as typical issues of general 
interest, and thus focus on the topics that are considered relevant for the public. 
Therefore, the main hypothesis of this chapter can be formulated as follows.
H 3.1 The media can function as an ‘accountability forum’ for independent 
regulatory agencies.
In addition, as a subsidiary hypothesis, one can expect that the media evaluations 
of credibility and efficiency go together, or, at least, that the two properties are not 
a priori incompatible, following the two functional logics of delegation to IRAs 
(Majone 2001a).
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H 3.2 IRAs can be evaluated as credible and efficient at the same time.
Methodology
Case Selection and the Logic of the Comparison
Following the idea that ‘one strategy for explanation […] would be to select 
administrative systems that differ most and, from the research into those systems, 
develop propositions that appear to hold true regardless of the vast differences that 
may exist among the research locales' (Peters 2004), this examination of media 
coverage aims to explore two cases for which IRAs share a medium-high level 
of factual independence from politicians (Maggetti 2007) – given that effective 
delegation is a necessary precondition for the analysis – but that ideally diverge in 
the other macro- and meso-conditions that might influence the media evaluation 
of agencies. The aforementioned expectations can be validated or dismissed by 
comparing two cases that are situated at the two extremes on a continuum of the 
expected media evaluation of credibility and efficiency: a 'most likely' and a 'least 
likely' case (Gerring 2007a, b). This way, it possible to examine whether the media 
can function as accountability forum despite variations in political-administrative 
factors, institutional settings, media systems and agencies’ characteristics. The 
application of this research design also permits drawing a conclusion based on a 
counterfactual case-oriented logic. For instance, if a theory is disconfirmed even 
for the 'most likely' case, this can be considered a strong argument against that 
theory. Similarly, when a theory is confirmed even for the 'least-likely' case, it 
means that this theory deserves further attention and consideration (Gerring 2004, 
2007a; Seawright and Gerring 2008).
According to this logic, two IRAs are selected: the British Competition 
Commission (CC) and the Swiss Competition Commission (ComCo), both 
established at the beginning of 2000 with the official purpose of promoting 'non-
majoritarian' regulatory governance (Wilks and Bartle 2002; Maggetti et al. 
2011). Competition policy is a politically salient regulatory issue for electorally 
sensitive politicians (Elgie and McMenamin 2005), when the functionalist logic of 
delegation is strong (Christensen and Yesilkagit 2006), for which media coverage 
of credibility and efficiency should be particularly accurate. In addition, media 
coverage is examined for a commensurable period of time that is sufficiently 
long to avoid any potential bias due to contingent phenomena: the years 2006 and 
20072. It is worth stressing that the decisive argument for selecting this timeframe 
is reminiscent of the regulatory issues under investigation in the two countries. A 
similar big issue was examined in both cases: high concentration in the grocery 
market, which also represents a topic that is ideologically quite neutral on the 
left-right divide. Specifically, the selected media reported the following issues 
2. This choice seems reasonable as Arnold’s landmark study of the media accountability of the U.S. 
congress also comprises two years (Arnold 2004).
148 regulation in practice
(as percentages): in the United Kingdom (UK), grocery markets (39 per cent), 
aviation regulation (17 per cent), TV media plurality (16 per cent), home credit 
markets (8 per cent), book chains (6 per cent), payment protection insurance (3 per 
cent), price controls on business banks (2 per cent), store cards (2 per cent), the 
telephone directories market (2 per cent), and others (5 per cent); in Switzerland, 
grocery markets (41 per cent), book markets (9 per cent), import/export (9 per 
cent), liberalisation of the electricity sector (6 per cent), vertical cartels (6 per 
cent), credit cards (3 per cent), liberalisation of the postal service (3 per cent), 
telecommunications (3 per cent), the Zurich airport (3 per cent), and others 
(17 per cent). No particular crisis event occurred during this time period. Two 
particular features of this study shall be mentioned. First, this contribution does 
not deal with the reception, political impact or organisational reactions to media 
evaluation. Second, IRAs examined in this article are among the most media-
savvy regulators in Western Europe, whilst the contribution of media coverage to 
their accountability is plausibly inferior for IRAs that work far from the media’s 
spotlights. Therefore, the scope of the analysis is purposely limited to the media 
coverage of powerful, independent, mediatised regulators in Western Europe, 
which are the most important IRAs and those for which this type of accountability 
could be particularly relevant. The rest of this section shows how the British CC 
and the Swiss ComCo represent, respectively, a ‘most likely’ and ‘least likely’ 
case in terms of the outcomes of media evaluation in the population of Western 
European IRAs. 
UK and Switzerland
To begin, these two IRAs are embedded in political-administrative systems that 
are exceedingly dissimilar (see Figure 5.1). Despite some recent trends toward the 
devolution of political competencies, the British political system is considered 
the ideal type of majoritarian polity (Dunleavy and Margetts 2001). The electoral 
system provides each major political party the opportunity to contend for 
governmental positions, with no need for grand coalitions. Once a candidate is 
in office, there are few political and institutional checks and balances. Therefore, 
the government relies on its majority to pass its legislative programmes and to 
make and implement decisions (Norris 2001; Armingeon 2002). The Anglo-Saxon 
style of public administration traditionally emphasises management rather than 
legalism in the performance of public tasks, a contractualist and market-oriented 
logic, and a career-based professionalised civil-service system (Peters 2004). 
The new public management (NPM) reforms implied both the reinforcement of 
market-oriented structures and the creation of quangos, semi-public organisations, 
and semi-autonomous agencies responsible for operational management (Hood 
et al. 2001). At the same time, a tendency emerged toward the centralisation of 
control and the use of performance assessment and oversight procedures (Knill 
1998; Moran 2003).
Conversely, the Swiss political system typically follows a consensual model, 
traditionally showing a multi-party concordance government. The decision-making 
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process is open, inclusive, and strongly shaped by the pre-parliamentary phase, in 
which expert committees play a crucial role and political parties, interest groups, 
and cantons are extensively consulted by the federal administration (Papadopoulos 
2008). The participation of organised interests in policy formulation and collective 
negotiations is institutionalised, according to neo-corporatist logic (Armingeon 
2002; Katzenstein 2003). According to the federal structure and the related principle 
of subsidiarity, political competencies are entrusted to the lowest possible level, 
especially regarding implementation (Braun 2003). In addition to this vertical 
dimension, the fragmentation of the system is increased horizontally by frequent 
reliance upon non-professional administrators, extra-parliamentary commissions, 
and quasi-state organisations (Varone 2007). The NPM was introduced to impose 
a greater degree of responsibility and to evaluate the results of public actions. 
However, it produced contradictory injunctions to civil servants, resulting in an 
increased ‘institutional selfishness and one-purpose specialisation’ that produced 
even greater fragmentation, less cooperation, and poorer coordination (Emery and 
Giauque 2004; Widmer and Neuenschwander 2004).
Besides these structural differences, it is important to deal with those meso-
level variables that might have a direct impact on the media evaluation of agencies 
to operationalise the comparison of a ‘most likely’ and a ‘least likely’ case. The 
conditions that follow will systematically predict a better media evaluation of the 
British CC, in terms of credibility and/or efficiency, compared to the Swiss ComCo. 
First, the British CC could enjoy a more positive coverage, as it is formally more 
independent than the Swiss ComCo (Gilardi 2008). Second, the UK is a member 
of the European Union (EU), which is said to have a positive impact on agencies’ 
activism through the promotion of a strong regulatory approach to sustain the 
economic integration and the common market (Majone 1996a). On the contrary, 
because it operates in a non-member state, the Swiss ComCo receives at best only 
indirect support from the EU. Third, the use of ex-post mechanisms to monitor 
and evaluate the quality of regulatory outcomes, such as oversight control tools 
and the application of procedures of regulatory impact assessment, might improve 
the agencies’ media evaluation for regulatory efficiency. These instruments are 
consistently adopted in the UK, while they remain comparatively underdeveloped 
for Swiss IRAs (Widmer and Neuenschwander 2004; Radaelli and De Francesco 
2007).
Fourth, the British CC is considered one of the world’s leading antitrust 
authorities (GCR 2006; Wilks 2007). Furthermore, its analytical skills and 
capacities are highly rated by peer agencies, experts, and stakeholders, according 
to the survey enquiries of the Global Competition Review (five out of five stars). 
This might enhance its media evaluation for both credibility and efficiency. 
Conversely, the Swiss ComCo is relatively poorly rated (three out of five stars). 
Moreover, international experts frequently criticise it for its supposed lack of 
effectiveness (OECD 2005). Fifth, the type of political economy may also have 
an impact on the institutional appropriateness of the action of regulators (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). Again, the media evaluation for credibility and efficiency should be 
higher for the British regulator, given that the CC operates within a liberal market 
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economy. Instead, the Swiss ComCo has the task of regulating a coordinated 
market economy, for which the internal market is traditionally strongly cartelised. 
This situation could to lead interest groups and private actors that hassle the new 
wave of regulation-for-competition to challenge the regulatory activity of the 
competition commission by undermining its reputation.
Sixth, the structure of the media field might influence media perceptions of 
credibility and efficiency. Media industry concentration appears to be higher 
in Switzerland, producing incentives for the national media to be more critical 
toward ComCo, since the press industry might feel threatened by the regulator 
(Doyle 2002). On the contrary, in the UK, the press market is larger and more 
pluralist, segmented, and quite dynamic. Since there are fewer pressures for 
regulatory interventions, one can exclude any enduring bias against the CC for 
this reason. Finally, unlike ComCo, the CC has a strong and active department 
of press communication and public relations, plausibly doing its best to enhance 
agencies’ media evaluations of credibility and efficiency. In general the human 
and financial resources of the British CC are significantly higher than those of 
the Swiss ComCo (Maggetti 2007). All these factors increase the chances that the 
former agency will perform better than the latter in terms of media evaluation of 
credibility and efficiency. 
Consensual
Majoritarian
Figure 5.1: Typology of democracies (adapted from Lijphart 1999)
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The Assessment of Media Evaluation
The empirical analysis zooms in on the so-called quality press. Quality 
newspapers are indeed considered crucial because they influence other media, 
thus directly or indirectly impacting the public (Coglianese and Howard 1998). 
It is widely recognised that the elite press reaches a much larger segment of 
the public by determining issues and perspectives for the news coverage of all 
types of media (Kepplinger et al. 2004). In addition, the perceived quality of 
information determines the magnitude of its effect on the prior beliefs of readers 
(Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). Editorials and commentaries are particularly 
important in shaping the symbolic environment, although they are unfortunately 
quite neglected in media coverage studies (Voltmer and Eilders 2003). In fact, 
they become more and more essential as they respond to the people’s need for 
orientation (Voltmer 1998), especially concerning ‘non-obtrusive’ issues such 
as the action of regulatory agencies that cannot be experienced in everyday life 
(Lang and Lang 1984). Moreover, editorials are the articles in which the media’s 
own positions are most openly and legitimately expressed (Eilders 2000, 2002). 
Therefore, a focus on editorials, commentaries, and interviews would allow 
for the examination of press articles that include an explicit evaluation of the 
agency in a transparent and direct manner. To investigate how the media evaluate 
independent regulatory agencies and their regulatory action, a measure of ‘media 
favourableness’ will be created. For each newspaper, each article that mentions 
the investigated agency corresponded to an observation, and it was preliminarily 
coded as an editorial (‘e’), comment (‘c’), or interview (‘i’). In addition, the day 
of the publication was recorded. News items in which the agency was marginally 
cited and ordinary articles in which the journalist referred to the agency without 
any judgement or comment were excluded from the sample. Then, each article 
was considered according to the explicit evaluation of two distinct elements the 
represents the ‘official goals’ of delegation: the credibility and the efficiency of 
the related agency (Majone 1996b, 2000; Franchino 2002; Gilardi 2002b; Braun 
and Gilardi 2006).
Each element was evaluated using four criteria: (1) autonomy from politicians, 
(2) predictability of decisions, (3) status of board members, and (4) autonomy 
from regulatees, with regard to credibility; and (1) public-good orientation, (2) 
uniqueness of the solution, (3) organisational capability, and (4) cost-benefit 
gains, with regard to efficiency. These criteria referred to a number of empirical 
measurements of organisational reputation that were derived and adapted from 
the literature dealing with organisational credibility and efficiency (Peters et al. 
1997; Brunetti et al. 1998; Blinder 1999; Deephouse 2000; Maeda and Miyahara 
2003; Blühdorn 2006; de Jonge et al. 2007; Kim et al. 2007; Radaelli and De 
Francesco 2007). Accordingly, each criterion can be considered as ‘constitutive’ 
of the related element (Goertz 2006b).
Further, the code for each single criterion was assigned on a three-point scale 
by considering whether the article explicitly referred to that criterion in a positive, 
negative, or neutral tone (i.e. no evaluation present; not all editorials were clearly 
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evaluative; some were characterised by a neutral and diagnostic tone). A positive 
reference to one criterion was coded a ‘1’; a negative evaluation was coded a ‘-1’; 
and a neutral evaluation was coded a ‘0’. In turn, each element was nominally 
evaluated as positive, negative, or neutral according to the positive, negative, or 
neutral value of the sum of the four criteria defining that element. Following this 
approach, an article that positively evaluates IRAs’ autonomy from politicians 
constitutes an instance of positive evaluation of credibility. More than one indicator 
can be simultaneously present in a news article. The coding procedure is consistent 
across newspapers. This information can be summarised by calculating ‘c’, the 
coefficient of media favourableness (Deephouse 2000). According to Deephouse, 
‘c’ measures the relative proportion of favourable to unfavourable articles while 
controlling for the overall volume of articles. Consistent with prior research, each 
article is given equal weight in the measure. The formula for calculating ‘c’ is:
(f2 – fu)/(total)2, if f > u;
c = 0, if f = u;
(fu – u2)/(total)2, if u > f;
Where f = number of favourable recording units for an agency in a given 
time period; u = number of unfavourable recording units for the agency in that 
time period; and total = the total number of recording units for the agency in that 
time period. The range of this variable is -1 to 1, where 1 indicates all favourable 
coverage, -1 indicates all unfavourable coverage, and 0 indicates a balance 
between the two over the time period.
Empirical Analysis
The dataset encompasses all editorial articles, comments, and interviews in the 
daily broadsheet newspapers on the national competition commissions, during the 
years 2006-2007. The selected newspapers represent the so-called quality press, as 
usually defined in Switzerland and the UK.
Data
Case 1: UK (325 articles): The Daily Telegraph (63 articles), The Financial Times 
(70 articles), The Guardian (62 articles), The Independent (64 articles), The Times 
(66 articles).
Case 2: Switzerland (214 articles): 24 Heures (11 articles), Basler Zeitung (28 
articles), Der Bund (23 articles), Neue Zuercher Zeitung (54 articles), Tages 
Anzeiger (55 articles), Le Temps (31 articles), Tribune de Genève (12 articles).
Prior to the analysis, the consistency of the coding procedure was examined 
through the recoding of a random sample of articles by another researcher to 
establish intercoder reliability with Krippendorff’s Alpha (Krippendorff 2004), 
using the SPSS macro developed by Hayes (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007). Then, 
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a principal component analysis (PCA) was used to explore the structure of the 
dataset and to examine whether the aforementioned four criteria were adequate 
for measuring credibility and efficiency. These preliminary analyses are reported 
in the following two sections.
Reliability
When data are generated by (trained) human observers who systematically 
record or transcribe textual, pictorial, or audible material and make some kind of 
judgement in suitable terms for analysis, intersubjectively-valid measurement is 
not possible without the test of the reliability of collected data. The assessment of 
the reproducibility of the code is the strongest and most feasible kind of reliability 
test in content analysis – while the standard tests of ‘stability’ and ‘accuracy’ are 
less important in this context (Scott 1955; Lombard et al. 2002; Krippendorff 2004; 
Hayes and Krippendorff 2007; Krippendorff and Bock 2009). In content analysis, 
reproducibility is often conceptualised through the level of ‘intercoder reliability’, 
measuring ‘the extent to which the different judges tend to assign the same rating 
to each object’ (Krippendorff 2004). In other terms, it assesses the reproducibility 
of the coding, that is, the degree to which the coding process can be replicated by 
different analysts, working independent of each other, when applying the same 
recording instructions to the same observations. It is worth noting that a tension 
exists between choosing comprehensive but non-reproducible interpretations and 
superficial or oversimplified but very reliable text analysis (for instance generated 
through computer applications) (Krippendorff 2004). The middle path is a properly 
conceptualised measure with a satisfactory (but not necessarily perfect) level of 
intercoder reliability.
The Krippendorff’s alpha is the most general agreement measure with 
appropriate reliability interpretations in content analysis (Hayes and Krippendorff 
2007). The basic idea is to ensure that data do not deviate too much from perfect 
intercoder agreement (and not that they do not deviate from chance). Concretely, 
the alpha algorithm ‘counts pairs of categories or scale points that observers 
have assigned to individual units, treating observers as freely permutable and 
being unaffected by their numbers’ (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007). Measures of 
agreement are possible for nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio data, rendering the 
reliabilities for such data fully comparable across different metrics. Approximations 
assumptions are avoided, and, instead, the distribution of alpha is bootstrapped 
from the given reliability data. So, the alpha scale defines two points: 1.000 for 
perfect reliability and 0.000 for the absence of reliability (as if categories or scale 
points were statistically unrelated to the units they describe). K-Alpha follows a 
quite demanding test of reliability, because data coding is considered reliable not 
simply when the null hypothesis that agreement occurs by chance can be rejected 
with statistical confidence, but when data are ensured not to deviate too much from 
perfect agreement. According to Krippendorff, there is no set answer to what is a 
good level of reliability (Krippendorff 2004). A level of 0.7 means that at least 70 
per cent of the data are perfectly coded to a degree better than chance. This level 
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is probably not ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ when the life of someone is directly 
affected, such as in court proceedings or in some medical tests. But it can be 
considered good for most types of content analyses, especially for social science 
research. Accordingly, the benchmark value for the minimum satisfactory level 
of intercoder reliability is 0.667, while a value of 0.800 or above indicates a very 
reliable measurement. 
The first step of the procedure is the definition of a random sample of 
observations to be recoded by an independent analyst. Ideally, the recoding of 
the whole dataset would be desirable.  However, it is hardly feasible because 
of the unavoidable constraints of time and resources. Thus, the sample must be 
representative of the population whose reliability is in question (Krippendorff 
2004). According to the suggestions of Krippendorff (2004: 234-40), when the 
coding procedure involves the appraisal of values on three equally probable 
categories (as here), the sample size should be the following. For a minimum 
accepted alpha of 0.667, the required sample size is 34 at a level of significance of 
0.050, and 68 at a level of significance of 0.010. For a minimum accepted alpha of 
0.800, the required sample size is 59 at a level of significance of 0.050, and 117 at 
a level of significance of 0.010.
In the present case, after the main coding procedure executed by myself, a 
sample was given to another analyst (a sociologist working for another research 
institute) for recoding, by carefully following the written instructions, but being 
not aware of the purpose of the research, so as to independently measure the 
level of intercoder reliability. Following the aforementioned guidelines, I decided 
to maximise the sample size. I took 30 random observations for each case and 
for each one of the two variables. I obtained a total of 120 observations to be 
recoded, producing thus 120 pairs of judgements (120 by the principal coder 
and 120 recoded by the independent analyst), whose alpha level of agreement 
is representative of the population (at least) at 95 per cent significance level (see 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2). Once the recoding procedure accomplished, I applied the 
SPSS macro developed by Hayes to calculate the Krippendorff’s alpha, using the 
following formula (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007):
KALPHA judges = obsa obsb/level = 1/detail = 1/boot = 5000.
This means that I compared the agreement between the two pairs of judgements 
(obsa and obsb), treating data as nominal (for improving the robustness of the 
measurement), and allowing the software 5000 bootstraps. The result is a 
satisfactory level of intercoder reliability that is representative of the population 
at 95 per cent:
KALPHA: = ,7194
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Table 5.1: Sample of the coding of the British CC
Country New. Date N° Credibility Efficiency
    Coding Recoding Coding Recoding
uk ThG 21.12.2007 2 0 0 -1 -1
uk ThG 3.11.2007 3 0 0 0 1
uk ThG 2.11.2007 4 0 0 1 1
uk ThG 1.11.2007 5 0 0 -1 -1
uk ThG 1.11.2007 6 0 -1 0 -1
uk ThG 1.11.2007 7 0 0 -1 -1
uk ThI 8.12.2007 8 0 0 0 0
uk ThI 8.12.2007 9 0 0 -1 -1
uk ThI 4.12.2007 10 0 1 0 0
uk ThI 8.11.2007 11 0 0 1 1
uk ThI 1.11.2007 12 0 0 0 -1
uk ThI 1.11.2007 13 0 0 0 0
uk ThI 1.11.2007 14 0 0 1 1
uk ThT 10.12.2007 15 0 0 -1 -1
uk ThT 29.11.2007 16 0 0 1 1
uk ThT 4.11.2007 17 1 1 0 1
uk ThT 4.11.2007 18 0 0 -1 -1
uk ThT 4.11.2007 19 0 0 0 0
uk ThT 1.11.2007 20 0 1 -1 -1
uk ThT 1.11.2007 21 0 0 0 0
uk FiT 22.12.2007 22 0 0 -1 -1
uk FiT 21.12.2007 23 0 0 1 1
uk FiT 17.11.2007 24 0 0 0 -1
uk FiT 3.11.2007 25 0 1 -1 -1
uk DaT 27.12.2007 26 0 0 0 0
uk DaT 27.12.2007 27 0 0 0 -1
uk DaT 21.12.2007 28 0 0 0 0
uk DaT 11.11.2007 29 0 0 -1 -1
uk DaT 4.11.2007 30 0 0 -1 -1
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Table 5.2: Sample of the coding of the Swiss ComCo
Country New. Date N° Credibility Efficiency
    Coding Recoding Coding Recoding
ch 24H 15.9.2007 1 0 0 1 1
ch Baz 28.11.2007 2 0 0 -1 -1
ch Baz 27.11.2007 3 0 0 0 0
ch Baz 23.11.2007 4 0 0 -1 -1
ch Baz 8.9.2007 5 0 0 -1 -1
ch Bun 28.11.2007 6 0 0 -1 -1
ch Bun 27.11.2007 7 0 0 0 0
ch Bun 27.11.2007 8 0 0 -1 -1
ch Bun 10.9.2007 9 -1 -1 -1 -1
ch LeT 7.12.2007 10 -1 0 0 -1
ch LeT 27.11.2007 11 0 1 -1 0
ch LeT 7.11.2007 12 0 0 1 1
ch LeT 20.10.2007 13 0 0 0 0
ch LeT 19.10.2007 14 0 -1 -1 -1
ch LeT 27.9.2007 15 -1 -1 -1 -1
ch LeT 10.9.2007 16 0 0 -1 -1
ch LeT 7.9.2007 17 0 0 0 0
ch NZZ 7.12.2007 18 0 0 0 0
ch NZZ 28.11.2007 19 0 0 0 -1
ch NZZ 27.11.2007 20 0 0 1 1
ch NZZ 27.11.2007 21 0 0 0 0
ch NZZ 7.11.2007 22 0 0 -1 -1
ch NZZ 24.10.2007 23 0 0 -1 -1
ch NZZ 9.9.2007 24 0 0 0 -1
ch NZZ 6.9.2007 25 0 0 1 1
ch Tag 12.12.2007 26 0 0 -1 -1
ch Tag 17.11.2007 27 0 0 0 0
ch Tag 7.11.2007 28 0 0 0 0
ch Tag 18.10.2007 29 -1 -1 -1 0
ch TrG 28.11.2007 30 0 0 0 0
Principal components
Principal component analysis is a statistical technique employed for identifying 
clusters of variables. Here, this technique is used to explore the structure of the 
dataset, and subordinately for examining whether the previously mentioned four 
criteria are adequate for the measurement of credibility and efficiency. The SPSS 
package is employed. Preliminarily, please note that criteria are assumed to 
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constitute different conceptual facets of credibility or efficiency; therefore they are 
not expected to be necessarily consistent with a linear relationship. In other words, 
they should not be considered as indicators of the same thing. Principal component 
analysis reveals which variables (here: the selected criteria for evaluating agencies’ 
reputation) are loaded to a factor, which represents a classification axis (here: being 
possibly consistent with the reputation for credibility or efficiency) (Field 2005). 
The principal component matrix can be rotated for improving interpretation, so as to 
maximise the loading of variables to each factor. In this paper, orthogonal rotation 
is adopted (varimax), because factors are theoretically assumed to be unrelated. 
According to Kaiser’s criterion of retaining factors with eigenvalues greater than 
1, four factors are extracted (Kaiser 1970). Finally, the benchmark value that is 
retained for displaying factor loadings that represent substantive values is 0.4, so 
as commonly assumed (Stevens 2002). Results indicate that the selected criteria 
cluster relatively well into two broad dimensions, with reference to credibility 
and, respectively, efficiency (see Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2). To be precise, in line 
with theoretical assumptions, two groups of variables for credibility and one for 
efficiency are identified, while another group displays mixed results (see Table 5.4).
Specifically, the first group that refers to credibility includes the criteria of 
autonomy from the political decision-makers and from the regulatees. The other 
includes the predictability of decisions and policies. The distinction between 
these two groups is theoretically meaningful, because they represent two diverse 
facets constituting the concept of credibility. The group related to agencies’ 
efficiency consists of the uniqueness of the solution and cost-benefit gains. The 
last group also refers mainly to efficiency, as it comprises the criteria of public 
good – oriented action and agencies’ capability (in addition to the status of 
board members). To sum up, it appears that the selected criteria, although being 
as expected fundamentally unrelated, tend to cluster meaningfully into groups 
that should correspond to the dimensions of credibility or efficiency. Moreover, 
interestingly, some subcomponents emerge from the analysis, such as the level of 
perceived autonomy.
Table 5.3: Principal component matrix
Criteria Label Extraction
1. Autonomy from elected politicians CRED1 0.707
2. Predictability of decisions and policies CRED2 0.974
3. Status of board members CRED3 0.402
4. Autonomy vis-à-vis the regulatees CRED4 0.722
1. Public good–oriented action EFFIC1 0.412
2. Uniqueness of the solution EFFIC2 0.563
3. Capability (competencies, expertise, fin./
hum. resources)
EFFIC3 0.394
8.  Cost-benefit gains EFFIC4 0.459
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Table 5.4: Rotated component matrix
 Label
Component
1 2 3 4
 1. Autonomy from 
elected politicians
CRED1 0.839   
 2. Predictability CRED2    0.987
 3. Status of board members CRED3  0.624  
 4. Autonomy vis-à-vis 
the regulatees
CRED4 0.843   
 1. Public good–oriented action EFFIC1  0.620  
2. Uniqueness of the solution EFFIC2   0.731
 3. Capability (comp., 
expertise, fin./hum. res.)
EFFIC3  0.566  
4. Cost-benefit gains EFFIC4   0.655
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.
Rotation converged in 4 iterations.
Figure 5.2: Component plot in rotated space
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Results
The empirical analysis focused on six issues, in accordance with the theoretical 
expectations outlined above, which correspond to the minimal prerequisites to 
consider the media as a potential accountability forum for IRAs. The first three 
items illustrate to what extent do the media give an account of agencies’ regulatory 
actions; the other three indicate the positive or negative tone of media coverage 
as a form of symbolic reward or sanction. The systematic study of a ‘most 
likely’ and a ‘least likely’ case as regards news coverage – the British and Swiss 
competition commissions – shall permit to enhance the analytical leverage of the 
comparison and explore the cross-case validity of prospects regarding agencies’ 
media accountability. 
1) Frequency in Comparison with Other Issues. Calculations based on data from 
Pfetsch et al. permit illustrating the annual average number of editorial comments 
per newspaper regarding seven relevant policy issues: monetary politics, 
agriculture, immigration, troops deployment, retirement/pensions, education, 
European integration; that is, 12.04 for the UK and 7.25 for Switzerland (Pfetsch 
et al. 2004). In comparison, the average annual coverage of the UK competition 
commission corresponds to 21.70 editorial comments per newspaper, and, 
respectively, to 13.00 related to the Swiss competition commission. These 
averages represent levels comparable to those of the most salient policy issues, 
such as European integration. 
2) Trend. There was an overall increase in the frequency of articles evaluating 
the two competition commissions under investigation: from 137 news items in 
2006 to 188 in 2007 on the UK CC, and from 70 to 142 on the Swiss ComCo (see 
Figure 5.3). More precisely, the average quarterly growth of news coverage was 
12.28 per cent in the UK and 20.36 per cent in Switzerland during the investigated 
time period. This trend is remarkable, in comparison with the activity of the media 
in the seven salient policy issues studied by Pfetsch et al., which remained fairly 
constant over time (Pfetsch et al. 2004). When the type of articles is considered, 
it appears that, on average, from 2006 to 2007 the increase is 71 per cent for 
comments, 78 per cent for editorials and 32 per cent for interviews.
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Media coverage in the UK
Media coverage in Switzerland
Figure 5.3. Trend of media coverage of the British CC and the Swiss ComCo
3) Regulatory Cycle. The trend in news coverage roughly follows the agencies’ 
regulatory agenda, as it tended to cluster in relation to specific regulatory 
issues by peaking significantly near important events, such as the beginning of 
an investigation, a crucial decision, or the publication of the annual report. As 
indicated by the white stars in Figure 5.3, 13 articles were published in the UK 
when a full competition inquiry into the dominance of large British grocers was 
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announced (March 10 2006). The publication of another 15 articles corresponded 
to the unveiling of the initial findings of the CC’s investigation on the grocery 
market (January 24 2007). Eighteen articles included a sensible CC report on the 
large supermarkets’ dominance (November 1 2007). In Switzerland, meanwhile, 5 
articles were published after ComCo’s decision to sanction the country’s leading 
telecommunications company for abusing its dominant position (April 11 2006). 
Nine articles were published prior to the disclosure of the initial position of the 
Swiss ComCo on an exceptional merger in the grocery market (February 17 2007). 
In addition, 13 articles reported and discussed the decision made by ComCo 
relative to that issue (September 5 2007). At the same time, the average tone was 
not decisively contingent upon specific events, but positive or negative evaluation 
of regulatory action by the investigated competition agencies followed comparable 
patterns across issues (when also controlling for newspaper type) (see Figure 5.4).
4) Media Bias for Credibility. The last row of Table 5.5 presents the coefficients of 
media favourableness3. According to media coverage, credibility was considered 
significantly more positive for the British CC (a coefficient of media favourableness 
of 0.48, or a differential between positive and negative cases of +5 percentage 
points) than for the Swiss ComCo (a coefficient of -0.74, or a differential of -8 per 
cent). As regards credibility, coefficients of media favourableness display absolute 
values that are distant from zero, indicating that media evaluations of agencies are 
consistent over news articles. In addition, Table 5.5 shows a good deal of ‘neutral’ 
articles, which is as expected according to the coding procedure.
5) Media Bias for Efficiency. The tone of the evaluations of the agencies’ efficiency 
was almost identical in the UK and in Switzerland. In both cases, there were more 
negative articles than positive ones. The coefficient of media favourableness was 
-0.19 in the UK (-19 per cent) and -0.18 (-16 per cent) in Switzerland; therefore, 
the CC was evaluated slightly more negatively than the ComCo on this dimension 
(but both coefficients are quite close to zero). Figure 5.5 displays a scatterplot 
showing where the two IRAs are situated according to the mean values of their 
media evaluations of credibility and efficiency (the small bars represent the 
standard errors)4. This scatterplot permits a comprehensive comparison of the 
media evaluation for the two agencies. As regards efficiency, the tone of media 
coverage is similar in both cases, and constantly negative; instead, credibility is 
positively evaluated for the British agency but negative in the Swiss case. 
3. Excluding the 0 in order to improve the interpretation of results.
4. The mean values and 95 per cent confidence intervals of the differences are as follows: Credibility 
of the British CC: M = .0462; CI = .0163 to .0760. Efficiency of the British CC: M = -.1785; CI = 
-.2597 to -.0972. Credibility of the Swiss ComCo: M = -.0841; CI = -.1259 to -.0423. Efficiency 
of the Swiss ComCo: M = -.1636; CI = -.2644 to -.0627.
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British CC
Swiss ComCo
Figure 5.4: Trend and tone of media coverage
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Table 5.5. Media favourableness
Credibility CC Efficiency CC Credibility 
ComCo
Efficiency 
ComCo
1 20 65 2 45
0 300 135 195 89
-1 5 125 20 80
c 0.48 -0.19 -0.74 -0.18
Credibility
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
Figure 5.5. The tone of the media coverage of the British CC and the Swiss 
ComCo
6) Content. The element that received the most intensive media coverage by far was 
‘efficiency’ in both cases. Among all articles referring to credibility or efficiency, 
88 per cent evaluated the efficiency of the British CC, and 85 per cent evaluated the 
efficiency of the Swiss ComCo, respectively. Figure 5.6 illustrates the relevance 
of each criterion of the coding for the aggregated evaluation of credibility and 
efficiency, respectively. Concerning the British CC, the analysis shows that the 
positive evaluation of credibility is predominantly due to a perception of its being 
largely separated from politicians and organised interests. On the other hand, 
its negative reputation for efficiency stems largely from a harmful evaluation of 
cost-benefit gains. Pertaining to the Swiss ComCo, it appears that the negative 
evaluation of credibility is almost entirely due to the perception of its having 
scarce autonomy from those being regulated, whereas its perceived poor efficiency 
derives principally from a negative evaluation of organisational capabilities (i.e. 
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human and financial resources) and from the perception of low cost-benefit gains.
Credibility and efficiency in the UK
Credibility and efficiency in Switzerland
Credibility:
Efficiency:
Figure 5.6: The criteria for credibility and efficiency of the British CC and the 
Swiss ComCo
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Discussion
The expectation that media can function as an ‘accountability forum’ (Bovens 
2007) for IRAs finds considerable support in the cases of the British CC and 
the Swiss ComCo, confirming thus the main hypothesis of this chapter, that is, 
Hypothesis 3.1. To begin with, these agencies seem to be consistently scrutinised 
by the media (Schedler 1998), which give account of their regulatory activities 
quite regularly and consistently. (1) The coverage of the agencies in terms of 
the average annual number of editorial comments per newspaper is well above 
the average in both countries, in comparison with other relevant policy issues; 
and, (2) such coverage tends to increase over time. More importantly, (3) media 
coverage appears roughly in line with the regulatory cycle, with news peaks near 
crucial events for the IRAs under examination: the opening of new inquiries, the 
publication of the results of previous investigations, and key decisions such as 
important sanctions on the regulated industries.
Pertaining to the application of symbolic rewards and sanctions, results are 
also quite in line with our expectations. First, (4) a systematic positive bias for 
credibility can be dismissed, given that the British CC benefits from an excellent 
media evaluation of credibility, while the Swiss ComCo has a negative media 
evaluation of credibility. Similarly, (5) the existence of a negative bias as regards 
efficiency is improbable because, although persistently negative, the coefficients 
of media favourableness are quite close to zero, indicating a good balance between 
negative and positive evaluations. However, the fact that the average tone for 
efficiency is clearly negative, even for the ‘most likely’ case of the CC when one 
would expect a greater number of positive evaluations, is quite surprising and 
would deserve further investigation. Consequently, Hypothesis 3.2, the subsidiary 
expectation of this chapter, concerning the compatibility of (the media evaluations 
of) credibility and efficiency, is only partially corroborated. Finally, (6) the content 
of media coverage is largely in harmony with the topics that can be considered 
of general interest for the public: namely the ‘autonomy’ of agencies as regards 
credibility and their ‘cost-benefit gains’ as regards efficiency.
These results are not only relevant for the literature on regulatory governance, 
but they also indicate the analytical relevance of the concept of ‘mediatisation’ 
‘(Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Kepplinger 2002; Strömbäck and Esser 2009), 
according to which the media are becoming social institutions that operate 
according to their own logic and have an autonomous impact on political 
actors and political phenomena (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Kepplinger 2002; 
Strömbäck and Esser 2009). Following this perspective, it seems that the growing 
importance of IRAs is recognised by the news media, which report IRAs’ activity 
and mediate their communication, with increasing frequency and evaluating 
them according to the ‘official goals’ of delegation, in terms of credibility and 
efficiency, eventually making ordinary citizens potentially more aware of what 
IRAs do. Before concluding, it is fair to note that these findings are expected to 
account for cases presenting similar characteristics, that is, powerful, independent, 
mediatised regulators in Western Europe, and that they hold within the context of 
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the quite limited research goal of this chapter, that is, the exploration of the role 
that media can play as a necessary but insufficient component of a ‘multi-pronged’ 
accountability system for independent regulatory agencies (Majone 2002).
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to assess whether the media can function as an 
‘accountability forum’ (Bovens 2007) for independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). 
To this aim, it explored the media’s coverage of IRAs according to the official 
rationales that justified decisions to delegate public authority from governments to 
this type of non-majoritarian institutions: the enhancement of regulatory credibility 
and the improvement of decision-making efficiency. This approach is relevant 
not only because public communication is a requisite for the responsiveness of 
political institutions towards citizens but also because the media represent a venue 
for policymakers for the appraisal of regulatory outcomes. The two components 
of accountability—to give an account and to reward and sanction—are examined 
through comparison of a ‘most likely’ and a ‘least likely’ case, among Western 
European regulators (i.e. the British Competition Commission (CC) and the Swiss 
Competition Commission (ComCo), respectively). During the investigated period 
(2006-2007), media attention pertaining to the regulation of competition in both 
countries was primarily directed toward market concentration in the grocery 
sector. This quite exceptional situation permitted endogenising the possible effects 
of issue-specific conditions.
The main results can be summarised as follows: IRAs seem accountable to the 
media, given that the average annual coverage of the Swiss and UK competition 
commissions corresponds to the level of the most salient policy issues, and, in 
addition, follows a positive trend. What is more, media attention is approximately 
in line with the regulatory cycle of agencies. Concerning symbolic rewards and 
sanctions by the media, findings corroborate expectations concerning the tone 
of editorial comments. Evidence indeed confirms the absence of a systematic 
positive bias for credibility or a negative bias for efficiency when evaluating 
IRAs. Nevertheless, the case of the CC shows that even well endowed IRAs do not 
necessarily benefit from a positive media evaluation for efficiency. It is impossible 
at this stage to say whether this result stems from a misrepresentation of this 
particular dimension or whether it is connected to substantial underperformances 
of IRAs under scrutiny. However, if supported by further research, these 
results might defy the popular ambition of designing a structure of delegation 
that simultaneously enhances regulatory credibility through independence and 
decision-making efficiency through the simultaneous application of ‘ex-ante’, ‘ex-
post’ or ‘ongoing’ control mechanisms. Furthermore, in line with other research 
studies, this chapter confirms that IRAs can be formally independent and yet 
be considered under control (Lægreid et al. 2008), with the application of the 
appropriate ‘ex-post’ accountability mechanisms (Busuioc 2009).
These exploratory findings are relevant not only for the burgeoning literature 
on the spread of regulatory capitalism and the functioning of IRAs (Levi-Faur 
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2006a, c; Gilardi 2008), but also for the discussion regarding the accountability 
of regulatory governance and the role of media in regulatory policy-making, 
especially regarding the so-called democratic deficit of the regulatory state. This 
article offers both good and bad news to the proponents of media scrutiny as an 
alternative procedure to making independent regulators accountable and maybe 
enhance their legitimacy, following the inappropriateness of traditional forms of 
upward and downward accountability for institutions that lack input-legitimacy 
by design (Majone 1994a; Scott 2000a; Lodge 2004; Maggetti 2009b, 2010). On 
the one hand, the media can possibly act as a proper accountability forum that 
provides the public with consistent evaluations of agencies’ work. On the other 
hand, whereas a positive media evaluation of credibility has proven to be attainable 
under specific conditions, the corresponding evaluation of efficiency seems 
chimerical for IRAs, even in the ‘most likely’ case, potentially compromising the 
reputation of (some) independent regulators in front of ordinary citizens.

chapter 
six
conclusive discussion
Regulation in practice: what we have learnt
Reframing the research questions
The current version of capitalism is said to correspond to the golden age of 
regulation. Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, 
privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration do not 
lead to the crumbling of the state, but they fostered instead a wave of regulatory 
growth, related to the new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, 
since the 1980s, no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster 
than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). A new regulatory order is rising, which 
implies a new division of labour between state and society (Levi-Faur 2005a). The 
previous model of governance, relying on public ownership and public intervention, 
coupled with self-regulation by the private actors, is being gradually substituted 
by a more formalised, expert-based, transparent, and independently regulated 
model (Hollingsworth et al. 1994; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005). This movement 
towards a new regulatory order is not linear, irreversible, or homogeneous, but 
it is increasingly pervasive across countries and sectors. Independent regulatory 
agencies (IRAs) represent the distinctive institutional feature of the regulatory 
state and regulatory capitalism (Gilardi 2005c).
In this book, I argued that the ‘de facto independence’ of IRAs constitutes the 
key variable for the study of regulatory governance after delegation. The starting 
point was a number of problem-driven empirical questions on the functioning of 
agencies. Do IRAs fulfil their mandates after the delegation of competencies? 
What shapes the implementation of formal independence? How do IRAs use their 
independence? What kind of relationship do they develop with their environment? 
Are they really independent in their routine or are they operating rather in the 
shadow of the administrative hierarchy? Are they deviating from the statutory 
prescriptions? Are they captured by the regulated industries? Who participates in 
the regulatory process? Which are the crucial political actors of the regulatory 
state? How far do agencies influence the policy making process? Do IRAs improve 
decision-making? Can they be held accountable?
A composite research design was then developed in order to investigate these 
research questions and test the related hypotheses, which entailed three distinct 
empirical analyses. (I) First, a novel approach was presented for conceptualising 
and assessing agencies’ de facto independence in a systematic and comparable way. 
The relation between formal and de facto independence was investigated, showing 
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that political, institutional, and organisational factors matter for explaining the 
variation of de facto independence beyond statutory prescriptions. (II) Second, 
the role of agencies in policy making was examined, with special attention to 
the consequences of de facto independence, so as to emphasise that agencies do 
not restrain themselves exclusively to the execution of regulatory functions. (III) 
The third empirical part of this book explored whether the news media meets 
the necessary prerequisites to be considered a potential ‘accountability forum’ for 
regulators, by means of the examination of the media coverage media of IRAs as 
regards their credibility and efficiency. Hypotheses are summarised in Tables 6.1 
and 6.2 with the corresponding results of the empirical analysis.
Table 6.1: Summary of the hypotheses (1)
N° Hypotheses Result
H 1.1 High formal independence could be neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
a high level of de facto independence from 
politicians.
Supported 
H 1.2 The combination of conditions that might 
give rise to high de facto independence from 
politicians is expected to be the old age of 
agencies and the presence of many veto 
players.
Supported 
H 1.3 A highly coordinated economy and sectoral 
path dependency will be two concomitant 
conditions for the low de facto independence 
of agencies from both the politicians and the 
regulatees.
Not supported ¥
H 1.4 Intense participation of agencies in European 
networks and the organisational weakness 
of those being regulated are expected to 
lead to high de facto independence from the 
regulatees.
Partially supported ~
H 1.5 In cases of high de facto independence from 
the politicians, a ;‘footloose’ agency could 
become scarcely independent vis-à-vis the 
regulatees.
Supported 
H 2.1 IRAs are expected to hold the most central 
role in the course of the political decision-
making processes in their area of competence.
Supported 
H 2.2 The presence of a ‘monocratic’ system is 
expected to lead to the higher centrality of 
IRAs in policy-making, unlike a dual model.
Not supported ¥
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Table 6.2 : Summary of the hypotheses (2)
N° Hypotheses Result
H 2.3 IRAs are expected to be highly central in policy-
making where the legislature is non-professionalised.
Supported P
H 2.4 Sector-specific expert-based IRAs are expected to 
play a very central role in policy-making, unlike 
general regulators.
Not supported O
H 2.5 a) High de facto independent IRAs from the political 
decision makers should be central actors in policy-
making.
b) Low de facto independent IRAs from the 
regulatees should be central actors in policy-making.
Supported P
H 3.1 The media can function as accountability forum for 
IRAs
Supported P
H 3.2 Media can evaluate agencies as credible and efficient 
at the same time
Partially ~
Main empirical findings
The main findings of the three empirical analyses presented in this book 
can be recapitulated as follows. The crucial point of part I is that high formal 
independence is neither a necessary nor a single sufficient condition for high de 
facto independence from political decision makers. The explanatory conditions 
leading to high de facto independence from politicians are the old age of the 
investigated agency and the presence of many veto players in the political system, 
the latter in combination with high formal independence. This means that the 
presence of multiple veto players enables the implementation of agencies’ formal 
independence, as it becomes more difficult for divided principals to sway the 
regulatory action, while agencies may benefit from a process of autonomisation 
when ageing. In addition, the incorporation of agencies in regulatory networks 
appears to be a sufficient causal condition for their de facto independence from 
regulatees, when combined with low de facto independence from politicians. 
Networks plausibly offer a range of material and symbolic resources, empowering 
agencies in front of the regulated industries. At the same time, the relationship 
between an agency and those it regulates is influenced by the relationships it 
develops with the elected politicians. In other words, it appears that an agency 
cannot be a servant of two masters: if it is scarcely independent from politicians, it 
should be highly independent from those being regulated. Finally, and contrary to 
a number of expectations derived from the theory of agencies’ life cycle, it seems 
that the old age might also support their independence vis-à-vis the regulatees.
Then, part II focused on the role of agencies in lawmaking, operationalising 
this concept with a measure of network centrality (representing IRAs’ influence 
in policy-making) that comprises structural and reputational features. The 
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highest centrality of regulators is discovered where the professionalisation 
of the legislature is the lowest. The other condition that is jointly sufficient to 
explain the outcome of maximal agencies’ centrality is the low level de facto 
independence from regulatees, and the related high de facto independence from 
political decision makers. Those agencies are plausibly perceived as credible veto 
players by the political decision makers. The underlying argument is that non-
professional legislators (suffering from a lack of material and symbolic resources) 
that must cope with a regulator that might challenge the later stages of the policy-
making process (due to its low de facto independence from those being regulated) 
have strong incentives to include this agency in policy making (if it has not been 
integrated yet). In that way, they can obtain relevant information, and they expect 
to avoid any possible implementation failure. The analysis reveals thus that the 
agencies’ expertise capacity gives rise to the opportunity of exerting considerable 
political power in policy making, rather than restraining themselves to the mere 
technocratic execution of their regulatory functions.
Finally, part III explored the accountability of agencies, in terms of the media 
evaluation of their credibility and efficiency. The expectation that media can function 
as an ‘accountability forum’ for IRAs finds support in the cases of the British 
CC and the Swiss ComCo. To begin with, these agencies seem to be consistently 
scrutinised by the media, which give account of their regulatory activities quite 
regularly and consistently. Pertaining to the application of symbolic rewards and 
sanctions, results are also quite in line with our expectations. A systematic positive 
bias for credibility can be dismissed, and the existence of a negative bias as regards 
efficiency is improbable because, although persistently negative, the coefficients 
of media favourableness are quite close to zero, indicating a good balance between 
negative and positive evaluations. Finally, the content of media coverage is largely 
in harmony with the topics that can be considered of general interest for the public: 
namely the ‘autonomy’ of agencies as regards credibility and their ‘cost-benefit 
gains’ as regards efficiency.
Theoretical insights for the study of regulation
Part I demonstrated that formal independence is insufficient for explaining 
variations in IRAs’ de facto independence. Therefore, more attention should be 
given to factors that consent the proper implementation of statutory prescriptions; 
otherwise the accountability structure could become unintelligible, and the 
separateness from representative institutions might become unjustified, making 
the democratic deficit even more problematical (Majone 1999), since the ‘non-
majoritarian standards of legitimacy’ will be no longer supported  (Majone 1998). 
Among the conditions leading to factual independence, it is worth emphasising 
that the embeddedness of domestic regulators into international networks reduces 
the risk of agency capture, while at the same time it might enable another, 
promising, form of accountability, that is, through ‘peer pressures’ and reputational 
mechanisms (Majone 1997b, 2000), ideally producing a situation where ‘no one 
controls the agency [i.e. the agency is independent], yet the agency is under control 
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[the agency is accountable]’ (Moe 1985; Majone 1994a, 1996b). It also appears 
that actors other than the elected politicians, namely the representatives of the 
regulated sector, are able to mould agencies’ de facto independence to some extent. 
This result supports the conceptualisation of IRAs as intermediary organisations 
(Braun 1993), where the three parties play complex cooperative and competitive 
regulatory games, instead of conceiving them as the mere agents of the political 
principals. Following this structure of interaction, agencies should be considered 
as involved in a double relationship with political decision makers and with those 
being regulated, whereby the two relations are mutually influencing. At the end of 
the day, factually independent agencies are those that are able to mediate between 
the (conflicting) interests of elected politicians and regulatees, by developing 
a ‘functional antagonism’, as shown by Dietmar Braun in the case of research 
policy (Braun 1997), which requires them to hold an equidistant position (in the 
Latin sense of aequi + distare), in order to manage the interdependence of politics 
and business in the name of the ‘public interest’. Finally, the analysis shows that 
regulators are neither systematically under direct political control nor are they 
steadily captured by the regulated industries, thus challenging a crucial argument 
of the economic theory of regulation (Stigler 1971; Pelzman et al. 1989). Rather, 
they constitute a relatively new, autonomous and significant player in regulatory 
governance and regulatory capitalism (Levi-Faur 2005a; Levi-Faur and Jordana 
2005), that, more often than not, enjoy a certain level of factual independence, 
while cumulating crucial competencies of rule-making, monitoring, sanctioning 
and adjudication.
Part II showed that IRAs are the most influent actor in lawmaking related 
to their area of competence, more than expert commission, organised interest 
representatives, and ordinary agencies subordinated to the ministerial level. This 
point sustains the arguments about the rise of an age of ‘regulocracy’ (Levi-Faur 
2005a) and ‘agencification’ (Christensen and Lægreid 2005), while also clarifying 
the apparent paradox inherent in the current use of the concepts of regulatory state 
and regulatory capitalism. To begin with, the term ‘regulation’ does not (only) 
connote the shift from state’s interventionism to the decline of public authority, in 
favour of the ‘negative’ defence of market freedom. First and foremost, it refers 
to the wave of re-regulation after phenomena of liberalisation and privatisation 
(Johnson 2002), and the consequent proliferation of IRAs as a relatively new 
type of public body that endorses regulatory functions and promote stricter, more 
transparent and more formalised rules, that should constrain the markets and 
promote the ‘public interest’ (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Jordana et al. 2007). 
At the same time, the evidence upholding IRAs’ centrality in policy making 
suggests that the activity of formally independent regulators is not limited to the 
implementation of the delegated regulatory competencies (i.e. market supervision 
and technical regulatory functions), however important they are (Jacobs 1999). 
Very interestingly, it seems that IRAs are also developing a key political role, 
and may exert significant political power, extending their role as the ‘third force’ 
(Thatcher 2005a), not only in regulation but also in policy making. Specifically, they 
are noticed to hold distinctive lawmaking functions, beyond their implementation 
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competencies, being particularly influential in agenda-setting and during draft 
preparation of the new bills. Hence, the distinction between the political arena 
and the supposedly depoliticised, technocratic activity of specialised bodies 
offering neutral, technical expertise appears to be blurred and artificial in practice. 
Depoliticisation looks like, rather than an objective condition, as a distinctive 
political strategy in the politics of regulatory governance (Burnham 2001; Flinders 
and Buller 2006). Above all, it appears that the level of de facto independence 
– the distinctive feature of IRAs – may affect their centrality in policy making, 
that is, their influence in the decision-making process, in combination with other 
variables. On the one hand, agencies’ de facto independence from politicians is 
positively related to the technocratic, ‘problem-solving’ need for including IRAs 
in policy making, while their de facto independence from regulatees is likely to 
modify the structure of incentives for including them strategically in order to 
avoid any possible implementation failure. On the other hand, external factors, 
such as the professionalisation of the legislature, may alter the possible influence 
of IRAs in the course of the decision-making processes, by determining agencies’ 
policy relevance and the expected legitimacy gains. This result reinvigorates the 
pertinence of the questions concerning the deployment of political power within 
the institutions and organisations of the regulatory state (Moe 2005), namely 
when considering that IRAs play a crucial role in policy making while being 
separated from democratic institutions, possibly increasing even more the political 
and societal concerns about the systemic ‘net loss of legitimacy’ and raising the 
fiduciary costs of delegation (Majone 2005).
Part III shows that the investigated IRAs seem accountable to the media. 
Therefore, in line with other research studies, this study confirms that IRAs can be 
formally independent and yet be considered under control (Lægreid et al. 2008), 
with the application of the appropriate ‘ex-post’ accountability mechanisms 
(Busuioc 2009). Nevertheless, the case of the British CC shows that even well 
endowed IRAs do not necessarily benefit from a positive media evaluation for 
efficiency. It appears that the proper implementation of the specific mode of 
delegation promoting IRAs’ factual independence – through a fiduciary principle 
(Majone 2001a, c, 2005) – is appropriate to sustain their credibility, but hardly 
improves efficiency. This result might defy the popular ambition of designing 
a structure of delegation that simultaneously enhances regulatory credibility 
through independence and decision-making efficiency through the simultaneous 
application of ‘ex-ante’, ‘ex-post’ or ‘ongoing’ control mechanisms. Agencies’ 
independence and bureaucratic control constitute thus two elements of a balance 
that is systemically unstable (Christensen and Lægreid 2007), reinforcing the claim 
that the quest for a middle way between these two poles can still be considered a 
crucial problem of regulatory policies (Braun 2002). Therefore, on the one hand, 
the media can possibly act as a proper accountability forum that provides the 
public with consistent evaluations of agencies’ work. On the other hand, whereas a 
positive media evaluation of credibility has proven to be attainable under specific 
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conditions, the corresponding evaluation of efficiency seems chimerical for IRAs, 
even in the ‘most likely’ case, potentially compromising the reputation of (some) 
independent regulators in front of ordinary citizens. 
In that regard, it is worth noting that my findings concerning the effect of 
agencies’ networks could offer a possible solution to reconcile these trade-offs, 
as networks could hypothetically promote a process of mutual adjustment leading 
to factual independence and credible/efficient regulation at the same time. On 
the one hand, agencies that perceive themselves as part of a formal or informal 
transnational network of regulators, sharing similar aims and problems, are more 
likely to resist external influences and conduct their regulatory action properly. 
Agencies’ leaders have motivational incentives to maintain their reputation in the 
eyes of the other members of the network, to achieve international cooperation 
and avoid public blame (Majone 1997a). On the other hand, the embeddedness 
in networks is expected to supply agencies with expertise and information 
derived from other regulators, to give them potential allies in front of political 
decision makers, while also offering a range of technical and symbolic resources 
that should enhance their emancipation from the regulatees (Maggetti 2007). 
Therefore, regulatory networks may respond to the challenge of developing new, 
more adequate procedures for securing agencies’ accountability, because they 
do not contradict the principle of IRAs’ independence and at the same time they 
do not hinder high-quality regulation. Whether, to what extent and under which 
conditions this really happens, remains however an open empirical question.
Connecting the levels of analysis
Ontology and methodology
My hypotheses were formulated according to rational choice, sociological and 
historical institutionalist perspectives, applying the comprehensive theoretical 
framework elaborated in the introductory chapter. In part I, a number of integrated 
combinations of conditions were expected to lead to the different types of 
outcomes (i.e. high de facto independence from elected politicians, high de facto 
independence from regulatees, low de facto independence from elected politicians, 
and low de facto independence from regulatees), following the notion of complex 
causation (Ragin 1987, 2000). Hypothesis 1.1 and Hypothesis 1.5 refer to non-
causal relationships portraying, respectively, the relationship between formal 
and de facto independence, and the relationship between de facto independence 
from elected politicians and de facto independence from regulatees. Hypothesis 
1.2 mixes historical and rational institutionalisms by examining the joint effect 
of ageing and veto players. Hypothesis 1.3 combines historical and sociological 
explanatory factors, drawing from the varieties of capitalism approach and 
developing arguments in terms of sector-specific path dependence. Hypothesis 1.4 
offers a rational – sociological account, looking at the effect of agencies’ networks 
and organisational strength. Part II displays a specific focus on a smaller sample 
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of agencies, implementing a specific ‘effects-of-causes’ approach (Mahoney 
and Goertz 2006). Therefore, a more inductive logic is adopted regarding the 
combination of complementary and competitive conditions, starting with a 
descriptive hypothesis (H 2.1) about the influence of agencies in policy making. 
Then, two remote factors are operationalised that should enable the occurrence of 
the outcome of agencies’ maximal centrality: the appropriateness with a dual or 
monocratic politico-administrative system and the degree of professionalisation of 
the legislature. The former hypothesis (H 2.2) follows a sociological institutionalist 
logic, while the latter (H 2.3) goes along a more rational line of reasoning. Next, 
proximate explanations are examined. Hypothesis 2.4 refers to the relevance of 
sectoral patterns, according to an historical institutionalist argument. Hypothesis 
2.5 offers two alternative sociological or rational explanations, depending from 
whether an efficiency-driven or legitimacy-driven behaviour is prevalent. Finally, 
part III focuses on two distinct theoretical questions. Hypothesis 3.1 emphasises 
the role of the media when evaluating IRAs, with a sociological-organisational 
perspective. Hypothesis 3.2 adopts rational choice institutionalist arguments for 
describing the relationship between the media evaluation of agencies’ credibility 
and efficiency.
Connecting the three new institutionalisms in a multi-layer explanatory model 
was possible by adopting a methodology that is not only appropriate for evaluating 
competing paradigms, but that in addition entails a configurational approach, in 
which the explanatory factors may be regarded as logically intertwined. This 
objective required in turn a framework that supports a view of causation that 
is equally unified (to treat the three new institutionalisms as complementary 
components of explanation) and complex (to keep the analytical levels distinct). 
The QCA analysis, its extension in terms of fuzzy-set, and the related analysis of 
necessary and sufficient conditions was the appropriate technique for this task 
(Ragin 1987, 2000; Rihoux 2006; Rihoux and Ragin 2008). Indeed, it has been 
possible to analyse cases as configurations, and to identify different combinations 
of causally relevant conditions. Then, instead of focusing on the symmetrical 
‘net effect’ of independent variables, QCA permitted the examination of subset 
relationships, in order to discover the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
outcome (Ragin 2005a, 2006b). The possibility of discovering complex patterns 
of causation implied, on the one hand, that much heuristic attention was given 
to discovery and diversity, assuming that it is possible, and even probable, that 
different causal paths may lead to the same outcome. On the other hand, each 
variable was considered valuable even as INUS (insufficient but necessary part of 
unnecessary but sufficient combination) or SUIN (sufficient but unnecessary part 
of an insufficient but necessary combination) condition (Mahoney 2007). 
In this research study, the results of the application of the Fs/QCA, the two-
step QCA and the comparative analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions 
support the ‘abductive’ complementarities of the three new institutionalisms and 
the convenience of combining them through a framework of analytical eclecticism 
(Sil 2000, 2004; Katzenstein and Sil 2005). This analytical perspective is not a 
priori committed to a specific theoretical perspective; it is ontologically relatively 
conclusive discussion 177
flexible; and problem-oriented. Therefore, a meta-theoretical synthesis is 
unnecessary and falls beyond the ambitions of this type of investigation. However, 
the moderate analytical eclecticism elaborated in the present research, based on 
three relatively compatible research traditions, offers a certain degree of coherence 
that permits to draw some more general insights.
Part I finds empirical support for the historical-rational institutional hypothesis 
(H 1.2) and, partly, for some sociological institutional insights (H 1.4). In turn, 
part II highlights the pertinence of combining rational (H 2.3) and sociological (H 
2.5) factors. Finally, part III, again, illustrates the usefulness of examining rational 
and sociological explanations (H 3.1 and H 3.2). Therefore, it appears that the 
new three institutionalisms can be fruitfully connected, in the sense that historical 
institutionalism seems mainly useful for explaining the contextual causes enabling 
the possible occurrence of meso-level outcome variables (in this case, the causes of 
de facto independence), while sociological institutionalism is particularly relevant 
for studying the variation of meso or macro effects (here, the consequences of 
de facto independence). This means that, historical institutionalism seems more 
appropriate to a ‘causes-of-effects’ research design (such as in part I) (Mahoney 
and Goertz 2006), while sociological institutionalism corresponds better to a 
‘consequential and problem-oriented’ approach (part II and III), which focuses, 
for instance, on ‘how the existence of given institutions contributes to the 
emergence or avoidance of certain societal or economic problems’ (Scharpf 
2000b). Furthermore, in accordance with Lindenberg’s method of decreasing 
abstraction, rational choice institutionalism can be integrated in both perspectives 
for operationalising the necessary connection with the actor’s level, which is, at 
the end of the day, the actual source of action and change (Lindenberg 1992).
Towards a two-level model
The overall insights of the empirical parts I, II and III can bring into being a 
comprehensive, single model, configuring a two-level structure (Goertz and 
Mahoney 2005; Goertz 2006b). The basic level contains the main explanatory 
conditions and outcome variables (Goertz and Mahoney 2005). The former consist 
of IRAs’ de facto independence from political decisions makers and IRAs’ de facto 
independence from regulatees. Respectively, the outcomes are the centrality of 
IRAs in policy making and their media evaluation of credibility/efficiency. At the 
secondary level, we find variables that are less central to the core argument but still 
display a (indirect) causal connection to the main outcome variable (Goertz and 
Mahoney 2005). In other words, causal relationships exist between secondary-level 
variables and basic-level outcomes, mediated by the basic-level variables. Here, 
the combination of old age OR veto players AND formal independence leads to de 
facto independence from political decision makers. Old age OR networks AND de 
facto independence from political decision makers lead to de facto independence 
from regulatees. The secondary-level conditions, by contributing to the generation 
of more proximate causal conditions, constitute the remote causes of the outcomes at 
the basic level, while basic-level variables can be considered intermediary variables. 
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Regulation after the crisis
This is a very brief note on the future of the regulatory state after the financial 
crisis of 2008-2010, originated from the so-called US subprime mortgages crisis, 
and on the ‘crisis of knowledge and ideas’ it is producing (Hutter et al. 2008). The 
global crisis invokes a reassessment of the pertinence of the approach in terms 
of regulatory state – regulatory capitalism. Is a formalised, open, multi-level, 
and independently regulated model of regulatory governance still sustainable 
for the financial markets, and beyond? Or rather, will the financial turmoil 
imply the premature obsolescence of the new regulatory order, meaning that the 
regulatory state has actually failed and should be replaced by something else? The 
underlying question is whether are we moving towards a new form of ‘regulatory 
statism’. On the one hand, the subprime crisis puts the spots on the failure of 
the devices for supervising the financial system, casting doubts on the capacity 
of the regulatory framework to prevent systemic crises; what is more, the main 
weaknesses emerged in the leading country in the development of the regulatory 
state, that is, the U.S.A, directly challenging the prudential supervision of the 
Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the Securities Exchange Commission. On the 
other hand, the management of the disaster involved a series of massive measures 
of public intervention, to prevent the collapse of the system. As a result, not only 
the allocative efficiency of (financial) markets is severely put into question, but 
also the ambition of the (long-term) viability of a regulated capitalism becomes 
doubtful. Against the market-oriented politico-economic zeitgeist, governments 
promoted a colossal public rescue of the big financial players in many countries, 
through the offer of huge amounts of cash and even by the mean of a partial 
nationalisation of the companies of ‘national interest’ – reinvigorating a ‘dirty 
word, designating a bad old past’ (Miller 2008) – through a spectacular violation 
of the international accounting standards. 
While acknowledging the systemic character of the crisis (Hutter et al. 2008; 
Nesvetailova and Palan 2008), it is useful to discuss its implications for regulatory 
governance, by provisionally treating the crisis as an epiphenomenon (and not as the 
consequence of inherent disequilibria). First of all, a number of regulatory failures 
can be identified, among which the most relevant for the present discussion are 
three: the insufficient supervision over the activities of some big banks and other 
financial institutions; the use of inadequate models for evaluating the systemic 
risks; and the lack of authoritative means for direct intervention (Chavagneux 
2007, 2008b, c). To begin with, the regulators were materially unable to ensure 
the systematic supervision of the regulated industries. As a matter of fact, even the 
chairperson of one of the leading financial IRAs in Europe (the Financial Services 
Authority) admitted the fiasco of the previous ‘light-touch’ approach and asked for 
‘more resources and more personnel’ (Turner 2009). The second point refers, for 
instance, to the questionable adoption of statistical models of historical probabilities 
based on relatively short time-series (generally fifteen years) for evaluating 
the future risk, and to the faulty assumption about the mutual independence of 
payment defaults, whereas the risk management would imply an extreme level of 
sophistication and technical skills (Moatti 2008). Finally, the crisis highlighted the 
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need for more competencies of regulation, in order to control, among others, the 
activity of speculative hedge funds that introduced high volatility in the market, 
and the extensive use of financial derivatives. In this respect, the US supervision 
authorities are proposing to consent to the trade of derivatives only on so-called 
organised markets, where professional accountants would ensure the security of the 
transactions, under the direct supervision of independent regulators (Chavagneux 
2008c). These regulatory failures draw attention to three main shortcomings of 
regulatory governance by (banking and financial services) IRAs: the amount of 
human and financial resources for enforcing effective supervision; the possible 
inadequacy of certain regulators’ knowledge-based capacities; and, respectively, 
the (relatively) limited extent of the delegated competences of regulation beyond 
prudential supervision. 
However, a number of elements would suggest that the diagnosis of these 
shortcomings will lead policy makers to reinforce regulatory governance, and 
not to challenge the present regulatory order with a paradigmatic change (Hall 
1993; Sabatier 2007). First of all, one must bear in mind that these regulatory 
failures are located within the governance of the financial sector, and have limited 
consequences for other sector-specific agencies, which are usually regulating 
less deregulated domains. Concerning the financial sector, it appears that IRAs 
constitute, together with governments, the key players in the crisis (Hutter and 
Dodd 2008). Moreover, the public intervention is designed as merely temporary 
(Hutter and Dodd 2008). Finally, the solution to the problem is politically and 
societally framed in terms of ‘more regulation’ (Hofmann 2008; Lodge 2008; 
Miller 2008). In fact, one can observe that the immediate effect of the crisis is to 
support the trend towards re-regulation, in spite of self-regulation or deregulation. 
For instance, in France two new public sector-specific agencies were created in 
the immediate aftermath of the crisis (Chavagneux 2008a). The first is the Société 
de prise de participation de l’Etat, to help the recapitalisation of the banks, by 
borrowing liquidity on the international financial markets. The second is the 
Société de refinancement, which was created to ensure the financing of short-term 
credit as a substitute of the interbank market. The Swiss case displays another 
interesting development. The two Swiss big banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, were 
severely knocked by the crisis. Namely, UBS was hit by the reverse of its highly 
risky investment activities in the USA It received a massive public help that 
amounts to a considerable percentage of its capitalisation, through a coordinated 
intervention of the Swiss government and the Swiss National Bank. The Swiss 
Federal Banking Commission remained passive for a long time, and was unable 
to predict and prevent the crisis. Its limited resources and scarce independence 
from regulated industries, especially from the big banks, were publicly blamed.1 
1. David Gow, ‘Switzerland unveils bank bail-out plan: UBS hit by “massive” outflows of clients’ 
money’, ‘Bank’s chief says markets in “panic mode”’, The Guardian, 16 October 2008; Alan 
Cowell, ‘Credit Suisse and UBS Get Funds’, The New York Times, 16 October 2008; The Econo-
mist, 5 July 2008.
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Meanwhile, a new, integrated regulator is being created (the Finanzmarktaufsicht, 
the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority), in order to ensure the 
supervision of financial markets and insurances, which will benefit from more 
resources, a different organisational structure (consisting of a board, a general 
direction with decisional powers and an audit office) and a greater level of formal 
autonomy. Similarly, in the U.S.A, the federal administration is proposing to give 
broader powers to the Securities Exchange Commission and to the Federal Reserve 
and to create new agencies to supervise hedge funds and all trading in financial 
derivatives, in order to impose tougher standards on big financial institutions, and 
to major non-bank financial firms (Geithner 2009). As a consequence, companies 
and financial instruments now unsupervised will be reregulated, fostering greater 
wide-ranging oversight also on credit rating agencies, mortgage brokers, and 
greater supervision of complex financial instruments (WGFR 2009).. Finally, the 
European parliament and the EU commission gave new powers to the Committee 
of European Securities Regulators (CESR) (Wymeersch 2009), for instance in 
order to regulate and supervise rating agencies. At the same time, the de Larosière 
report suggested the creation of a European Systemic Risk Council, so as to collate 
and analyse issues and information relating to systemic risk and financial stability, 
and a new ‘European System of Financial Supervisors’, providing central co-
ordination for regulators (but leaving day-to-day supervision to member states) (de 
Larosière et al. 2009). Correspondingly, the establishment of a new independent 
authority with regulatory powers has been proposed at European level, which 
would consist of ‘a standard setter and overseer in the area of supervision, [that] 
would be involved, alongside central banks, in macro-prudential analysis' (whilst 
the primary responsibility for supervision would remain, again, at member state 
level) (Turner 2009).
At the end of the day, it appears that the regulatory state can also become 
interventionist; and that the regulation of the architecture and the practices of the 
banking and financial services is considered even more necessary, as the viability 
of self-regulated markets that were deemed to be naturally able to allocate 
efficiently resources and correctly evaluate the risks is being largely disconfirmed 
in practice (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Stiglitz 1982; Krugman 1992; Fligstein 
2001; Rodrik 2002; Aglietta and Rebérioux 2004; Black 2008; Lodge 2008; 
Miller 2008). Therefore, the future of regulation, as a specific form of (public) 
governance, seems rosy, since (financial) regulatory institutions survived the crisis 
and they have been even reinforced and further legitimised, while at the same 
time the regulatory state is possibly coming of age, no longer constrained by the 
pure free-market ideology that shaped some stages of its early development (and 
eventually starting to address the questions of the effectiveness of regulators’ 
independence and performance more seriously).
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The virtues and perils and of independence
To conclude our discussion on the practice of regulation by independent regulatory 
agencies, a set of normative questions needs to be briefly addressed. At the end 
of the day, is de facto independence a good or a bad thing? To what extent and 
under which conditions are independent regulators beneficial or detrimental 
for democratic policy-making? How do IRAs help or hinder policy-making 
efficiency? Should decision-makers improve or reduce regulatory independence 
and how? After having analysed the causes of de facto independence and some 
of its consequences, it is possible to offer some tentative considerations. Now 
we know that regulatory agencies are mostly de facto independent from elected 
politicians, regardless of formal independence (with some variations); that they 
are important in lawmaking (the most independent, the most important); and that 
they are potentially accountable to media (but other control devices are needed).
These findings have normative implications for the political management of 
IRAs. In that regard, this section discusses the following points: (1) the need for 
aligning formal and de facto independence; (2) the functional antagonism between 
agencies, politicians and the regulatees; and (3) the balance between independence 
and accountability. The argument is at follows: IRAs’ independence is not a priori 
good or bad, but their institutional design must be adequate and effective; IRAs 
can positively contribute to policy-making as new powerful actors when they 
successfully develop and maintain a functional antagonism between politicians 
and the regulatees; finally, the most pressing question is how to keep regulators 
independent, accountable, credible and efficient in their day-to-day activity.
Adequacy of formal and de facto independence
One of the main empirical finding of this book is that the formal independence 
of agencies, as granted by statutory prescriptions, has a contingent impact, 
together with other conditions, but does not fully determine the level of de facto 
independence of IRAs. Factual independence is indeed shaped by a number of 
organisational and institutional factors. This result has important implications for 
the institutional design of IRAs. The argument has two steps.
First, policy-makers should select the adequate level of formal independence 
to be given to IRAs and to be inscribed in agencies’ constitutions, according to 
the desired balance between agency’s discretion and direct political control, by 
taking into account informal and contextual factors. The optimal level cannot 
be pre-defined once and for all, but it should be a matter of political debate, 
discussion and negotiation. This choice can be informed by some considerations. 
The adequacy of the level of independence firstly depends on the desired trade-
off between credibility in front of external stakeholders and direct political 
accountability, in line with the characteristics of the regulated sector. Economic 
regulation typically requires higher independence from policymakers than social 
regulation (Gilardi 2008). In fact, in economic sectors such as utilities and finance, 
the main task of independent agencies is to promote regulation-for-competition by 
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providing credible commitments that secure long-term policy consistency vis-à-
vis customers and investors in the regulated industries (Drazen and Masson 1994; 
Brunetti et al. 1998). Conversely, social regulation – that concerns issues such as 
food safety, healthcare, pensions, environment – follows another, broader rationale 
than competition-oriented regulation, which is more concerned with welfare, 
health, quality control and consumer protection (Carpenter 2001b; Moran 2002). 
Such ‘positive’ regulation can be more controversial, as it has higher redistributive 
effects and entails more concentrated costs and benefits, for which a coordinated 
solution is more difficult and more demanding (Majone 1993a; Wincott 2003). 
As a consequence, in the case of social regulation, the political management of 
regulators requires higher accountability and increased ‘bottom-up’ participation, 
to overcome resistance and improve the implementation of regulatory policies, 
while economic regulation calls for more attention to the mechanisms that secure 
high de facto independence.
Furthermore, the design of independent regulators should depend on the 
institutional ‘appropriateness’ of the agency model for the target countries 
(March and Olsen 2004). It appears that contextual factors and path-dependent 
trajectories shape the functioning of public sector organisations that are adopted 
and implemented from the experience of other countries, following top-down and 
horizontal pressures – by the means of ‘benchmarking’, ‘best practice’, ‘policy 
transfer’, and ‘lesson-drawing’ (Radaelli 2004a). For instance, institutional 
settings comprising an adversarial legal system, strong separation of powers and 
a system of checks-and-balances, like the USA, can quite easily accommodate 
powerful independent regulators, which constitute an ‘at arm’s length’ branch of 
government that is consistent with their political-administrative culture (Levi-
Faur 2005b; Van Waarden and Hildebrand 2009). On the contrary, in political 
systems based on consensual policy-making, where trust and informal decision-
making routines play a crucial role, the same level of independence from elected 
politicians could generate different results (Armingeon 2002). The example of the 
introduction of New Public Management in Norway showed that de-contextualised 
reforms promoting excessive formalisation and control mechanisms may disrupt a 
coherent institutional framework based on mutual trust and produce unnecessary 
conflicts and higher coordination costs (Fukuyama 1999; Bartle 2006; Christensen 
et al. 2008).
The second step is the alignment of formal and factual independence. Institutional 
engineering and the establishment of new public sector organisations always 
imply some unintended consequences (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). However, 
some safety measures can help minimising the risk of implementation problems. 
On the one hand, it is important to understand the role regulators will play in 
each political-administrative system, by recognising the ‘functional equivalence’ 
of organisations across countries and their ‘institutional complementarities’ 
within countries (Van Deth 1998). Therefore, political decision-makers should 
bear in mind the topography of the regulatory system, and be able to identify the 
‘political principal’ and, respectively, the ‘regulatees’, that is, the relevant external 
actors to whom IRAs are expected to be related, as defined by their mandate. 
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In different institutional settings, functionally equivalent principals can be: the 
president, the government, one or more ministers, administrative offices, the 
parliament, parliamentary committees, or a specific oversight body. The target 
of regulation, which is affected by regulation, supervision and sanctions and 
rewards, may comprise: all economic actors, the industries operating in the sector, 
the licensed firms, liberal professionals, producers’ associations, employees’ 
associations, civil servants, stakeholders, consumers, and citizens. Next, the 
notion of ‘institutional complementarities’ is useful to stress the need for analysing 
institutions in a relational manner (Hall and Soskice 2001) and realise that IRAs’ 
factual independence may also depend on the horizontal relationships that they 
develop with other public sector organisations. Regulators are indeed involved in 
a complex web of collaborative and competitive relationships with co-regulators, 
regional and local authorities, and tribunals, which may limit, or support, the 
effective independence of IRAs. To sum up, the alignment of formal and de facto 
independence requires the clarification of the structure of delegation concerning 
each regulator, in order to specify the systemic role of the investigated IRA and 
to qualify the nature of its linkages with the other relevant actors in the regulatory 
space.
On the other hand, in this book it has been suggested that some specific conditions 
influence de facto independence beyond formal prescriptions, for which a special 
attention is needed. It appears that agencies are highly de facto independent from 
their principal when they are old and when the politicians have to cope with several 
veto players. To be precise, agencies may benefit from a process of autonomisation 
from the principal when ageing, due to the accumulation of material and symbolic 
resources in the course of repeated interactions with the regulated sector. This way, 
they acquire informational advantages in front of elected politicians and a unique 
acquaintance with those being regulated that enhance their emancipation from 
political control. At the same time, the presence of many veto players favours the 
independence of agencies, as it becomes more difficult for ‘multiple principals’ to 
coordinate themselves to sway the regulatory process, while the monitoring process 
also becomes more costly. Institutional veto points are constituted, for instance, 
by presidential vetoing prerogatives, the procedural requirements of parliamentary 
bicameralism, and the existence of federalist arrangements. Partisan veto players, 
that are populating these institutions, represent different configurations of political 
coalitions, whose agreement is necessary to make decisions (Tsebelis 2002).
Equally, the participation of agencies in transnational networks may support 
their independence from the regulatees, by offering them technical assistance 
and promoting learning, socialisation, and the diffusion of ‘best practices’. By 
taking advantage of their position, network-embedded agencies can enhance their 
independence by relying on a transnational coalition supporting their regulatory 
policies, and providing the belief in their capacity (Carpenter 2001a, b). In addition, 
agencies’ networks are said to sustain agencies’ effective exercise of delegated 
competencies, while leaving wide discretionary power to independent regulatory 
agencies (Majone 2001b, 2002). Therefore, old agencies would require closer 
oversight to avoid excessive autonomisation from elected politicians, especially 
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when the ‘principal’ must cope with many veto players, while transnational 
networks of regulators may help reducing the risk of capture by the regulated 
industries. Finally, it should be added that the relationship between an agency 
and the politicians and the relationship between an agency and those it regulates 
are mutually influential, suggesting that agencies cannot ‘serve two masters’. The 
implications of this finding are discussed in the next section.
Agencies, politicians and the regulatees
It has been noted that agencies, besides elected politicians and the regulatees, 
represent a distinct set of actors, which accomplish their regulatory tasks quite 
effectively and autonomously (Thatcher 2002c, d). Two findings of this book 
permit to corroborate this argument and to qualify it. The first line of reasoning 
is as follows. Pertaining to their regulatory functions, effective IRAs are those 
that are able to successfully develop and maintain a ‘functional antagonism’ with 
their external actors (Braun 1993, 1997). Accordingly, factually independent 
agencies shall mediate between the conflicting interests of elected politicians 
and regulatees, and build up a situation where the two external actors are related 
through the IRAs but remain equally distant from them. When agencies develop 
this intermediary position, they can successfully manage the interdependence 
of politics and business in the name of the ‘public interest’. Empirical research 
shows that functional antagonism is possible, but it configures a rather unstable 
equilibrium, which tends to oscillate permanently between the two opposite 
poles. In particular, agencies that are very independent from elected politicians 
cannot benefit from their political support vis-à-vis the regulated industries. These 
‘footloose’ agencies are more prone to regulatory capture(Bernstein 1955, 1972). 
A number of conditions are helpful to counteract these tendencies, namely, as 
said, the support and coordination with other agencies, and, on the other hand, 
a complex, redundant system of ex-post controls increasing the legitimacy of 
regulators in front of the politicians and the regulated industries (this point will be 
dealt in detail in the last section).
Furthermore, given that IRAs have a key role in sector-specific lawmaking, they 
shall be considered as important political actors, too. Therefore, the development 
of functional antagonism is also desirable when agencies are involved in policy 
making at domestic, international and supranational level. This time, the risk is 
no longer to be captured by the regulatees, but that of political steering by the 
principal, beyond the official mandate, following the electoral agenda, in order 
to legitimise prior decisions through de-politicisation and technocratic rhetoric. 
Instead, agencies should be factually independent not only in the execution of 
their regulatory tasks, as stated in their constitutions, but they should also remain 
independent when they are integrated in lawmaking to provide expertise and offer 
policy advice, even though these activities do not follow the statutory competences 
of agencies. This time, functional antagonism can be favoured by another, 
complementary set of mechanisms, which comprises statutory prescriptions 
of formal independence and the presence of many veto points in the political 
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system (or their functional equivalents). High formal independence consists of 
traditional arrangements concerning IRAs’ board appointments and dismissals, 
their relationships with government and parliament, and their financial and 
organisational autonomy (Gilardi 2002a). These features are however insufficient 
to ensure factual independence from elected politicians. As discussed above, the 
presence of many veto points can contribute to guarantee adequate leeway to 
agencies. In fact, it appears that, as it is the case for ordinary bureaucracy, under 
‘multiple principals’, agencies has wider discretion vis-à-vis elected officials 
(Wood and Petrovsky 2007), because the structure of agency incentives is blurred 
and there is a collective action problem for the principals (Gailmard 2009). The 
same holds for other institutional devices with similar effects of delegation, which 
counteract ‘majoritarian’ policy making, through the fragmentation of political 
power in the executive and the geographical partitioning of sovereignty, such as 
power sharing, federalism and devolution (Lijphart 1999).
Independence, accountability, credibility, efficiency
The main functional rationales for delegating public authority to IRAs, that is, 
the expected enhancement of regulatory credibility and efficiency, are expected 
to derive from their statutory separateness from elected politicians and organised 
interests (Majone 1993b, 2001b). Therefore, delegation to IRAs implies a ‘net 
loss’ of legitimacy for the political system, because the political ‘principal’ can 
transfer his powers to the independent delegate, but not his legitimacy; hence 
IRAs must rely on other – external – sources of legitimacy (Majone 2005). This 
situation implies two theoretical problems: the reconciliation of independence and 
accountability; and the concomitant pursuit of regulatory credibility and efficiency.
In this book, it was repeatedly argued that neither ‘inputs-oriented legitimacy’ 
nor traditional top-down (or ‘downward’) accountability and bottom-up (or 
‘upward’) accountability are relevant for agencies that are formally independent 
by design. Instead, following Majone, the possible solution is a ‘multi-pronged 
system of controls’ to keep regulatory bodies accountable and yet independent 
(Majone 1996a, 2002). This system consists of a variety of control mechanisms, 
whose crucial elements are network embeddedness and media accountability. On 
the one hand, the emergence and ongoing consolidation of transnational networks 
of regulators could provide, ‘as a more or less unintended by-product’ (Majone 
2000), incentives and means to agencies for the development of a system of mutual 
controls, ideally making the agencies horizontally accountable (Moe 2005). In 
addition, networks may provide regulators with additional dynamism, resources 
and expertise, and favour a process of policy diffusion, which is expected to follow 
rational and problem-solving orientations, eventually producing ‘better’ regulatory 
outputs. On the other hand, the media can function as an ‘accountability forum’ for 
IRAs, by scrutinising agencies with increasing attention and growing autonomy, 
and working as ‘linkage mechanisms’ for solving informational asymmetries vis-
à-vis elected politicians and ordinary citizens.
However, the second problem, the extent to which regulatory credibility and 
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efficiency can really coexist, constitutes an open question. According to a theoretical 
argument, there is a possible trade-off between IRAs’ credibility and efficiency, 
because they entail two structures of delegation that appear hardly reconcilable 
in practice. On the one hand, in order to create credible commitments, we should 
expect agencies to be factually independent in the exercise of their powers. Indeed, 
the pre-condition for solving the policy time-inconsistency problem of regulation 
is a broad delegation of powers, following the fiduciary principle, derived from the 
framework of transaction-cost politics (Majone 2001; de Visscher et al.), which 
entails a substantial differentiation between the trustor and the trustee’s preferences 
and behaviour. The need for credibility in the long term requires freedom from ex-
ante, ongoing and also ex-post controls, implying the transfer of political property 
rights—i.e. specific policy competences—to independent regulators, while the 
key problems of agency theory—hidden action and hidden information—are no 
longer central (Majone 2001b). On the other hand, the implementation of efficient 
regulation should imply that the de facto independence of the agency be more 
restricted and constrained (Franchino 2002). In fact, in this case, the main problem 
is to avoid inefficient delegation and ‘bureaucratic drift and slippage’ (Epstein 
and O’Halloran 1999, Majone 2001). This means that the principal should be able 
to retain some formal and informal controls on agencies’ behaviour (Calvert et 
al. 1989; Bendor et al. 2001) to minimise any possibility of agencies’ ‘shirking’ 
(Pollack 2002, 2003). As a consequence, the concomitant pursuit of credibility and 
efficient seems puzzling and calls for new regulatory arrangements and innovative 
solutions.
Directions for further research
This book was designed in order to contribute to advance knowledge on the 
regulatory state and regulatory capitalism through the examination of the de facto 
independence of regulators and the consequences of agencification on policy-
making and regulatory outcomes. The study of regulation in practice is, however, 
still in its infancy, as three limitations of this research study illustrate.
(1) To begin with, the question of the real performance of regulators is still 
very much undetermined, both conceptually and empirically. On the one hand, 
at conceptual level, we still lack an intersubjective standard for assessing and 
evaluating the quality of agencies’ regulatory action from an outcome-oriented 
perspective. There is neither consensus on the type of regulatory result that should 
be considered primary (among, for instance, the quality of agencies’ individual 
outputs, in the form of rules or decisions; their effects on the behaviour of the 
regulatees, such as the cases of infringement and litigation; and the macro-impact 
of regulation on the markets, or even on the whole society), nor on the specific 
goals that constitute the notion of IRAs’ regulatory quality (either economic, or 
technical, social, political). On the other hand, empirical evidence continues to be 
mixed, partial and ambiguous. In particular, the problem of developing reliable 
measures of IRAs’ performance remains methodologically unsolved, and with 
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existing data meaningful cross-cases comparisons are extremely difficult to 
execute.2. 
(2) In addition, in Chapters 4 and 5, I examined the consequences of 
agencification for policy-making and for the media evaluation of credibility and 
efficiency. The focus on the de facto independence of IRAs justified this analytical 
decision.  Nevertheless, in a next step, it would be interesting to bridge the gap 
with the literature on policy diffusion, illustrating how regulatory agencies operate 
in a context of interdependence, not only as regards their establishment, but also 
in the execution of their day-to-day regulatory action, namely by investigating 
the implications of the diffusion of ‘best practices’ for the regulatory process 
and regulatory outcomes, either framed as intended or unintended consequences. 
Specifically, one shall expect that the timing, the sequence and the mechanism 
of diffusion will crucially shape the consequences of regulatory governance. 
For instance, early adopters should perform better when one supposes that the 
implementation of regulatory reforms is an incremental phenomenon. But one 
may also suppose that the followers could avoid the negative experiences and 
adopt the most favourable innovations, if they are able to circumvent the take-for-
grantedness of apparent ‘best practices’ that do not ‘travel’ across countries and/or 
sectors; and that processes of reflexive learning from successful experiences are 
plausibly expected to produce better results than dynamics of social emulation.
(3) Finally, a normative concern is becoming urgent, and even more following 
the recent trend towards ‘more regulation’, that is, the need to deal with the 
‘democratic deficit’ of the regulatory state. Further research should investigate 
the conditions under which it is possible (or, respectively, impossible) to ensure 
the new forms of accountability, and, in turn, the legitimacy of regulatory 
governance by IRAs. Seeing that, as it was theoretically argued at the beginning 
of this dissertation and empirically supported later on, the traditional procedures 
for legitimising regulatory governance by IRAs are hardly sustainable in the 
long run, this enterprise calls for the elaboration of new forms of legitimacy 
and accountability, as component of a ‘multi-pronged’ accountability system, 
to complement and qualify their media scrutiny, as presented in Chapter 5. As 
anticipated, a promising venue for improving IRAs’ legitimacy might stem from 
the creation and institutionalisation of networks of regulators. In fact, according 
to the empirical analysis in Chapter 3, it appears that regulatory networks could 
provide agencies with informational, technical, and symbolic resources, while 
they might also constitute potential devices for promoting a reciprocal control 
through horizontal interactions and the social valorisation of virtuous behaviour, 
without compromising their independence.
2. Though the current developments of the COBRA project seem very promising for the study of the 
performances of public sector organisations at large  (see http://www.publicmanagement-cobra.
org/).

appendix the questionnaire
to chapter 3
Introduction
The first part will ask you some general questions about the functioning of your 
agency and its relationships with other actors. In the second section we will ask 
questions about the dynamic and the composition of the management board of 
your agency. Finally, we are interested in the agency’s rule-making process, name-
ly by studying the ‘regulations’ (rules, ordinances, circulars, recommendations, 
communications, advices and so forth) issued by the agency, to which the super-
vised institutions (companies, firms, etc.) should conform.
1 --- questions --- first part (self-determination of preferences): 
 • What proportion of the current employees of the agency’s 
secretariat have previously worked in the public administration?*
 • What proportion of the current employees of the agency’s 
secretariat have previously worked in the private sector?
 • What proportion of the former employees of the agency’s secretariat 
will work in the public administration in the future? 
 • What proportion of the former employees of the agency’s secretariat 
will work in the private sector in the future?
 • What proportion of the employees of the secretariat of the agency 
have accomplished internships in the public administration?
 • What proportion of the employees of the secretariat of the agency 
have accomplished internships in the private sector?
 • The agency asks for the support of the public administration for 
expertise purposes… 
  
 • The public administration asks for the support of the agency for 
expertise purposes…
  
 • The agency asks for the support of the private sector for expertise 
purposes…
  Very infrequently or never   Very frequently
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 • The private sector asks for the support of the agency for expertise 
purposes…
  Very infrequently or  never                                             Very frequently
  
 • Meetings between the agency and the public administration are…
  Very infrequently or  never                                             Very frequently
  
 • Meetings between the agency and the representatives of the private 
sector are…
  Very infrequently or  never                                             Very frequently
  
 • To what extent can the government influence the budget of the 
agency? 
  Not at all                                                                                                                                 Entirely
  
 • To what extent can the parliament influence the budget of the 
agency?
  Not at all                                                                                                                                 Entirely
  
 • To what extent can the public administration influence the budget 
of the agency?
  
 • To what extent can the private sector influence the budget of the 
agency?
  Not at all                                                                                                                                 Entirely
  
 • How far can the government determine the internal organisation of 
the agency?
  Not at all                                                                                                                                 Entirely
  
 • How far can the parliament determine the internal organisation of 
the agency?
  Not at all                                                                                                                                 Entirely
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 • How far can the public administration determine the internal 
organisation of the agency?
  Not at all                                                                                                                                 Entirely
  
 • How far can the private sector determine the internal organisation 
of the agency?
  Not at all                                                                                                                                 Entirely
  
 • Generally speaking, do you consider budgetary resources of the 
agency...
  Largely sufficient                         Completely insufficient
  
 • Generally speaking, do you consider human resources of the 
agency...
  Largely sufficient                         Completely insufficient
  
 • Political parties play an important role when deciding who should 
become a member of the management board of the agency.
  Strongly agree  Strongly disagree
  
 • If yes, are the representatives of the political parties homogenously 
represented in the board?
  Yes            No 
 • How are the powers distributed among the board members?
  Equally distributed            Unequally distributed  
 • The departure of a member of the management board before the 
end of its mandate is: 
  Very rare                                                           Very frequent
  
 • The discussions of the board are generally:
  Very conflicting                                               Very consensual
  
 • The decisions of the board are in effect taken :
  By a majority vote            By consensus                Other :             
2 --- questions --- second part (self-determination of preferences): 
 • When has there been a replacement of the management board’s 
director or chairperson of the agency in the last twenty years? 
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More than one answer is possible.
 1985  1992  1999
 1986  1993  2000
 1987  1994  2001
 1988  1995  2002
 1989  1996  2003
 1990  1997  2004
 1991  1998  2005
 • At the moment, is the director of the board of the agency hired full 
time?
  Yes               No 
  If not, which is the current occupation of the director (more than 
one answer is possible)?
   Public official
   Employee of the Secretariat of the agency
   Member of the Board of the agency
   Employee, executive or manager in the private sector 
   Representative of a producer association
   Representative of a consumer association
   Liberal professional (lawyer etc.)
   Professor, researcher or other academic occupations
   Other :      
  If yes, which was the former occupation of the director (more than 
one answer is possible)?
   Public official
   Employee of the Secretariat of the agency 
   Member of the Board of the agency
   Employee, executive or manager in the private sector 
   Representative of a producer association
   Representative of a consumer association
   Liberal professional (lawyer etc.)
   Professor, researcher or other academic occupations
   Other :      
 • Are board members (except the director) full time hired?
  Yes                No  
  If not, could you approximately distribute 100 percentage points 
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among the following current occupations of the board members 
(more than one answer is possible)? For example, if roughly 1/2 
of board members are professors, write ‘50’ in the corresponding 
space.
Public officials %
Employees of the Secretariat of the agency %
Employees, executives, managers in the private sector %
Representatives of producer associations %
Representatives of consumer associations %
Liberal professionals (lawyers etc.) %
Professors, researchers or other academic occupations %
Others :      %
Æ Total : 100%
  If yes, could you approximately distribute 100 percentage points 
among the following former occupations of the board members 
(more than one answer is possible)? For example, if roughly 1/2 
of board members were professors, write ‘50’ in the corresponding 
space.
Public officials %
Employees of the Secretariat of the agency %
Employees, executives, managers in the private sector %
Representatives of producer associations %
Representatives of consumer associations %
Liberal professionals (lawyers etc.) %
Professors, researchers or other academic occupations %
Others :      %
Æ Total : 100%
   
3 --- questions --- (autonomy of the activity of regulation): 
Could you specify which are the main ‘regulations’ produced by the agency (if 
any)? *
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 1) Who inspired the basic principles of the ‘regulations’ that institutions 
your agency supervise should satisfy? More than one answer is 
possible. If possible, we would appreciate if you could specify who 
the actors are (names of the individuals or organisations).
Participant If possible, could you 
specify the actors?
Agency  secretariat      
Agency manag. board      
Government      
Parliament      
Public administration      
Other indep. agencies      
Producer associations      
Consumer associations      
Liberal professionals      
Academic profession.      
Audit companies      
Supervised institutions      
European Union      
Others:..      
No one      
 2) Who worked out the draft of the ‘regulations’? More than one answer 
is possible. If possible, we would appreciate if you could specify 
who the actors are (names of the individuals or organisations).
Participant If possible, could you 
specify the actors?
Agency  secretariat      
Agency man-
ag. board
     
Government      
Parliament      
Public administration      
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Other indep. agencies      
Producer associations      
Consumer as-
sociations
     
Liberal professionals      
Academic pro-
fession.
     
Audit companies      
Supervised in-
stitutions
     
European Union      
Others:..      
No one      
 3) Who was consulted during the draft preparation of the ‘regulations’? 
More than one answer is possible. If possible, we would appreciate 
if you could specify who the actors are (names of the individuals 
or organisations).
Participant If possible, could you 
specify the actors?
Agency  secretariat      
Agency manag. board      
Government      
Parliament      
Public administration      
Other indep. agencies      
Producer associations      
Consumer 
associations
     
Liberal professionals      
Academic profession.      
Audit companies      
Supervised institutions      
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European Union      
Others:..      
No one      
 4) Who decided the adoption of the ‘regulations’? More than 
one answer is possible. If possible, we would appreciate if you 
could specify who the actors are (names of the individuals or 
organisations).
Participant If possible, could you 
specify the actors?
Agency  secretariat      
Agency manag. board      
Government      
Parliament      
Public administration      
Other indep. agencies      
Producer associations      
Consumer associations      
Liberal professionals      
Academic profession.      
Audit companies      
Supervised institutions      
European Union      
Others:..      
No one      
 5) Who is monitoring the respect of the ‘regulations’ by the institutions 
that you supervise? More than one answer is possible. If possible, 
we would appreciate if you could specify who the actors are (names 
of the individuals or organisations).
Participant If possible, could you specify the ac-
tors?
Agency  secretariat      
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Agency manag. board      
Government      
Parliament      
Public administration      
Other indep. agencies      
Producer associations      
Consumer associations      
Liberal professionals      
Academic profession.      
Audit companies      
Supervised institutions      
European Union      
Others:..      
No one      
 6) Who can decide a sanction in case of non-respect of ‘regulations’ by 
the institutions you supervise? More than one answer is possible. If 
possible, we would appreciate if you could specify who the actors 
are (names of the individuals or organisations).
Participant If possible, could you 
specify the actors?
Agency  secretariat      
Agency manag. board      
Government      
Parliament      
Public administration      
Other indep. agencies      
Producer associations      
Consumer associations      
Liberal professionals      
Academic profession.      
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Audit companies      
Supervised institutions      
European Union      
Others:..      
No one      
Additional remarks …   
Details
Preliminary 
and control 
study
• Interviews: - 6 Face-to-face semi-directive 
interviews 
- 10 Telephone and 25 electronic 
interviews
• Documentation: - Annual agencies reports
- Agencies’ web sites
- Official documents (public 
administrations)
- Official documents (parliamentary 
services)
Survey • Targets: - IRAs’ chairpersons
- Total = 20 (16)
• Waves: - 3 (non-anonymous, by mail and 
email)
• Response rate: - 80%
Aggregated 
outcomes data
• Maximum: - Politicians = 6 ; Regulatees = 6
• Minimum: - Politicians = 2 ; Regulatees = 2
• Mean: - Politicians = 4.06 ; Regulatees = 
4.56
• Median: - Politicians = 4 ; Regulatees = 5
• Mode: - Politicians = 4 ; Regulatees = 5
* In the first wave, the formulation was slightly different.
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Introduction
We are interested in studying the ___ act, which came into force on ___.  We have 
some questions about the decision-making process concerning this legislative re-
vision. Our focus is on the participants (please check the corresponding box). We 
would also appreciate if you could roughly approximate the weight of each actor 
during the corresponding phase of the process (please check a box on the seven-
point scale). If possible, you could also specify the actors (names of persons or 
organisation). More than one answer is possible.
Questions:
 1) Who inspired the basic principles of the new law? 
Participant Approximate weight If possible, 
please speci-
fy the actors
Government Low - - - - - -  High
First Chamber Low - - - - - -  High
Second Chamber, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee FC Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee SC, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Public administration Low - - - - - -  High
Independent agency Low - - - - - -  High
Other agencies or courts Low - - - - - -  High
Employers/producers 
associations 
Low - - - - - -  High
Consumer associations Low - - - - - -  High
Liberal professionals Low - - - - - -  High
Academic experts Low - - - - - -  High
Trade Union Low - - - - - -  High
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Supervised institutions Low - - - - - -  High
European Union Low - - - - - -  High
Others: Low - - - - - -  High
Don’t know/don’t answer
 2) Who conducted preliminary investigations for the new law?
Participant Approximate weight If possible, 
please speci-
fy the actors
Government Low - - - - - -  High
First Chamber Low - - - - - -  High
Second Chamber, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee FC Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee SC, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Public administration Low - - - - - -  High
Independent agency Low - - - - - -  High
Other agencies or courts Low - - - - - -  High
Employers/producers 
associations 
Low - - - - - -  High
Consumer associations Low - - - - - -  High
Liberal professionals Low - - - - - -  High
Academic experts Low - - - - - -  High
Trade Union Low - - - - - -  High
Supervised institutions Low - - - - - -  High
European Union Low - - - - - -  High
Others: Low - - - - - -  High
Don’t know/don’t answer
 3) Who worked out the draft of the new law? 
Participant Approximate weight If possible, 
please speci-
fy the actors
Government Low - - - - - -  High
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First Chamber Low - - - - - -  High
Second Chamber, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee FC Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee SC, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Public administration Low - - - - - -  High
Independent agency Low - - - - - -  High
Other agencies or courts Low - - - - - -  High
Employers/producers 
associations 
Low - - - - - -  High
Consumer associations Low - - - - - -  High
Liberal professionals Low - - - - - -  High
Academic experts Low - - - - - -  High
Trade Union Low - - - - - -  High
Supervised institutions Low - - - - - -  High
European Union Low - - - - - -  High
Others: Low - - - - - -  High
Don’t know/don’t answer
 4) Who was consulted during the draft preparation of the new law?
Participant Approximate weight If possible, 
please speci-
fy the actors
Government Low - - - - - -  High
First Chamber Low - - - - - -  High
Second Chamber, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee FC Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee SC, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Public administration Low - - - - - -  High
Independent agency Low - - - - - -  High
Other agencies or courts Low - - - - - -  High
Employers/producers 
associations 
Low - - - - - -  High
202 regulation in practice
Consumer associations Low - - - - - -  High
Liberal professionals Low - - - - - -  High
Academic experts Low - - - - - -  High
Trade Union Low - - - - - -  High
Supervised institutions Low - - - - - -  High
European Union Low - - - - - -  High
Others: Low - - - - - -  High
Don’t know/don’t answer
 5) Who modified the draft of the new law?
Participant Approximate weight If possible, 
please speci-
fy the actors
Government Low - - - - - -  High
First Chamber Low - - - - - -  High
Second Chamber, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee FC Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee SC, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Public administration Low - - - - - -  High
Independent agency Low - - - - - -  High
Other agencies or courts Low - - - - - -  High
Employers/producers 
associations 
Low - - - - - -  High
Consumer associations Low - - - - - -  High
Liberal professionals Low - - - - - -  High
Academic experts Low - - - - - -  High
Trade Union Low - - - - - -  High
Supervised institutions Low - - - - - -  High
European Union Low - - - - - -  High
Others: Low - - - - - -  High
Don’t know/don’t answer
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 6) Who decided the adoption of the new law?
Participant Approximate weight If possible, 
please speci-
fy the actors
Government Low - - - - - -  High
First Chamber Low - - - - - -  High
Second Chamber, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee FC Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee SC, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Public administration Low - - - - - -  High
Independent agency Low - - - - - -  High
Other agencies or courts Low - - - - - -  High
Employers/producers 
associations 
Low - - - - - -  High
Consumer associations Low - - - - - -  High
Liberal professionals Low - - - - - -  High
Academic experts Low - - - - - -  High
Trade Union Low - - - - - -  High
Supervised institutions Low - - - - - -  High
European Union Low - - - - - -  High
Others: Low - - - - - -  High
Don’t know/don’t answer
 7) Who is monitoring the respect of the new law?
Participant Approximate weight If possible, 
please speci-
fy the actors
Government Low - - - - - -  High
First Chamber Low - - - - - -  High
Second Chamber, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee FC Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee SC, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Public administration Low - - - - - -  High
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Independent agency Low - - - - - -  High
Other agencies or courts Low - - - - - -  High
Employers/producers 
associations 
Low - - - - - -  High
Consumer associations Low - - - - - -  High
Liberal professionals Low - - - - - -  High
Academic experts Low - - - - - -  High
Trade Union Low - - - - - -  High
Supervised institutions Low - - - - - -  High
European Union Low - - - - - -  High
Others: Low - - - - - -  High
Don’t know/don’t answer
 8) Who can decide a sanction in case of non-respect of the new law?
Participant Approximate weight If possible, 
please speci-
fy the actors
Government Low - - - - - -  High
First Chamber Low - - - - - -  High
Second Chamber, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee FC Low - - - - - -  High
Parl. Committee SC, if any Low - - - - - -  High
Public administration Low - - - - - -  High
Independent agency Low - - - - - -  High
Other agencies or courts Low - - - - - -  High
Employers/producers 
associations 
Low - - - - - -  High
Consumer associations Low - - - - - -  High
Liberal professionals Low - - - - - -  High
Academic experts Low - - - - - -  High
Trade Union Low - - - - - -  High
Supervised institutions Low - - - - - -  High
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European Union Low - - - - - -  High
Others: Low - - - - - -  High
Don’t know/don’t answer
Additional questions
 • Do you consider that I should contact any alternative important 
actor or interlocutor?
 • Do you have any additional remarks?
The data matrices
Netbk standard matrix
2 2 2 0 2 3 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
2 2 2 0 1 0 0 0
2 3 2 1 0 0 3 3
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Netco standard matrix
2 3 3 1 1 3 2 2
3 1 0 0 1 3 1 0
3 3 2 1 0 0 3 2
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Swebk standard matrix
0 1 2 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 3 3
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
2 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
Sweco standard matrix
2 3 3 1 3 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2 2 1 1 0 0 3 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Swibk standard matrix
0 0 1 1 2 2 0 0
0 0 0 1 2 3 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 2 1 2 0 0 0
3 3 3 1 2 0 3 2
the questionnaire to chapter 4 207
2 1 0 1 0 0 2 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 1 2 0 2 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Swico standard matrix
2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 3 3 0 0
2 0 1 1 2 2 0 0
1 2 3 1 1 1 0 0
3 3 3 1 2 1 3 3
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 3
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Details
Preliminary 
and control 
study
• Interviews: - 1 face-to-face semi-directive interview
- 6 electronic interviews
• Documentation: - Agencies’ annual reports
- Agencies’, public administrtion’s, 
  and parliaments’ Websites
- Drafts of the new pieces of legislation
- Expert commissions’ reports
- Parliamentary debates
- Specialised press articles
- Agencies’, public administration’s, 
  and parliaments’ press releases
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Survey • Targets: - Relevant IRAs services; civil servants in  
   charge; chancellor, chairperson, members 
   of the parliamentary comissions in charge 
- Total = 69 (42)
• Waves: 3 (non-anonymous, by mail and email)
• Response rate: 62%
Aggregated 
outcome 
data
• Maximum: 168
• Minimum: 4
• Mean: 36.68
• Median: 30
• Mode: 11
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 United Kingdom – Competition Commission
Country Newspaper Date Type Credibility Efficiency
uk DaT 12.1.2006 c 0 -1
uk DaT 25.1.2006 c 0 0
uk FiT 25.1.2006 c 0 0
uk FiT 25.1.2006 c 0 0
uk ThI 25.1.2006 e 0 -1
uk ThT 25.1.2006 c 0 0
uk FiT 28.1.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThT 13.2.2006 c 0 0
uk FiT 14.2.2006 c 0 0
uk FiT 16.2.2006 e 0 1
uk ThI 16.2.2006 c 1 0
uk ThT 16.2.2006 c 0 1
uk ThG 25.2.2006 i 0 1
uk ThT 25.2.2006 c 0 1
uk ThT 5.3.2006 c 0 1
uk ThG 8.3.2006 i 0 -1
uk ThI 8.3.2006 c 0 0
uk DaT 10.3.2006 c 0 -1
uk DaT 10.3.2006 c 0 1
uk FiT 10.3.2006 e 0 -1
uk FiT 10.3.2006 e 0 -1
uk FiT 10.3.2006 i 0 -1
uk FiT 10.3.2006 i 0 -1
uk FiT 10.3.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThG 10.3.2006 c 0 0
uk ThI 10.3.2006 c 0 1
uk ThI 10.3.2006 e 0 -1
uk ThT 10.3.2006 i 0 -1
uk ThT 10.3.2006 c 0 0
uk ThT 10.3.2006 i 0 1
uk ThI 11.3.2006 e 0 -1
uk DaT 12.3.2006 i 0 0
uk DaT 12.3.2006 c 0 -1
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uk ThT 12.3.2006 i/c 0 -1
uk ThT 12.3.2006 i 0 -1
uk ThG 14.3.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThI 14.3.2006 e 0 -1
uk DaT 16.3.2006 i 0 -1
uk FiT 16.3.2006 c 0 0
Country Newspaper Date Type Credibility Efficiency
uk ThT 16.3.2006 e 0 -1
uk DaT 31.3.2006 i 0 0
uk ThG 31.3.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThI 31.3.2006 i 0 -1
uk ThI 31.3.2006 i 0 -1
uk ThI 31.3.2006 i 0 -1
uk ThI 31.3.2006 i 0 0
uk ThI 31.3.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThI 31.3.2006 i 0 1
uk ThG 1.4.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThT 23.4.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThT 24.4.2006 i 0 1
uk DaT 25.4.2006 c 0 -1
uk DaT 26.4.2006 i 0 1
uk DaT 28.4.2006 c 0 -1
uk FiT 28.4.2006 c 0 0
uk ThG 28.4.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThG 28.4.2006 i 0 0
uk ThT 28.4.2006 c 0 1
uk ThT 29.4.2006 c 0 0
uk FiT 6.5.2006 c 0 -1
uk DaT 10.5.2006 i 0 1
uk DaT 10.5.2006 i 0 1
uk DaT 10.5.2006 c 0 -1
uk DaT 10.5.2006 c 0 1
uk FiT 10.5.2006 c 0 1
uk ThG 10.5.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThI 10.5.2006 c -1 0
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uk ThT 10.5.2006 c 0 0
uk ThT 10.5.2006 c 0 -1
uk FiT 11.5.2006 c 1 0
uk ThI 11.5.2006 c 0 1
uk FiT 12.5.2006 c 0 0
uk FiT 16.5.2006 i 1 -1
uk ThG 17.5.2006 c 0 -1
uk DaT 23.5.2006 i 0 -1
uk FiT 26.5.2006 c 0 0
uk FiT 26.5.2006 e 0 1
uk FiT 28.5.2006 c 0 0
uk ThT 28.5.2006 i/c 0 -1
uk ThI 1.6.2006 c 0 0
uk DaT 10.6.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThT 13.6.2006 i 0 0
uk DaT 14.6.2006 e 0 -1
uk FiT 14.6.2006 c 0 -1
uk FiT 16.6.2006 i 0 0
uk ThI 16.6.2006 c 0 1
uk FiT 20.6.2006 i 0 -1
Country Newspaper Date Type Credibility Efficiency
uk DaT 26.6.2006 i 0 0
uk FiT 3.7.2006 c 0 0
uk DaT 4.7.2006 i 0 0
uk ThG 4.7.2006 i 0 0
uk DaT 16.7.2006 c -1 0
uk ThG 18.7.2006 c 0 -1
uk DaT 10.8.2006 c 0 0
uk FiT 12.8.2006 i 0 0
uk ThI 12.8.2006 i 0 0
uk ThI 12.8.2006 c -1 0
uk ThT 18.8.2006 i 0 1
uk FiT 19.8.2006 i 0 0
uk ThG 19.8.2006 i 0 0
uk ThT 23.8.2006 i 0 1
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uk FiT 25.8.2006 i 0 1
uk DaT 8.9.2006 i 0 0
uk ThG 8.9.2006 i 0 -1
uk ThI 8.9.2006 e 0 -1
uk ThI 8.9.2006 c 0 0
uk ThT 8.9.2006 i 0 0
uk DaT 9.9.2006 c 0 0
uk FiT 23.9.2006 c 0 0
uk ThT 25.9.2006 c 1 0
uk ThG 26.9.2006 c 0 0
uk ThT 26.9.2006 i 1 0
uk ThT 26.9.2006 c 1 0
uk ThI 30.9.2006 i 0 0
uk DaT 1.10.2006 i 0 0
uk ThT 14.10.2006 i/c 0 -1
uk DaT 15.10.2006 c 0 -1
uk FiT 20.10.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThI 20.10.2006 c 0 -1
uk FiT 8.11.2006 c 0 0
uk ThG 11.11.2006 i 0 -1
uk DaT 19.11.2006 i 0 -1
uk DaT 19.11.2006 c 0 0
uk ThI 30.11.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThI 30.11.2006 i 0 0
uk ThT 30.11.2006 c 0 0
uk ThG 1.12.2006 i 0 1
uk ThI 1.12.2006 c 0 -1
uk ThT 2.12.2006 i 0 0
uk ThT 3.12.2006 i/c 0 1
uk ThI 5.12.2006 e 0 0
uk ThT 10.12.2006 c 0 0
uk ThT 10.12.2006 i 0 1
uk DaT 11.12.2006 c 0 0
uk ThI 13.12.2006 e 1 0
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Country Newspaper Date Type Credibility Efficiency
uk ThT 17.12.2006 i 0 0
uk DaT 31.12.2006 c/i 0 0
uk DaT 6.1.2007 c 0 -1
uk DaT 7.1.2007 c 0 0
uk ThG 20.1.2007 e 0 0
uk DaT 23.1.2007 c 1 0
uk ThG 23.1.2007 c 1 0
uk DaT 24.1.2007 c 0 0
uk DaT 24.1.2007 c 0 0
uk FiT 24.1.2007 c 0 1
uk FiT 24.1.2007 c 0 -1
uk FiT 24.1.2007 i 0 0
uk FiT 24.1.2007 i 0 0
uk ThG 24.1.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThG 24.1.2007 e 0 -1
uk ThG 24.1.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThI 24.1.2007 c 0 0
uk ThI 24.1.2007 c 1 0
uk ThI 24.1.2007 i 0 0
uk ThI 24.1.2007 e 0 0
uk ThT 24.1.2007 e 0 1
uk ThT 24.1.2007 c 0 1
uk ThG 25.1.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThT 28.1.2007 c 0 0
uk DaT 29.1.2007 c 0 0
uk ThG 31.1.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThG 7.2.2007 c 0 -1
uk DaT 8.2.2007 i 0 -1
uk DaT 8.2.2007 c 0 1
uk FiT 8.2.2007 i 0 0
uk ThG 8.2.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThI 8.2.2007 i 0 0
uk ThG 9.2.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThT 9.2.2007 i 0 1
uk ThT 18.2.2007 c 0 0
uk ThI 20.2.2007 e 0 0
uk FiT 27.2.2007 c 1 0
uk ThI 27.2.2007 c 0 1
uk ThG 1.3.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThI 21.3.2007 c 0 -1
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uk ThG 31.3.2007 i 0 1
uk ThT 31.3.2007 i 0 0
uk DaT 1.4.2007 i 0 0
uk ThT 1.4.2007 c 0 1
uk ThT 1.4.2007 c 1 1
uk FiT 2.4.2007 c 0 1
uk DaT 3.4.2007 i 0 0
uk ThI 3.4.2007 c 0 0
Country Newspaper Date Type Credibility Efficiency
uk FiT 5.4.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThG 9.4.2007 c 1 -1
uk FiT 11.4.2007 c 0 0
uk ThG 11.4.2007 i 0 0
uk ThT 11.4.2007 c 0 0
uk DaT 12.4.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThG 12.4.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThI 12.4.2007 i 0 -1
uk DaT 16.4.2007 i 0 1
uk ThI 18.4.2007 i 0 1
uk ThI 20.4.2007 e -1 0
uk DaT 26.4.2007 c 0 -1
uk FiT 27.4.2007 i 0 0
uk FiT 27.4.2007 c 1 0
uk FiT 3.5.2007 c 0 0
uk ThT 5.5.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThT 5.5.2007 c/i 0 -1
uk ThT 5.5.2007 c/i 0 -1
uk DaT 6.5.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThG 8.5.2007 i 1 0
uk ThT 19.5.2007 c 0 -1
uk FiT 25.5.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThG 25.5.2007 i 0 0
uk ThI 25.5.2007 c 1 -1
uk ThI 25.5.2007 c 0 0
uk ThT 25.5.2007 i 0 1
uk ThG 28.5.2007 e 0 0
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uk FiT 11.6.2007 c 1 0
uk FiT 15.6.2007 c 0 1
uk FiT 22.6.2007 c 0 0
uk ThG 22.6.2007 i 0 -1
uk DaT 23.6.2007 i 0 1
uk ThI 10.7.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThG 16.7.2007 c 1 0
uk FiT 4.8.2007 c 0 0
uk ThT 4.8.2007 c 0 0
uk ThI 7.8.2007 e 0 -1
uk DaT 9.8.2007 c 0 1
uk FiT 10.8.2007 c 0 0
uk ThG 10.8.2007 c 0 0
uk ThI 10.8.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThT 10.8.2007 c 0 1
uk ThT 10.8.2007 c 0 1
uk ThT 12.8.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThG 20.8.2007 e 0 0
uk ThI 20.8.2007 c 0 0
uk DaT 22.8.2007 i 0 1
uk FiT 23.8.2007 i 0 0
Country Newspaper Date Type Credibility Efficiency
uk ThG 23.8.2007 c -1 1
uk DaT 24.8.2007 c 0 0
uk FiT 24.8.2007 i 0 0
uk FiT 24.8.2007 c 0 0
uk FiT 24.8.2007 i 0 0
uk ThG 24.8.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThI 24.8.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThI 24.8.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThT 24.8.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThT 24.8.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThG 25.8.2007 e 0 -1
uk DaT 29.8.2007 c 0 -1
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uk ThG 30.8.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThI 31.8.2007 i 0 1
uk ThG 8.9.2007 i 0 1
uk FiT 14.9.2007 i 0 1
uk ThT 16.9.2007 i 1 -1
uk FiT 17.9.2007 i 0 0
uk ThI 21.9.2007 c 0 1
uk ThG 22.9.2007 c 0 1
uk ThI 22.9.2007 c 0 0
uk ThT 22.9.2007 c 0 0
uk FiT 26.9.2007 i 0 1
uk ThI 27.9.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThI 1.10.2007 e 0 -1
uk DaT 3.10.2007 c 0 -1
uk DaT 3.10.2007 c 0 -1
uk FiT 3.10.2007 c 0 0
uk FiT 3.10.2007 c 0 1
uk ThG 3.10.2007 c 0 1
uk ThG 3.10.2007 e 0 0
uk ThI 3.10.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThT 3.10.2007 c 0 0
uk ThT 3.10.2007 c 0 1
uk DaT 4.10.2007 c 0 -1
uk FiT 4.10.2007 i 0 1
uk FiT 4.10.2007 c 0 0
uk ThG 4.10.2007 i 0 1
uk ThG 4.10.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThG 4.10.2007 c 0 0
uk ThG 4.10.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThI 4.10.2007 c 0 1
uk ThT 4.10.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThI 5.10.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThT 7.10.2007 c 0 0
uk ThG 8.10.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThG 8.10.2007 e 0 0
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uk ThI 12.10.2007 c 0 -1
Country Newspaper Date Type Credibility Efficiency
uk FiT 19.10.2007 e 0 1
uk DaT 20.10.2007 e 0 -1
uk ThG 29.10.2007 c 0 0
uk DaT 31.10.2007 e 0 1
uk FiT 31.10.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThT 31.10.2007 i 0 1
uk DaT 1.11.2007 c 0 0
uk DaT 1.11.2007 i 0 0
uk DaT 1.11.2007 c 0 0
uk DaT 1.11.2007 c/i 0 -1
uk FiT 1.11.2007 c 0 -1
uk FiT 1.11.2007 e 0 1
uk FiT 1.11.2007 c 0 0
uk FiT 1.11.2007 i 0 -1
uk FiT 1.11.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThG 1.11.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThG 1.11.2007 e 0 -1
uk ThG 1.11.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThG 1.11.2007 c 0 0
uk ThI 1.11.2007 c 0 1
uk ThI 1.11.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThI 1.11.2007 c 0 0
uk ThT 1.11.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThT 1.11.2007 c 0 0
uk ThG 2.11.2007 i 0 -1
uk FiT 3.11.2007 c 0 0
uk ThG 3.11.2007 i 0 1
uk DaT 4.11.2007 c 0 0
uk ThT 4.11.2007 c 0 0
uk ThT 4.11.2007 c 0 1
uk ThT 4.11.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThI 8.11.2007 c 0 1
uk DaT 11.11.2007 c 1 0
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uk FiT 17.11.2007 c 0 -1
uk ThT 29.11.2007 c 0 0
uk ThI 4.12.2007 i 0 -1
uk ThI 8.12.2007 c 0 0
uk ThI 8.12.2007 e 0 -1
uk ThT 10.12.2007 i 0 1
uk DaT 21.12.2007 c 0 0
uk FiT 21.12.2007 e 0 -1
uk ThG 21.12.2007 c 0 0
uk ThG 21.12.2007 e 0 0
uk FiT 22.12.2007 i 0 0
uk DaT 27.12.2007 i 0 -1
uk DaT 27.12.2007 i 0 -1
Switzerland – Competition Commission
Country News Date Type Credibility Efficiency
ch Tag 7.1.2006 c 0 -1
ch Tag 7.1.2006 e 0 -1
ch NZZ 8.1.2006 c 0 -1
ch Tag 10.1.2006 i/c -1 -1
ch Tag 10.1.2006 c -1 0
ch Tag 11.1.2006 i/c 0 -1
ch Tag 13.1.2006 i 0 0
ch NZZ 14.1.2006 i 0 0
ch Tag 14.1.2006 i -1 -1
ch NZZ 22.1.2006 c 0 0
ch Tag 31.1.2006 i/c 0 1
ch NZZ 8.2.2006 c 0 -1
ch NZZ 10.2.2006 c 0 -1
ch Tag 15.2.2006 i 0 0
ch NZZ 17.2.2006 c 0 0
ch NZZ 25.2.2006 c 0 -1
ch LeT 28.2.2006 c 0 -1
ch Baz 2.3.2006 c 0 -1
ch Bun 31.3.2006 c 0 0
ch NZZ 31.3.2006 c 0 -1
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ch Tag 31.3.2006 c 0 -1
ch Tag 1.4.2006 c 0 -1
ch Baz 5.4.2006 e -1 -1
ch NZZ 5.4.2006 c 0 -1
ch Tag 5.4.2006 c 0 0
ch LeT 5.4.2006 e 0 -1
ch Baz 11.4.2006 c 0 1
ch Bun 11.4.2006 c -1 1
ch NZZ 11.4.2006 c 0 1
ch NZZ 11.4.2006 e 0 -1
ch Tag 11.4.2006 c 0 0
ch NZZ 16.4.2006 c -1 1
ch Baz 27.4.2006 c 0 0
ch Bun 6.5.2006 c 0 0
ch LeT 23.5.2006 c 0 0
ch Bun 10.6.2006 c 0 0
ch Tag 10.6.2006 c 0 -1
ch Bun 12.6.2006 c 0 0
ch NZZ 20.6.2006 c 0 -1
ch NZZ 20.6.2006 i 0 -1
ch NZZ 30.6.2006 c 0 0
ch Tag 1.7.2006 c 0 0
ch NZZ 5.7.2006 c -1 -1
ch Tag 8.7.2006 i 0 -1
ch Tag 11.7.2006 e 0 0
ch Baz 12.7.2006 c 0 0
ch Tag 12.7.2006 C 0 0
Country News Date Type Credibility Efficiency
ch LeT 3.8.2006 i 1 0
ch LeT 5.8.2006 c 0 -1
ch LeT 12.9.2006 c 0 -1
ch Bun 14.9.2006 c 0 0
ch Baz 15.9.2006 c/i 0 -1
ch NZZ 21.9.2006 c 0 1
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ch LeT 23.9.2006 i 0 -1
ch NZZ 4.10.2006 c 0 0
ch Bun 6.10.2006 c 0 0
ch Tag 6.10.2006 c 0 0
ch Tag 7.10.2006 c 0 -1
ch NZZ 12.10.2006 c -1 0
ch NZZ 22.10.2006 i 0 1
ch Tag 27.10.2006 c 0 -1
ch TrG 7.11.2006 c 0 0
ch 24H 8.11.2006 c 0 -1
ch Baz 11.11.2006 c -1 -1
ch Tag 11.11.2006 c 0 0
ch 24H 24.11.2006 i 0 1
ch NZZ 26.11.2006 c 0 1
ch Tag 28.11.2006 i 0 1
ch NZZ 29.11.2006 c 0 0
ch Tag 29.11.2006 e 0 1
ch 24H 23.12.2006 c -1 0
ch Tag 3.1.2007 i 0 -1
ch 24H 9.1.2007 i 0 -1
ch Baz 9.1.2007 c 0 0
ch Tag 9.1.2007 c 0 0
ch Tag 12.1.2007 c 0 0
ch Tag 12.1.2007 c 0 -1
ch Baz 13.1.2007 c 0 0
ch LeT 13.1.2007 c 0 -1
ch LeT 13.1.2007 e 0 -1
ch TrG 13.1.2007 e 0 -1
ch TrG 13.1.2007 c 0 0
ch Baz 15.1.2007 c 0 1
ch Baz 15.1.2007 e 0 0
ch Bun 15.1.2007 c 0 1
ch NZZ 16.1.2007 c 0 0
ch LeT 16.1.2007 c 0 -1
ch Baz 20.1.2007 c 0 0
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ch Baz 1.2.2007 c 0 0
ch 24H 10.2.2007 c 0 1
ch NZZ 10.2.2007 c 0 0
ch TrG 10.2.2007 c 0 1
ch Tag 13.2.2007 c 0 -1
ch Tag 13.2.2007 i 0 -1
ch LeT 16.2.2007 c 0 -1
Country News Date Type Credibility Efficiency
ch 24H 17.2.2007 c 0 1
ch Baz 17.2.2007 c 0 1
ch Bun 17.2.2007 e 0 1
ch NZZ 17.2.2007 e 0 -1
ch NZZ 17.2.2007 c 0 1
ch Tag 17.2.2007 c 0 1
ch Tag 17.2.2007 c 0 1
ch TrG 17.2.2007 e 0 -1
ch TrG 17.2.2007 i 0 0
ch NZZ 18.2.2007 c -1 -1
ch LeT 23.2.2007 c 0 1
ch LeT 24.2.2007 i 0 -1
ch LeT 24.2.2007 c 0 -1
ch NZZ 2.3.2007 c 0 1
ch Tag 3.3.2007 c 0 0
ch NZZ 4.3.2007 c 0 0
ch NZZ 7.3.2007 c 0 0
ch Tag 17.3.2007 i 0 -1
ch Tag 17.3.2007 i 0 -1
ch Tag 20.3.2007 c 0 1
ch 24H 21.3.2007 c 0 1
ch TrG 21.3.2007 c 0 1
ch NZZ 23.3.2007 c 0 0
ch Tag 27.3.2007 c 0 0
ch LeT 7.4.2007 i 1 0
ch LeT 23.4.2007 c 0 -1
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ch 24H 24.4.2007 i 0 0
ch Tag 30.4.2007 c 0 1
ch NZZ 3.5.2007 c 0 0
ch Tag 7.5.2007 c 0 1
ch 24H 12.5.2007 c 0 -1
ch Baz 12.5.2007 c 0 0
ch Baz 12.5.2007 c 0 0
ch Bun 12.5.2007 c 0 -1
ch NZZ 12.5.2007 c 0 1
ch Tag 12.5.2007 c 0 1
ch LeT 12.5.2007 e 0 0
ch TrG 12.5.2007 i 0 1
ch Bun 26.5.2007 c 0 0
ch Baz 30.5.2007 c 0 -1
ch Bun 30.5.2007 c 0 0
ch NZZ 30.5.2007 c 0 1
ch NZZ 30.5.2007 c 0 0
ch Tag 30.5.2007 c 0 0
ch Tag 2.6.2007 c 0 1
ch Tag 2.6.2007 i 0 0
ch LeT 8.6.2007 i 0 0
Country News Date Type Credibility Efficiency
ch LeT 11.6.2007 i 0 1
ch NZZ 16.6.2007 c 0 0
ch Baz 22.6.2007 c 0 1
ch Tag 22.6.2007 i 0 0
ch Tag 30.6.2007 c/i 0 -1
ch NZZ 7.7.2007 c 0 0
ch NZZ 7.7.2007 c 0 0
ch Tag 7.7.2007 c 0 0
ch NZZ 20.7.2007 c 0 1
ch Tag 20.7.2007 c 0 1
ch 24H 23.7.2007 c -1 -1
ch TrG 23.7.2007 c -1 -1
ch TrG 23.7.2007 e 0 -1
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ch Baz 27.7.2007 c 0 1
ch NZZ 27.7.2007 c 0 0
ch Tag 27.7.2007 c 0 0
ch Bun 22.8.2007 c 0 0
ch Tag 22.8.2007 c 0 1
ch Bun 23.8.2007 c 0 0
ch Bun 23.8.2007 c 0 -1
ch Bun 23.8.2007 c 0 -1
ch NZZ 28.8.2007 c 0 -1
ch NZZ 1.9.2007 c 0 1
ch NZZ 2.9.2007 c 0 0
ch Baz 3.9.2007 c 0 0
ch Bun 3.9.2007 c 0 0
ch LeT 4.9.2007 c 0 0
ch LeT 4.9.2007 c -1 0
ch Baz 5.9.2007 c 0 0
ch Baz 5.9.2007 c 0 0
ch Bun 5.9.2007 e 0 -1
ch Bun 5.9.2007 c/i 0 -1
ch NZZ 5.9.2007 c 0 0
ch NZZ 5.9.2007 c 0 0
ch NZZ 5.9.2007 c -1 0
ch Tag 5.9.2007 c 0 1
ch Tag 5.9.2007 i 0 -1
ch LeT 5.9.2007 c 0 0
ch LeT 5.9.2007 e -1 -1
ch TrG 5.9.2007 e 0 -1
ch Baz 6.9.2007 i 0 -1
ch Baz 6.9.2007 c/i 0 -1
ch NZZ 6.9.2007 i 0 1
ch LeT 7.9.2007 c 0 -1
ch Baz 8.9.2007 e 0 0
ch NZZ 9.9.2007 c 0 -1
ch Bun 10.9.2007 i 0 -1
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Country News Date Type Credibility Efficiency
ch LeT 10.9.2007 i 0 -1
ch 24H 15.9.2007 i 0 0
ch LeT 27.9.2007 c 0 -1
ch Tag 18.10.2007 c -1 -1
ch LeT 19.10.2007 c -1 0
ch LeT 20.10.2007 i 0 -1
ch NZZ 24.10.2007 c 0 1
ch NZZ 7.11.2007 c/i 0 0
ch Tag 7.11.2007 i 0 -1
ch LeT 7.11.2007 c -1 -1
ch Tag 17.11.2007 c 0 -1
ch Baz 23.11.2007 c 0 0
ch Baz 27.11.2007 c 0 0
ch Bun 27.11.2007 e 0 0
ch Bun 27.11.2007 c 0 1
ch NZZ 27.11.2007 c 0 0
ch NZZ 27.11.2007 c 0 -1
ch LeT 27.11.2007 c 0 -1
ch Baz 28.11.2007 c 0 0
ch Bun 28.11.2007 c 0 1
ch NZZ 28.11.2007 c 0 -1
ch TrG 28.11.2007 c 0 0
ch NZZ 7.12.2007 c 0 0
ch LeT 7.12.2007 c -1 -1
ch Tag 12.12.2007 c 0 0
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